A Catalogue of Failures: G8 Arms Exports and Human Rights Violations
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AI INDEX: IOR 30/003/2003
19 May 2003
Amnesty International is opposed to the transfer of military, security, and police equipment, technology and expertise that can reasonably be assumed will contribute to human rights violations in the receiving country, and has consistently appealed to the G8 governments to abide by this principle which they have long recognised but never fully implemented.
As this study shows, the governments of the G8 authorize unparalleled levels of arms and related assistance to the world's armed forces and law enforcement agencies, but often to those who persistently commit gross human rights violations - equipping them, emboldening them and rewarding them.
At least two thirds of all global arms transfers in the years 1997-2001 came from five members of the G8.(1) The top supplier of weapons to the world was the United States, accounting for 28 per cent of global arms transfers. Second in line was Russia, with seventeen per cent. Third was France at 10 per cent, followed by Britain at 7 per cent and then Germany with 5 per cent.
For 25 years, US law has stipulated that weapons should be kept out of the hands of governments that will use them to abuse human rights. Yet US commercial arms sales have frequently had the opposite effect. US arms sales directed to developing countries have quadrupled from 2000 to 2001, many of them with forces that persistently abuse human rights. In addition, US military aid is currently furnished to more than 30 countries identified by the US itself as having a "poor" human rights record, or worse.
Almost ten years ago, the USA, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United Kingdom (UK) signed up, with other participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to the Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers. These Principles commit participating states to "avoid transfers which would be likely to be used for the violation or suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms." However, an examination of the practices of these seven powerful states falls tragically short of their agreed benchmark.
More recently, France, Germany, Italy and the UK, as Member States of the European Union (EU), committed themselves to the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (adopted 8 June 1998 by the EU Council). Canada, the USA and many other states have declared their general support for the principles of the EU Code. Although it leaves the final decision on exports to be made by national governments, the Code does stipulate that arms should not be exported to countries where there is a clear risk they might be used for internal repression or where serious violations of human rights have occurred. However, evidence so far suggests that this promise is not being fully kept. A binding international arms trade treaty grounded in principles of international law, especially human rights and humanitarian law, rather than an ad hoc voluntary Code would provide potential victims around the world with much greater protection, but only the G8 leaders could decide on that course.
There are almost no legal or regulatory requirements amongst the G8 states for the inclusion of international human rights or humanitarian law content in the various military, security, and police force training services that they provide to states in all world regions. Even where human rights criteria are referred to in laws governing arms export and foreign military and security aid, they are often loosely interpreted. In particular, inadequate attention is given during export decision-making by governments to the long lifecycle of most types of arms and security equipment and technology - and hence to the prolonged risk of abuse.
Instead, it is short term profit making and political advantage that guide the bulk of the international arms trade. Currently, the G8 governments allow companies to engage in secretive, loosely-regulated, international trade in weapons, technologies, and training. Using the excuse of "commercial confidentiality", the provision of meaningful and timely information to legislators, media and the general public about arms export decisions is lacking, thus undermining parliamentary scrutiny and public accountability of the trade. In addition, companies in the G8 countries have been allowed to establish foreign production facilities, sometimes under licensing arrangements with foreign companies where the licences and their impact are not subject to effective human rights conditionality or oversight. This practice allows G8 companies to evade domestic arms control restrictions by establishing production in foreign countries which have weaker arms export controls.
Some companies in the G8 countries have been involved in the supply of security equipment and devices whose prime practical purpose is for torture or ill-treatment. In many more cases, companies supply devices designed for security and crime control purposes but which in reality can easily lend themselves to torture and ill-treatment. For example, US, Russian, French and German companies are amongst the two hundred and thirty companies in 35 countries making, distributing or brokering the supply of electro-shock weapons. G8 governments do not have in place effective laws and regulations to prevent the export of such equipment to foreign security forces that are known to abuse legitimate devices to inflict torture.
The European Commission, following concerns expressed in the European Parliament, recently proposed a Trade Regulation for adoption by the European Council.(2) This will, if enacted un-amended, ban the import, export and brokering by companies and individuals within all 15 EU member states of items that the Commission has categorized as "torture equipment" including electro-shock stun belts, leg irons, thumb-cuffs and shackles. The proposed Trade Regulation will also require that all EU member states introduce controls on the export of items such as stun batons, stun guns and riot control agents such as tear gas. Amnesty International welcomes the introduction of this Trade Regulation and calls on other governments around the world to introduce similar prohibitions and controls to protect human rights.
In July 2000, six of Europe's largest exporters of arms - France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK - signed up to the Framework Agreement Concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the European Defence Industry. This agreement is designed to loosen controls on arms exporting companies within Europe but could undermine arms export controls since it does not provide for adequate transparency or monitoring of exports to non-participating countries.
Who Armed Iraq?
In the shadow of the massive US-led military build-up against Iraq in late 2002 and early 2003, evidence emerged that all the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, as well as several East European states, had supplied arms and related materials to the Iraqi government.
Before the 1991 Gulf War, at least 20 countries were accused of involvement in building up the technological basis for different Iraqi weapons programs, in particular the chemical weapons program.(3) In December 2002, the Iraqi government submitted a 12,000-page dossier to the UN naming companies from Britain, France, Russia, the USA and China as suppliers of weapons technology to Iraq. However, by the time of writing, no conclusive evidence had come to light showing that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction.
Seventeen British companies named as having supplied Iraq with nuclear, biological, chemical, rocket and conventional weapons technology are to be investigated and could face prosecution. The dossier claims that 24 US firms sold Iraq weapons including nuclear and rocket technology and that some "50 subsidiaries of foreign enterprises conducted their arms business with Iraq from the US". Germany was shown to be Iraq's biggest arms-trading partner with 80 companies selling weapons technology. Although most of the trade ended in 1991 at the outbreak of the Gulf War, Russia, China and reportedly Portugal traded arms with Iraq after 1991 in breach of UN resolutions.(4)
In August 1991, UN arms inspectors - UNSCOM - compiled a list of companies which had supplied technology to the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons program. The list was not made public, but governments can obtain information on the involvement of companies from their own country upon special request to the UN.(5) The German, US, UK, French, Russian, and Chinese governments should release the list of companies which supplied technology to the Iraqi chemical, biological and other weapons programs.
German companies have been subjected to criminal investigations on suspicion of violation of the arms embargo against Iraq. The UK and the USA have been accused of supporting the Iraqi chemical and biological weapons program through the sale of chemicals and technology.
"British firms sold thousands of kilos of the basic ingredients of nerve and mustard gas to Iraq and Iran last year, the Department of Trade confirmed yesterday... the Department's figures show that 2,000 kilograms of methyl phosphonyl difluoride has been exported to Iraq. This is the basic ingredient of the nerve gas Sarin... British firms also sold 38,000 kilograms of dimethyl methylphosphonate and other Sarin ingredients to Iraq." Andrew Beitch, the Guardian, 6 April 1984.
Four years after this article was published, in March 1988, an estimated 5,000 people were deliberately killed and thousands wounded as a result of chemical weapon attacks by Iraqi forces on the town of Halabja in Northern Iraq. Most of the victims were civilians, many of them children and women.
Conventional arms supplied by many states to the Iraqi armed forces, such as artillery, tanks, military vehicles, fighter planes and helicopters, have reportedly been used to commit grave human rights violations.
For example, in April 1999, violent clashes were reported between protesters and security forces when the latter attempted to prevent Shi'a Muslims from taking part in Friday prayers at the al-Hikma Mosque in Saddam City in Baghdad. These clashes reportedly left scores of protesters dead. An eyewitness told Amnesty International that ''when people were prevented from prayers they started shouting slogans against the authorities. Some protesters were armed and started shooting at the security forces but the latter were using tanks against the population and many people, including children, were killed."(6)
In 1994 Iraqi military and special forces continued to launch deliberate and indiscriminate armed attacks on civilian targets, including the settlements of al-Jibayesh, al-'Uwaili and al-Saigal in the predominantly Shi'a Muslim southern marsh region of the country. Scores of families were displaced after their homes were destroyed or after fleeing to escape artillery shelling.(7) In February 1992, President Saddam Hussein had said that Shi'a Muslims who participated in the March 1991 uprising should be machine-gunned for treason.(8)
In addition to supplies from countries named above, spare parts for Iraq's military were smuggled from Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics, despite a UN arms embargo. Although such transfers would have been illicit under international law, in many cases the arms sales appear to have been either authorized by government agencies or undertaken by state-owned arms export agencies.(9)
The ease with which companies, dealers and brokers - often with the collusion of government officials - have violated UN arms embargoes, highlights the need for a worldwide arms trade treaty with legally enforceable national export controls.
Increasingly global markets, transport links and communication networks provide opportunities for arms traffickers to circumvent national arms and security equipment controls. Since the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, United Nations investigations into the violation of UN Security Council arms embargoes have shown, often in graphic detail, how international networks of arms brokers and traffickers have fuelled human rights crises. Only extra-territorial and transparent control by powerful states over arms brokering and trafficking has any chance of properly regulating the arms trade and stopping the kind of "third country" deals that result in transfers of arms contributing to gross human rights abuses. The USA has an extra-territorial law on arms brokering which, although imperfectly applied and undermined in covert gun running operations by US government agencies, does appear to deter arms trafficking by US nationals abroad. But Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the UK do not even have such laws.(10)
Arms brokering should be prohibited unless brokers pass strict eligibility criteria before being declared a 'fit and proper' person to carry out brokering activities. The US already has such a register but none of the other G8 countries has one. Moreover, by simply being on such a register, a broker should not be authorized to conduct any particular arms deals they want without first applying for an individual licence whose issuance is subject to strict human rights and other criteria. Such a system would assist enforcement agencies to target their efforts in a more informed way and provide for effective accountability.
Illicit firearms trafficking first appeared on the G7 agenda during the 1994 Economic Summit in Halifax when leaders highlighted the economic and social costs of crime. At the June 1997 G8 Summit in Denver, illicit small arms and light weapons trafficking had become a stated priority. The issue was discussed again at the May 1998 G8 Summit in Birmingham where it was agreed to develop an "international instrument" to combat firearms trafficking.
Although scant attention was given to the control of other conventional arms by the G8, the focus on small arms and light weapons did help the development of the UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, which it signed in 2002. This Protocol was attached to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. However, it has limited applicability to the supply of state armed forces and law enforcement agencies.(11)
In July 2001, the US and Russian governments allied with those of China and some in the Non Aligned Movement to significantly weaken the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Specifically, they objected to the inclusion of any explicit clauses to uphold international human rights and humanitarian legal responsibilities in relation to arms export control.(12) Nevertheless, governments did agree in the UN Programme to "assess applications for export authorisations according to strict national regulations and procedures that cover all small arms and light weapons and are consistent with the existing responsibilities of States under relevant international law, taking into account in particular the risk of diversion of these weapons into the illegal trade" (13) But will the governments of the G8 give effect to this promise?
Before 2001, the G8 had little engagement with peace and human rights issues, but at the June 2001 Summit in Italy the G8 leaders began to address conflict prevention as a policy concern especially for Africa. (14) This Plan was elaborated further at the 2002 G8 Summit in Calgary, but the Summit adopted little in the way of concrete steps and clear principles to make a serious improvement to human rights protection. In the run-up to the Calgary summit, Amnesty International made demands in three areas where courageous and decisive action by the G8 leaders could have an enormous impact:
· controlling the international arms trade;
· controlling the trade in 'conflict diamonds' and other minerals resources from armed conflict areas which fund the supply of arms and contribute to human rights abuses;
· supporting efforts to make police across the world more accountable and trained to respect human rights
Amnesty International and others highlighted the failure of governments from seven of the G8 states - the USA, the Russian Federation, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Canada - to regulate arms transfers that contribute to grave human rights abuses in developing countries, particularly in Africa.
In response, the G8 proposed to "support efforts by African countries and the United Nations to better regulate the activities of arms brokers and traffickers and to eliminate the flow of illicit weapons to and within Africa." These efforts are to include (i) "developing and adopting common guidelines to prevent the illegal supply of arms to Africa"; (ii) "providing assistance in regional trans-border co-operation to this end", and (iii) "supporting African efforts to eliminate and remove antipersonnel mines."
The 2002 G8 Summit's Action Plan for Africa failed to recognise the responsibility of the G8 governments themselves for the sale and transfer of arms to African countries, including by dealers, brokers and transport agents who are nationals and residents of the G8 countries. The Action Plan rather included a call for African nations to regulate illicit arms sales.(15) The G8 proposed international guidelines and border co-operation for dealing with the massive suffering and destruction caused by the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in Africa. But these measures are clearly not enough. In response to direct threats to their own states, the G8 Summit agreed a "global partnership to prevent terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction". This included a set of tough principles, a host of practical measures, and a $20 billion budget to stem nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons. Yet no similar partnership was offered to Africa to curb small arms and associated military items.
During 2001-03, the G8 governments have participated in the OSCE and "Wassenaar Arrangement", where Japan was also represented, to develop "best practice guidelines" for the export and control of small arms and light weapons. These guidelines include references to the need to avoid arms transfers that will be used for human rights violations, but are not binding on the participating states.(16)
What is needed is a genuine commitment and action from each of the G8 governments to enact powerful new arms control laws consistent with international human rights standards and humanitarian law that will bring an end to their complicity in this shameful catalogue of failures.
2. United States of America
2.1 Arms Sales and Export Controls
The United States is the world's leading arms exporter, with arms
sales agreements for new (non-surplus) weapons in 2001 totaling more
than $12 billion and actual deliveries valued at nearly $10 billion.(17)
The US has two separate systems for selling arms abroad, a government-to-government
sales program (Foreign Military Sales, FMS) and licensed commercial
sales. Some of these sales are subsidized by a special financing program
known as Foreign Military Financing.(18) Data released by the US in
June 2002 indicate that whereas sales negotiated through the Pentagon
declined from 2000 to 2001, commercial sales reversed a two-year downward
trend and nearly doubled from 2000 to 2001. Significantly, US commercial
sales directed to developing countries quadrupled in that same time
period (from 2000 to 2001).(19)
Despite a weak world economy, trends may well show an increase in
total US arms sales when the data are collected for 2002. The budget
allocation to finance foreign military sales rose from $3.57 billion
in FY 2001 to $4.11 billion for FY 2003.(20) A supplemental request
for fiscal year 2002 defense appropriations (debated alongside the
fiscal year 2003 budget) included another $372.5 million in counterterrorism-related
FMF for a wide range of countries including Oman, Nepal, Ethiopia,
and Djibouti.(21) U.S. military aid has also been on the rise to Colombia,
the Philippines, Georgia, and Indonesia, which have redefined their
long-standing insurgencies as "counter-terrorism" activities.(22)
Philippines received 30,000 M-16 rifles (plus ammunition) from stocks
of US excess equipment.(23)
Israel
The U.S. government has continued to sell sophisticated weaponry to
Israel—including 52 F-16 fighter jets and six Apache attack helicopters
in 2001- despite the fact that these weapons facilitate the disproportionate
use of force and lead to violations of human rights.(24) On 9 April
2003, eyewitnesses reported that Israeli Apache attack helicopters
and F16 Jets flew over Gaza city. The helicopters then fired a missile
at a Palestinian car; after the first missile apparently failed to
explode a second missile was fired at the same car killing two people.
According to a local eyewitness, "After the attack dozens of residents
from the area went outside to investigate and see if they could help
in some way, when the helicopters came back and fired two additional
missiles at the crowd." This second attack killed five Palestinians,
including two children; 13 year-old Ahmad Hamsa Al-Ashraf and 16 year-old
Sami Hasan Qassem, both from the Zeitouna neighborhood. According
to Gazan doctors, the bodies of all five were riddled with shrapnel
from the missiles. 47 other Palestinians were wounded in the attack,
five of whom were admitted to intensive care.(25)
In 2002, Amnesty International called on all governments to suspend
all transfers of the military equipment being used by the Israeli
Defence Forces to commit human rights violations.(26) This includes
components and weapons such as combat aircraft, helicopters, tanks,
small arms, light weapons, and ammunition including air-to-surface
rockets. The suspension should remain in force until the Israeli authorities
demonstrate that the equipment will not be used to commit human rights
violations in Israel and the Occupied Territories.
Earlier this year, the Bush Administration requested approval of $4.41
billion to finance foreign military sales, as part of the fiscal year
2004 budget.(27) The requested funding includes a $60 million increase
in military aid to Israel, $15 million to Yemen in conjunction with
the Global War Against Terrorism, $10 million to Nepal to fight counter-insurgency;
and $110 million to Colombia to support counter-terrorism efforts
and to protect the Cano Limon oil pipeline partly owned by Occidental
Petroleum.(28) A supplemental appropriations bill to cover the cost
of the Iraq war includes an additional $1 billion in financing for
military equipment, together with another $1.06 billion to be split
among 18 other small country allies, including Jordan, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and Colombia.
In theory, for 25 years US law has sought to keep weapons out of the
hands of governments that will use them to abuse human rights. In
1978 Congress established a principled prohibition against the transfer
of weapons to governments that engage in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of human rights. In 1996 it established tight new regulations
on arms brokering,(29) and unauthorized retransfer of weapons to another
country are likewise prohibited by law.(30) The US currently observes
more than 20 arms embargoes and in 1999, Congress passed the International
Arms Sales Code of Conduct Act requiring the administration to pursue
a multilateral agreement on uniform, strict export standards. This
bill also includes provisions that require the State Department to
include in its annual report on human rights the extent to which states
meet the Code's criteria.(31) Although many of these measures contain
important loopholes that have impeded implementation or otherwise
limited effectiveness, they do provide a legal framework to constrain
arms transfers that put human rights at risk.
Over the past year, however, there have been several disturbing efforts
to weaken or waive several of the provisions that constrain the sale
of arms to countries that have a poor record of human rights. In March
2002 the Administration introduced an emergency supplemental defense
authorization bill that sought to lift human rights restrictions in
place for Colombia and Indonesia, despite continuing human rights
abuses perpetrated by those wielding arms supplied by the state. Through
so-called "counter-terrorism" funding, the US Administration sought
to extend Indonesia's eligibility for military and police training,
and it sought direct support for Colombia's operations against armed
rebels.(32)
Colombia
The Colombian armed forces have been a relatively large recipient
of US military rifles and machine guns despite the high probability
that these arms are persistently used to facilitate human rights violations.
During 2001 more than 4,000 Colombian civilians were killed for political
motives. Paramilitary groups acting with the active or tacit support
of the Colombian armed forces carried out the bulk of such killings.(33)
In April 2001 paramilitaries massacred approximately 40 peasant farmers
along the river Naya that runs between the Departments of Valle del
Cauca and Cauca. The paramilitaries apparently entered the area immediately
after detachments with the Third Brigade of the Colombian Army, Brigada
III, left the area, pointing to a strong coordination between
paramilitaries and the Colombian security forces.(34) The paramilitaries
were able to carry out the massacre despite the heavy militarization
of the area and the fact that the authorities had been repeatedly
alerted to an imminent paramilitary attack.(35)
US military assistance has included aid to the Colombian Marine Infantry.
In February 2000, paramilitaries massacred local inhabitants in the
municipality of El Salado, Department of Bolívar, over the course
of several days whilst military units attached to the Colombian Navy's
Primera Brigada de Infantería de la Marina (First Marine Infantry
Unit) not only failed to prevent the massacre but also reportedly
set up a roadblock to prevent humanitarian organizations from getting
through to the village. According to information received by Amnesty
International, 200 paramilitary gunmen raided the village of El Salado,
killing 36 people, including a six-year-old child. Many victims were
tied to a table in the village sports field and subjected to torture,
including rape, before they were stabbed or shot dead.(36)
During this last year, restrictions imposed on the supply of weapons
to Pakistan after its 1998 testing of nuclear bombs were waived,(37)
and security assistance to Pakistan has skyrocketed from $3.5 million
in fiscal year 2001 to a current authorization of some 1.3 billion.(38)
Human rights advocates are also concerned about a review of defense
trade policy being undertaken by the Bush Administration. Publicly
available information suggests that the administration is considering
policy changes that would relax controls on defense exports to key
allies and potentially limit Congressional oversight of the arms trade.
Because the strength of these allies' export controls varies widely,
such changes may open new avenues for the diversion of U.S. technology
and weapons.(39)
Uzbekistan
In 2003 Uzbekistan received a 258 per cent increase in funds available
to purchase military equipment from US suppliers. The US is providing
$25 million for military assistance and $18 million for "border security
assistance" for Uzbekistan, now described as "one of our foremost
partners in the fight against terrorism".(40) The $25 million, from
the Foreign Military Financing program, is for "lethal and non-lethal"
equipment including communication equipment, airfield upgrades and
training, as well as uniforms, equipment and counter-insurgency training
for Uzbek Special Forces. It also covers helicopters and aircraft,
some leased from Ukraine, for border patrols. In return, the US can
maintain military bases in Uzbekistan.
The US has also offered another $1 million in policing assistance,
to set up an anti-narcotics unit to stem the flow of heroin and other
drugs from Afghanistan, a trade that it says is helping to finance
terrorist activity.
Yet at the same time, the US government has noted the "unsatisfactory"
state of human rights in Uzbekistan, accusing the Uzbek government
of using concerns about terrorist activity to "crack down broadly"
on political opposition groups and human rights activists. "There
are regular reports of human rights violations on the part of law
enforcement bodies," it says. Amnesty International also noted the
"unabated" reports of ill-treatment and torture by Uzbek law enforcement
officials of alleged supporters of banned Islamist opposition parties
and movements.(41)
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Kenya and Ethiopia also saw important
increases in their US military spending allowances. Restrictions on
military assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan were waived.(42) Budget
requests for the next fiscal year (2004) include substantial increases
for Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan. They also include an additional
$60 million for Israel, despite the US State Department's recent assertion
that helicopters, fighter aircraft, anti-tank missiles, and flechettes
have been used to commit human rights abuses.(43)
Cluster bombs used in Iraq
Although the US and UK authorities said that they would do everything
possible to protect the Iraqi people, hundreds of civilians were reportedly
killed in Iraq. Some were victims of cluster bombs; some died in attacks
in disputed circumstances.
The scenes at al-Hilla's hospital on 1 April 2003 showed that something
terrible had happened. The bodies of the men, women and children brought
to the hospital were punctured with shards of shrapnel from cluster
bombs. Injured survivors told reporters how the explosives fell "like
grapes" from the sky, and how bomblets bounced through the windows
and doors of their homes before exploding. A doctor at al-Hilla's
hospital said that almost all the patients appeared to be victims
of cluster bombs.
Some of the cluster bombs reportedly dropped from the air by US forces
on a civilian area of al-Hilla appeared to be of the type BLU97 A.
Each canister contains 202 small bomblets the size of a soft drink
can. These cluster bombs scatter and spray over a large area about
the size of two football fields. At least 5 per cent of the bomblets
do not explode on impact, turning them into de facto anti-personnel
mines as they continue to pose a threat to people, including civilians,
who come into contact with them. This is the same air-dropped weapon
that caused severe humanitarian problems in Afghanistan and Kosovo.
Dark green-grey ball-shaped BLU61 bomblets were also filmed and reported
seen around al-Hilla, Najaf and Baghdad. In addition, the US forces
fired M77 multiple rocket launched salvos, each with 644 cluster submunitions
that spread over a 100 to 200 metre area.
Following a report by the US-based Violence Policy Center exposing
past sales of long-range .50 caliber sniper rifles to Osama Bin Laden,
the US State Department has recently decided to suspend the commercial
export of these high-powered rifles that can pierce armoured vehicles
and bring down aircraft. The State Department had already approved
the export of 75 such weapons this year, though only 16 had already
been delivered before the decision to suspend further sales.(44)
Afghanistan
By July 2002, the US had militarily defeated the Taleban and Al-Qaeda
forces and observed a United Nations embargo on arms to Afghanistan
agreed in December 2000, except for the new Government of Afghanistan
and the International Security Assistance Force.
It should be recalled that, according to its officials, the US Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) gave over US$2 billion in light weapons
to Mujahideen groups in Afghanistan fighting the Soviet invasion between
1979 and 1989. Much of this was channelled via the Pakistan Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI). This US aid continued openly until 1991, despite
the fact that thousands of Afghan civilians were deliberately and
arbitrarily killed by Mujahideen fighters, who were also responsible
for widespread beatings, abductions and rapes. Other outside powers,
including Iran and China, also supplied the Mujahideen groups with
munitions, and they captured arms from the former Soviet Union. By
late 2001, the weapons markets in the Taleban-held towns and villages
on the Afghan border with Pakistan and Iran, were still reportedly
doing a heavy trade in arms, including US and other missiles, and
Kalashnikovs, made under licence in China and Egypt.
It came to light in 2002 that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former Afghan
prime minister (1992-1995) whose faction received considerable US
assistance, has now been placed on a US list of terrorists associated
with Al-Qaeda.
2.2 Exports of Security Equipment
In a few cases, US companies have been involved in the marketing of
devices that easily lend themselves to use in torture or ill-treatment
- such as electro shock stun guns, belts, leg-irons and thumbcuffs.
In many more cases, US companies produce devices designed for security
and crime control purposes but which in reality can easily lend themselves
to torture. In some cases US companies have provided this equipment
to foreign security forces that are known to abuse legitimate devices
to inflict torture. Amnesty International has compiled lists of more
than 80 US companies involved in the manufacture, marketing and export
of the type of weapons and other equipment that can be used to torture
over the past decade.
In Russia, for example, sixteen-year-old Andrei Osenchugov was reportedly
beaten, whipped and subjected to electric shocks over a three-day
period in July 2002 in order to force him to confess to a robbery
that he says he did not commit. From 1999-2001, the Commerce Department
approved licenses for more than $4 million dollars of discharge type
arms (for example stun guns and shock batons) to Russia. Between 2000-2001,
the Department of Congress approved US export licenses for more than
$15 million in restraint equipment, $30 million in discharge type
arms and $185 million in all crime control exports.
Recent changes to the laws and the administrative rules that govern
the export of such equipment are intended to limit its possible use
for torture and ill-treatment. Current policy now restricts export
of crime control items on a broad range of human rights concerns(45),
and an interim rule issued by the Department of Commerce in September
2000 significantly improved the regulation of crime control items
that could be used in torture by requiring export license and disaggregated
reporting of electric shock and restraint items. In the last session
of Congress (2002), the House International Relations Committee passed
the Lantos-Hyde Amendment. The amendment, initiated by Representative
Tom Lantos (D-CA) and Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL), limits the
export of crime control equipment when the foreign government has
repeatedly engaged in acts of torture. It also restricts the exports
of equipment that Amnesty International considers to be inherently
cruel, inhuman or degrading such as thumbscrews, weighted gloves,
and electro-shock stun belts. (46)
2.3 Military and Police Training
The US government trains more than 100,000 foreign police and soldiers
from more than 150 countries each year in US military and policing
doctrine as well as war-fighting skills.(47) Throughout the decade
of the 1990s, the record of one US military training institution,
in particular, attracted public scrutiny in the US - the US Army's
School of the Americas (SOA) offered training and education to Latin
American soldiers, some of whom went on to commit human rights violations,
and in 1996 training manuals advocating torture, extortion, kidnapping
and execution were brought to light. No one has ever been accountable
for these manuals or for the behaviour of SOA graduates, but in 2001
the school was renamed "the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security
Cooperation" (WHINSEC) and its curriculum was changed to include coursework
in human rights and humanitarian law.
SOA-WHINSEC is well known, but in fact it is only one small part of
a vast and complex network of US programs for training foreign military
and police forces. Some of this education and training is conducted
inside the US, funded either by the foreign government itself or with
US loans and grants. In addition to the WHINSEC, there are approximately
275 military schools and installations in the US, offering over 4100
courses. Tens of thousands of students train in these programs, but
far more receive some US training in their own nations through a variety
of programs, including military exercises. Funding requests for International
Military Education and Training (IMET), one of several US foreign
military training programs, have risen to $91.7 million for budget
year 2004, an increase of nearly 60 per cent since 2001.(48)
The US has imposed various restrictions on eligibility for military
training, but these are not always rigorously observed. For example,
because of Congressional concerns about Guatemala's continuing human
rights performance, Guatemala is eligible only for non-lethal training
supplied through a program known as Expanded-IMET. However, the current
US Foreign Military Training Report indicates that 95 Guatemalan Army
troops received light infantry training, which is generally supplied
by US Special Forces.(49)
2.3.1 Private Military Services
In recent years the US government has frequently hired or authorized
private military consultants to train foreign police forces and military
troops. According to a detailed scholarly study, US companies trained
militaries in more than 24 countries during the 1990s. This list includes
Angola, Bolivia, Bosnia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial
Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Hungary, Kosovo, Peru, Liberia, Malawi,
Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Taiwan and Uganda
(Sudanese forces).(50)
In many cases the US Defense, Justice or State Departments hire private
corporations to implement training projects that the government has
designed. For example, the US State Department has been using Military
Professional Resources International (MPRI) and Logicon to train countries
involved in its Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Similarly,
many training missions related to the US-funded war on the illegal
drugs trade are being contracted privately.(51)
This stepped up "outsourcing" by the US government for training is
attributable most principally to the overall growth in military and
police training taken on by the United States in the past decade;
US forces are unable to meet all of the training missions that various
parts of the US government support around the world. On the supply-side,
post-cold war reductions in the size of the US military forces led
to a glut of experienced military personnel looking for work. Long-established
professional military companies expanded operations in the 1990s and
new firms sprang up to meet this business demand. The principal companies
providing training to foreign forces are MPRI, Vinnell Corporation,
Carlyle Group, BDM, Defense Forecasters International, DynCorp, Science
Applications International Corporation, Texas Instruments and Booz-Allen
& Hamilton.
In addition to working for the US government to carry out training
programs, private companies may also contract directly with foreign
governments to train military, security, or police forces in programs
run independent of the US government. To do so, firms must first apply
and be granted an export license by the State Department's Office
of Defense Trade Controls.(52) Companies ranging from Boeing to MPRI
apply for training contracts - Boeing for training on weapons systems
it manufactures, and MPRI for training in tactics and operations.
Sometimes persistence is rewarded. According to the New York Times,
the State Department twice refused to grant MPRI authorization to
work with the government of Equatorial Guinea because of its poor
human rights record. After two years of lobbying, though, the company
was finally given permission to help build a coast guard to protect
the oil-rich coastal waters being explored by Exxon Mobil. The State
Department balked, however, at MPRI's request to help Guinea build
its police and military forces.(53)
In 1975 Vinnell Corporation became the first private American company
to receive permission from the State Department to run an independent
training program for a foreign security force—in this case the Saudi
Arabian National Guard.(54) Vinnell's most recent contract is for
1998-2003, and the firm currently has around 1400 civilian employees
in Saudi Arabia.(55) Several other foreign militaries and police forces
have hired private US companies for training. According to a news
report in early 2000, DynCorp Inc. and MPRI were then completing contracts
for logistical support and training of Colombian police and counterinsurgency
forces, while at least six US firms had set up shop in Latin America,
in anticipation of lucrative new contracts related to the United States'
$1.6 billion military aid program for Colombia.(56)
The level of public transparency and accountability is significantly
higher for US government programs that employ private contractors,
such as the Africa Crisis Response Initiative, than it is for private
commercial transactions between foreign entities and private US firms,
such as the Colombian contracts. Information on private transactions
is scarce. There is no requirement that the State Department publish
an annual listing of precisely whom it has licensed (and therefore
authorized) to provide private military or security training, for
what purpose, where and with which security unit. Nor does Congress
know who is training whom, since the State Department is only required
to notify lawmakers of contracts valued at $50 million or more - a
threshold so high that very few, if any, training operations are likely
to surpass it.
In April 2003 the US Department of State awarded the multi-million
dollar contract for policing Iraq to DynCorp, a private company with
a dubious policing record. DynCorp was seeking to recruit active or
recently retired policemen and prison guards and "experienced judicial
experts". DynCorp personnel contracted to the United Nations police
service in Bosnia were accused of buying and selling prostitutes,
including a girl as young as twelve years old. Several DynCorp employees
were also accused of videotaping the rape of one of the women. When
Dyncorp employee Kathy Bolkovac spoke out publicly about the sex ring
she was dismissed by the company for drawing attention to their abuses,
but won her case against the company in a British employment tribunal
in November.(57)
Military training is now a multimillion dollar global business, and
most companies involved in the business have Internet web sites relating
their corporate histories and advertising their services, including
perhaps some information on their past or even current deployments.
If so, this source might be about the only public information available,
as commercial training contracts are exempt from disclosure under
the Freedom of Information Act, the law that forces the government
to review and release documents to the public. Military companies
can and have blocked public access to information on commercially
negotiated contracts by arguing that even the most basic information
is proprietary.
In terms of official oversight of private training contracts, the
only remote possibility is that an official from the local US embassy's
security assistance office will make a field visit to inquire into
how a training program is being carried out. Oversight varies from
embassy to embassy, depending on the prominence of the issue. However,
the fact that quite a few defense attaches have past relationships
with the retired military personnel who now work for private military
companies, likely further undermines serious oversight.
There are no legal or regulatory requirements for the inclusion of
any international human rights or humanitarian law content in military,
security, or police force training contracted privately. In addition,
the "Leahy Law" requirement that trainees be vetted for prior human
rights abuses does not apply to training purchased with the buyer's
own money (but it does apply to US taxpayer-funded programs employing
private firms, such as ACRI).
Taken together, these realities lead many to fear that training by
private US security companies might contribute to human rights violations
by providing sophisticated military training to abusive personnel,
by not including any human rights or humanitarian law emphasis in
the training, or perhaps even by imparting tactics and doctrine that
are not standard for US forces.
Private Military Training in Croatia
Military Professional Resources International (MPRI) received a two-year
contract with Croatia in September 1994 (later extended for two more
years) for the "Democracy Transition Assistance Program" (DTAP). This
privately contracted program between MPRI and the Croatian government
was supposed to ensure that the Croatian military could meet the necessary
human rights and democracy standards for admission into NATO's "Partnership
for Peace" program. DTAP was to focus on classroom teaching of issues
such as the difference between military and civil systems of law and
proper military conduct toward civilians during and after conflict.
No classes on tactics or on the use of weaponry were to be taught.
In 1995 the Croatian military launched two surprisingly successful
military operations, called "Flash" and "Storm." In these operations,
the army exhibited new communications techniques and movements that
did not resemble its usual Warsaw Pact military tactics.(58) In addition,
Croatian troops committed a number of serious human rights abuses.(59)
In May 1996 Amnesty International sent a letter to the head of MPRI
and to the Secretary of State, raising several questions about the
human rights situation in Croatia (and Bosnia, where MPRI was also
training forces), and inquiring about MPRI's human rights training.
"The fact that MPRI's initial training was followed by human rights
violations [in Croatia], raises serious questions about the effectiveness
of the human rights component of the training offered by MPRI." The
letter asked specifically about the firm's system of vetting trainees,
the content of the training (in particular inquiring whether the training
raised the issue of gender, given widespread use of rape in the war),
and how the impact and effectiveness of the training were monitored.(60)
Amnesty International USA staff subsequently met with Ed Soyster,
the International Vice President of MPRI, who said that there was
no specific human rights training included in the training provided
to the Croatian forces. He also made the point, that as a private
organization, MPRI was not accountable to Amnesty International or
to anyone else for the content of their training programs.
The following year Amnesty USA filed a series of requests for information
about the human rights components of the MPRI's Croatia contracts
with the US State Department's Office of the Special Representative
for Military Stabilization in the Balkans. The group received no useful
information.(61)
2.4 Specific Recommendations
The government of the USA should actively promote the development
of an international "Arms Trade Treaty" with provisions for arms export
control based upon respect for international law, especially international
human rights and humanitarian law. The US government should also takes
steps to strengthen efforts to address the trade in small arms, light
weapons and security equipment, and to prevent the use of indiscriminate
weapons [for details on these measures, see the final recommendations
at the end of this report]
In addition, the US government should:
· Suspend US arms sales, transfers and military aid to countries whose
armed forces are likely to use them to commit human rights abuses,
such as Israel, Colombia and Uzbekistan, until the danger of misuse
has been proven to be very low. ·
Amend sections 36(b)(1)(D) and 36(c)(1) of the Arms Export Control
Act to require the Secretary of State to evaluate the likelihood that
the articles included in the proposed sale will be used to commit
human rights abuses. · Amend sections 116(d) and/or 502B of the Foreign Assistance
Act to require that the annual Country Report on Human Rights
include a chapter summarizing the use of U.S. defense articles in
human rights abuses. · Refine the language in
Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act to underscore the importance
of human rights norms in determining eligibility for participation
in arms transfers programs.
· Include in all US training programs for foreign security forces
sufficient international human rights and humanitarian law educational
components based on internationally recognized legal standards and
conducted by academic and/or non-governmental experts in the field.
· Disclose and better monitor the activities of private military companies
that it has authorized (i.e., given an export license) or hired to
train foreign militaries.
· Make explicit the applicability of human rights and vetting criteria
for training activities undertaken by US contractors, and require
that private contractors include human rights and humanitarian law
training in their courses. · Reintroduce the Export Administration Act with the 2002 Lantos-Hyde
Amendment included to limit US exports of equipment that can be used
in torture. The Amendment limits exports of crime control equipment
especially susceptible to abuse to countries that practice torture
and bans export of certain types of crime control equipment which
are inherently cruel, inhuman, or degrading.
· Sign, ratify, implement and monitor the 1997 Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty,
and ban the use, production, stockpiling, sale, transfer or export
of anti-personnel landmines.
· Ratify the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing
of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related
Materials.
3. Russian Federation
3.1 Introduction
Despite the break up of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation remains
one of the world's top three producers of military, security and police
(MSP) equipment and is still the world's second most important supplier
of light weapons and ammunition after the United States.(62) The military
industrial complex in Russia encompasses over 2,500 state defence
contractors of which about 1,100 enterprises are licensed for the
production of weapons and war materiel.(63)
Increasingly private companies are engaged in the MSP industry supplying
such products as personal protection equipment or surveillance systems,
or offering a full range of security services such as VIP protection
or training of security forces. Often they have links into, or ex-staff
from, the Russian security services, police or army.(64)
3.2 Arms Production
Russian companies make a wide range of weaponry and internal security
technologies for purposes such as riot control, surveillance and prisoner
restraint and control. These range from batons, shields and chemical
incapacitants to shotguns firing a diverse range of incapacitating
ammunition.(65) Russia has also imported security equipment and training
from many countries including Israel, Germany, Canada, USA and Australia.(66)
The Israeli company Elite Alpha Firearms Training Ltd claims to have
trained Russian special forces.(67). Russia has engaged in significant
programmes of research in "advanced non-lethal" weapons for disabling
protestors using radio frequency, laser, kinetic, acoustic and biochemical
systems (68) and in recent years some of this research has been in
co-operation with a variety of agencies in the United States(69) and
Germany.(70) Russian forces have also used "less lethal" weapons -
most notoriously in the breaking of the Moscow theatre siege in October
2002, when they used a calmative agent based on the chemical fentanyl.
Approximately 204 hostages died from the effects of the gas.(71) It
has also been reported that Russian forces have used an ultrasound
device during the conflict in Chechnya.(72)
Russia has manufactured electroshock batons since at least the early
1990s and has an institute dedicated solely to the testing of them.(73)
The March Joint Stock Co, Moscow produces the Scorpion, Malvina and
Arnold electroshock batons ranging from 70-100,000 volts, also 45,000
volt stun guns and a 45,000 volt electroshock briefcase.(74). Advanced
pulsed electro-shock stun batons were imported from America in the
mid nineties.(75) Small arms and light weapons continue to be manufactured
largely in state owned factories.
3.3 Arms Export Control
Russia epitomizes the problems of controlling the use of arms and
security equipment to prevent human rights violations. It is a major
producer, a major exporter and a major victim of illicit proliferation
of light weapons. Russia already has one of the most bureaucratically
efficient systems of marking and tracking small arms. Its centralized
systems mean that all trade is either officially sanctioned or it
is illicit. The major flaw is that there is virtually no reference
to controlling exports in terms of respect for human rights and international
humanitarian law, and no national legal criteria or oversight mechanisms
to achieve this goal.
Nevertheless, the Russian Federation agreed in 1991 to the OSCE Principles
Governing Conventional Arms Transfers which do include respect
for human rights, and more recently the Russian government supported
the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons. On December
1, 2000, Russia set up the Committee on Military-Technical Co-operation
of the Russian Federation to develop a more effective export control
mechanism for military supplies. The Russian Government has also agreed
to submit to the OSCE appropriate data on small arms and light weapon
transfers in accordance with the agreed nomenclature. These are important
shifts in policy that need to be recognized but, as is shown by the
other G8 states, it is not sufficient to have a policy recognizing
human rights - the main challenge is to abide by that policy.
In recent years, Russia has still ranked in the top three weapons
exporters, despite the poor state of some of its production facilities.
The majority of Russia's military exports are carried out by the state
controlled marketing organization, Rosoboronexport, which has agents
in 36 countries.(76) Exports in 2002 set a new post-Soviet record
of $4.7 billion.(77) In 2002 Rosoboronexport exported 85 per cent
of Russia's weapons. Five Russian companies also exported directly
to overseas customers.
Despite efforts by Rosoboronexport to control all exports from Russia,
the number of private companies able to export independently is set
to increase. Because of the severe financial situation in Russia,
its armed forces cannot afford to replace aging equipment and the
only way many companies can survive is to export. This is leading
to direct competition between the state exporter and private companies.
It is extremely difficult to obtain official information about Russia's
arms exports, and the Russian committee on military-technical cooperation
with foreign countries has even developed a list of information relating
to exports that will be banned from publication.(78)
Russia's main export markets are China and India. Other important
markets are Vietnam, Algeria, Yemen, Kuwait, Greece, Burma, Malaysia
and Sudan - mostly countries with long-standing and acute human rights
problems.
3.4 Small Arms
Russian small arms and light weapons have proliferated to many of
the world's conflict zones. The USA remains an important market for
sporting and hunting versions of military weapons as well as ammunition.
The Kalashnikov assault rifle (AK47 - a term which covers the vast
range of some 160 variants) is the world's most widely distributed
single weapon model and has a huge impact on human rights especially
within Africa and the Middle East. Copies of the AK47 are produced
in at least 19 countries (including China, Bulgaria, Finland, Yugoslavia,
Iraq and Romania), but it is no longer made in Russia. Its legendary
reliability has led to estimates of the number of AK47s in circulation
to be as high as 100 million(79), and it is held in the inventories
of more than 80 countries, with the Russian Federation itself possessing
ten different versions.(80) The price of these rifles varies enormously.
The official Russian export price is $100 but models can be worth
from $200-1000 on the illicit market, yet in areas of high availability
such as South Africa, it can be as low as $15.(81)
The fact that so many countries are producing copies means that it
is and will always be extremely difficult to determine exact provenance
of manufacture of any weapon used in human rights violations, unless
and until Russia shares its gun serial numbers with the international
community. Estimates on available stockpiles of Russian small arms
and light weapons are also difficult. The Swiss Small Arms Survey
for example calculates that Mozambique alone has six million or more
AK47s, roughly half the number thought to be in the whole of the Russian
federation, and Afghanistan is thought to have at least 10 million
in circulation.(82) What is more certain is that in the difficult
economic climate which now prevails in Russia and its former client
states, these stockpiles leak and become substitute currencies for
army personnel, many of whom have not been paid for many months.
Examples of recent Russian small arms, light weapons and ammunition
exports include automatic grenade launchers made by KBP to Afghanistan,
Iraq, Chad and Angola(83); ammunition from LVE Plant to Afghanistan,
Cambodia, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea.(84) Over the last
3 years Russia has exported over 9,000 modern, NATO calibre AK-101
and AK-102 assault rifles to Indonesia, with further exports ongoing.(85)
3.5 Larger weapons
Increasingly Russia is signing military-technical cooperation agreements
as a first step towards increasing exports. Currently Russia has such
agreements with a number of countries including Algeria, Syria, Yemen,
UAE, Kuwait, Sudan, Egypt, Jordan and Libya. (86)
In early 2003 Russian officials visited Pyongyang to discuss military
upgrades for tanks, and supplies of night vision equipment and ammunition.(87)
It has recently delivered military equipment and training to Myanmar
under a deal worth $130 million.(88) In 2002 Russia signed an agreement
worth some $150 million to supply Ethiopia with a range of military
equipment including combat helicopters, armoured personnel carriers
and ammunition for infantry weapons.(89) It has also recently supplied
helicopters to Nigeria.(90) Russia is increasing its exports and cooperation
with Indonesia, exports include armoured personnel carriers, combat
helicopters and military training.(91) All of these are countries
where Amnesty International has documented human rights violations
by armed forces
Russia uses arms exports to directly fund the re-equipping of its
armed forces which otherwise it could not afford to do. The promotion
of Russian MSP equipment has increased hugely in recent years. There
are MSP fairs held regularly not only in Moscow but new fairs such
as Ural Expo Arms, OTTV Omsk and Moscow Aerospace. International arms
fairs used to see one stall of Russian weaponry marketed by the state
export organization. In recent years Russian companies have exhibited
at numerous international arms fairs including Malaysia, Colombia,
Turkey, France, Greece, Pakistan, South Africa and United Arab Emirates.
As well as weaponry, financial services for defence enterprises have
also been offered at the fairs, for example by Interprombank at DSA
in Malaysia and MAKS in Russia.(92)
3.6 Foreign Licenced Production
As well as exporting directly, Russia is increasingly embracing licensed
production abroad as a way of earning badly needed revenue. Where
foreign licenced production is established in states with weak arms
export controls, the chances of such arms falling into the hands of
human rights abusers is greatly increased. In Soviet times the production
of Russian small arms and other weaponry took place in most Warsaw
Pact countries but was often unregulated. Recently Russia has been
trying to claw back some of this intellectual property and potential
earnings by threatening lawsuits against unlicensed manufacture of
its designs.
For example the Bulgarian Arsenal Plant was pressured to purchase
a licensed production agreement for the Kalashnikov assault rifle.(93)
Bulgaria has been the source of such Kalashnikovs by international
arms traffickers supplying governments and rebel groups who commit
human rights violations. It has also been reported that Bazalt, the
Russian company that developed the RPG-7 rocket launcher, has pressed
Pakistan Ordnance Factories as well as Bulgarian and Greek manufacturers
to enter into agreements in relation to unlicensed copies.(94) At
a recent arms fair in Abu Dhabi it was reported that Rosoboronexport
was actively seeking out unauthorised copies of Russian military hardware.(95)
Russia is also actively offering new licensed production agreements
as a method of ensuring arms exports, for example to India,(96) Vietnam,(97)
China(98) and Syria.(99) At the recent Defendory arms exhibition in
Greece (October 2002) Russia entered into negotiations with Greece
on the possible licensed production of a new compact assault rifle,
and the Bazalt company held discussions with Israeli representatives
to discuss joint cooperation.(100)
3.7 Arms for Natural Resources
A worrying development in Russian MSP exports is the link between
resource extraction companies (oil and gas) and the supply of weapons.
Participation in oil and gas projects in Algeria by a number of companies,
including Gazprom, has been linked to arms deliveries.(101) Recently
it has been reported that Promgaz (an affiliate of Gazprom) has signed
a cooperation agreement to interact in foreign markets to boost the
export potential of Russia's defence industry.(102) Russian resource
extraction companies, for example the joint Belarussian-Russian company
Slavneft, are also heavily involved in exploiting Sudan's oil reserves.(103)
Russia has actively exported arms to states in zones prone to violent
conflict, particularly in African countries rich in natural resources.
Sudan
For example, following a trade delegation that visited Sudan in April
1995, the government in Khartoum reported that the Russian government
was ready to support Sudan in technical and training fields and to
reactivate previous military agreements.(104) It was reported in 1997
that Russia had supplied 9 T-55 tanks and 6 Mi-24B "Hind" attack helicopters
to Sudan via Belarus.(105) Russia further supplied 60 BTR-80A armoured
personnel carriers manufactured by the Arzamas Machinery Plant, which
were delivered in 2000 to the Sudanese government forces.
On 21 February 2002, a Sudan government helicopter gunship killed
24 civilians in Bieh, injured many others and disrupted a World Food
Programme (WFP) food distribution operation. The attack occurred despite
a flight clearance agreement given by the Sudanese government to WFP
operations in Bieh that day, under the framework of Operation Lifeline
Sudan, the umbrella organization providing relief to civilians in
Southern Sudan. The government announced an investigation into the
incidents but no results of any investigation were ever announced.(106)
Angola
Weapons supplied by Russia to Angola range from Su-24 fighter bombers
handed over in January 2001(107), Mi-23 fighters, repairs to other
fighters, T-72 tanks, grenade launchers supplied by the Instrument
Design Bureau KBP Tula(108), attack helicopters supplied in 2000.(109)
The civil war in Angola continued throughout 2001; hundreds of unarmed
civilians were deliberately killed by government forces and by forces
of the Uniăo Nacional para a Independęncia Total de Angola (UNITA),
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. The armed conflict
and insecurity were responsible for the number of internally displaced
people increasing by 300,000 during the year to an estimated total
of four million and for a precarious humanitarian situation.(110)
A visit to Luanda by Igor Sergevey, Minister of Defence of the Russian
Federation, led to the parties reaching agreement on the maintenance
and modernization of the Angolan army's weapons. It is also reported
that Russia and Angola are proposing to establish in Angola centres
for serving of weapons of Soviet manufacture in other African states.(111)
This could have a profound effect as Africa is awash with old, broken
down Russian equipment such as APCs and artillery pieces.
Russia has also supplied arms to Eritrea and Ethiopia at a time of
high tension and military clashes.(112) Russia supplied significant
amounts of weaponry to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan (in 2001
estimated at Ł30-40 million) and is expected to be the largest provider
of MSP equipment to the new regime.(113) The largest markets by far
for Russian MSP exports are China which over the last few years is
stated to be worth up to US$9 billion,(114) and India.(115)
Russia has recently signed a number of major contracts with India
and is in line to modernize and re-equip Indian paramilitary forces
with equipment including Mi-17 helicopters and AK small arms.(116)
This includes weaponry for border security forces that operate in
Kashmir as well as Assam. Recently new contracts have been signed
with Iran(117) and with Indonesia to supply helicopters which may
have a role in the Papua and Aceh conflicts.(118) The Indonesian navy
this year plans to buy two Mi-171 and eight Mi-2 helicopters from
Russia. Human rights activists claim the new helicopters may be used
in operations to crack down on separatist rebels in Papua and Aceh.(119)
3.8 Foreign-based Brokers, Dealers and Agents
Russian companies increasingly use agents and dealers abroad to promote
their weaponry. One example is the South African based company Suburban
Guns which advertises on its website that it is a dealer for Izhmash,
Baikal and Makarov weapons, and has also offered Igla and Strela man-portable
shoulder launched air-to-air missiles. It also stated in company product
information that it was a distributor for NII Stali, although whether
this included electroshock weapons is not known.(120)
Besides the "official" trade in weapons, there are a large number
of arms traffickers and brokers willing to supply arms to warring
factions across Africa. One example is the network operated by Victor
Bout who, through his UAE based Air Cess Company, is reported to have
delivered arms clandestinely to Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and
Congo and to have been paid in "conflict diamonds" mined illegally.
Much of the weaponry traded originated in Russia, Central Asia and
other Eastern European countries. Another example is the Zimbabwean
company, Avient, with management links to the UK, which was reported
to have hired Russian aircraft and air crew to support the government
of Laurent Kabila in the Congo with "air drops", and also admitted
to repairing and maintaining Russian MIG fighters for the Kabila regime.(121)
A major source of weapons for the arms brokers is from stockpiles
left over from the Soviet era, or from current army stockpiles that
may be poorly maintained and guarded. A number of instances have been
reported where serving military units have supplied equipment to dealers.
A Russian military unit reportedly supplied ten anti-aircraft missile
launchers to a dealer who then sent them to Chechen armed oppositionists.
The launchers were the same kind used to shoot down four military
helicopters in 2002.(122) Such illicit weapons can impact greatly
on domestic crime issues (Russia has seen an increase in the use of
small arms in crime), as well as ending up in the hands of criminals
abroad, for example the recent cases of military pistols ending up
in Japan.(123)
3.9 Impact on Violations within Russia
Chechnya
The ongoing conflict in Chechnya has seen repeated human rights violations
by Russian MSP forces in their efforts to contain rebel forces. Reports
of torture in "filtration camps", disappearances, extrajudicial executions
and the indiscriminate targeting of the civilian population have consistently
been reported.(124) Of particular concern is the practice of "zachistki"
or sweep operations, when villages or sectors of towns are cordoned
and searched, in many cases leading to destruction of property, looting
and the disappearance of young males.(125) Also reported is the use
of "fuel air" weapons (more powerful than any conventional explosives)
in civilian areas causing huge casualties(126) and the use of cluster
bombs, which because of their high failure rate become de-facto landmines
after the conflict has ended.(127)
Tragically much of the weaponry used by the rebels in Chechnya was
provided by, or seized from, official Russian stocks.(128)For example
in May 1992 the Russian Minister of defence ordered the handover to
the Chechen General Dzhokhar Dudayev of half of the military armaments
belonging to Russian Federation forces in Chechnya. Estimates of the
Russian small arms left in Chechnya when Russian troops pulled out
in 1992 range between 41,000 and 57,000 pieces. The Russian Defence
Ministry reported 18,832 AK 74s 9,307 AKM's, 533 Dragunov sniper rifles,
138 grenade launchers, 678 tank machine guns, 319 large calibre machine
guns and 10,581 pistols left behind. Rebels were also thought to have
acquired 200,000 hand grenades and over 13 million rounds of ammunition.(129).
It is worrying that Russia has decided to end the mandate of the OSCE
assistance group in Chechnya as this could reduce scrutiny of human
rights abuses in Chechnya and gives a false impression of normalisation.(130)
3.10 Specific Recommendations
The government of the Russian Federation should actively promote the
development of an international "Arms Trade Treaty" with provisions
for arms export control based upon respect for international law,
especially international human rights and humanitarian law. The Russian
government should also takes steps to strengthen efforts to address
the trade in small arms, light weapons and security equipment, and
to prevent the use of indiscriminate weapons [for details on these
measures, see the final recommendations at the end of this report]
In addition, the Russian government should:
· Establish a system of export control based upon rigorous case by
case consideration of whether any proposed arms or security equipment
or technology export would be likely to result in such exports being
used for serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian
law; · Implement
fully the OSCE arms export criteria, agreed by the Russian Federation
as a participating state, in order to to raise its standards in the
control of all exports, transits and imports of military, security
and policing technology
· Develop an effective system of parliamentary scrutiny of arms export
decisions, for instance via a regular reporting to a parliamentary
committee and office;
· Publishing more comprehensive data about its arms transfers to allow
effective parliamentary and public scrutiny to ensure that Russian-supplied
arms do not contribute to, or facilitate, such human rights violations.
· Include compulsory licencing and registration requirements for all
'transfers' of Russian-based arms manufacturers, brokers, transporters
and financiers who operate only through third countries. ·
Any authorised arms dealer, broker or shipper should be removed from
the register if they are found to be guilty of committing related
criminal offences; money laundering, firearms related violence or
trafficking to unauthorised states. · Sign, ratify, implement
and monitor the 1997 Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty, and ban the use, production,
stockpiling, sale, transfer or export of anti-personnel landmines.
4. France
4.1 Introduction
France is one of the world's largest producers of military equipment
and is ranked in the top five largest arms exporters. However, the
French government is generally not transparent about its arms exports.
Since coming to power in 1995, President Jacques Chirac has instigated
wide-ranging reforms of French defence policy. The defence reform
programme, first announced in February 1996, was implemented through
the 1997-2002 Military Planning Act, which ended conscription and
reorganised both active and reserve forces. As a result of these reforms
the defence industry has been forced to undergo huge changes, including
privatisations and job cuts.(131) It has also meant that exports have
been accounting for an increased proportion of business for French
producers as orders from the French armed forces decrease.(132)
4.2 Production and Exports
In 1997-2001 France accounted for 10 per cent of global arms transfers,
ranking as the third largest exporter(133). French military exports
were 2.7 billion euros in 2000 and 3.1 billion in 2001. Figures are
not available yet for the year 2002(134). Arms fairs to promote French
military and security technology are organised and attended with government
support, such as the Eurosatory arms fair in Paris in June 2002, Milipol
Qatar 2002 and the Asian Aerospace 2000 show at which French fighter
aircraft were displayed.(135)
4.3 Arms Control
Arms possession, production and trade are still governed by the Decree-law
of 18 April 1939, though an inter-ministerial working group has recently
been appointed to take into account recent changes in the field of
public security, national defence policy and armaments. Features of
the French national arms export control law include the following:
· Many types of security and police equipment and technologies
are not mentioned in French trade legislation and hence their
export is generally not controlled. There are exceptions for those
items classified as 'arms' in which case both manufacture and export
are regulated. ·
Government authorisation must be granted for any arms exports - one
can only obtain a final export permit after receiving a 'Autorisation
de Fabrication et de Commerce'.(136) The procedure is complex and
involves a large number of administrative bodies. Those wishing to
export weapons must obtain prior authorisation from the Prime Minister
or from the Secretary General for National Defence. Such authorisation
is granted on the basis of an opinion given by the Inter-Ministerial
Committee for the Study of Exports of War Weapons (CIEEMG(137)) which
is chaired by the Secretary-General of National Defence and composed
of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry
of Defence and the Ministry of Finance. As well as giving their opinion
on general arms export policy, they are also asked to check all export
applications on a case-by-case basis.(138) · There is almost no parliamentary
oversight of French arms exports; the French Parliament is not formally
involved in the procedure. But in 2000, for the first time, a report
on French arms export policy by the Ministry of Defence was distributed
to national representatives(139). Since then, three reports have been
made public.(140) The 4th report on arms exports for the year 2002
is not yet available(141). The publication of the report is a step
towards some meaningful transparency, but it does not yet provide
sufficient information for effective parliamentary and public scrutiny
of French government claims to take human rights into account before
authorising exports. French Members of Parliament do not take a formal
role in monitoring the human rights impact of arms export licences.(142)
· An official of the French Ministry of Defence told Amnesty International
that French customs authorities always work closely with customs authorities
in the country of destination, in order to ensure the constant monitoring
of goods exported from France.(143) But judging from many cases of
French arms and security equipment being supplied in the face of human
rights abuse (see below) the French government still fails to ensure
that its export licence and 'end-use' monitoring systems prevent such
transfers falling into the hands of those who have been responsible
for human rights violations, whether they are state security forces
or opposition groups.
4.4 Small Arms and Light Weapons
Successive French governments have provided military and other security
equipment and training to most Francophone countries in Africa, often
regardless of their human rights record..(144) Among the recipients
of weapons such as small calibre machine-guns, automatic rifles, light
guns and shoulder-fired rockets in 1999 were Burkina Faso, identified
by the UN as a conduit for arms to Liberia and to armed opposition
forces in Sierra Leone.
Cameroon
The French authorities have also allowed the export in 1999 of small
calibre machine-guns, automatic rifles, light weapons and shoulder-fired
rockets in to Cameroon. There the security forces were reported to
have unlawfully executed hundreds of people since 1998. In 1999, extrajudicial
executions of criminal suspects in North, Far-North and Adamawa Provinces
of Cameroon continued during operations to combat armed robbery by
a joint unit of the army and gendarmerie (the paramilitary police),
known as the brigade anti-gang. From March 1998, when the "brigade"
was deployed, some 700 people were reported as extra-judicially executed.
Killings were reported to have continued throughout 1999. The practice
of abandoning unburied bodies decreased and it became more difficult
to establish the numbers killed.(145)
Egypt
Despite persistent reports of human rights abuses involving the use
of force by Egyptian security forces in the late 1990s(146), including
excessive use of force and torture in police stations, shotgun cartridges
were transferred from France to Egypt during 2000.(147) In a student
demonstration at Alexandria University on 9 April 2002, a 19-year-old
student, Muhammad Ali al-Sayid al-Saqqa, was killed and several others
were seriously injured by buckshot. The demonstration began peacefully
but events escalated as security forces prevented students from leaving
the confines of the university campus to join others outside for a
protest march.
A statement issued by the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior said that
the security forces fired buckshot in an attempt to calm down the
situation. Amnesty International fears that Muhammad 'Ali al-Sayid
al-Saqqa died after being shot by buckshot fired by a member of the
security forces in circumstances where the safeguards required under
the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials were not adhered to.(148)
Senegal
Ammunition not categorised, as 'war material' still needs a special
French export licence for 'explosive commodities'.(149) Many police
forces worldwide use non-military grade ammunition in weapons such
as shotguns. During 2000 France transferred both 'small arms ammunition'
and 'shotgun cartridges' to Senegal.(150)
In January 2001, student Balla Gaye was shot dead in clashes between
demonstrators and the police near the University of Dakar. President
Wade immediately ordered an investigation which concluded in November
that the police might have been responsible for this death. A policeman
was subsequently charged and detained but has not yet been tried.(151)
Throughout the 1990s Amnesty International had reported regular human
rights violations by the Senegalese security forces in the context
of the armed conflict in Casamance, including arbitrary arrests and
long-term detentions without trial, extrajudicial executions, "disappearances",
torture and ill-treatment. In 1999, for example, Amnesty International
reported that many civilians in Casamance, arrested by the security
forces, were reportedly tortured or ill-treated while held incommunicado
for up to 10 days before being presented before an examining judge.
A number of them were allegedly burned with petrol-filled plastic
bottles set alight. None of these allegations were investigated. In
May 1998, security forces fired live ammunition to break up a student
demonstration in Saint-Louis, Senegal's second city. Nine students
and one policeman were hurt in these clashes.(152)
In April 1998 Djoumondong Bassčne, Louis Bassčne, Babao Manga and
Lamine Tendeng were detained in Djiromaďte. They were reportedly asked
to dig their own graves and then shot. Adrien Sambou ''disappeared''
after being arrested by soldiers in Kabrousse in July. In November
soldiers broke into Djifangor Banjal, a neighbourhood near Ziguinchor,
and killed some 30 civilians in a door-to-door search for MFDC (an
armed opposition group) rebels.(153)
Côte d'Ivoire
Firearms' cartridges and parts were transferred to Côte d'Ivoire from
France during 2000.(154) In 2002 Amnesty International reported several
instances of extrajudicial execution in the country. On 7 October
gendarmes in Abidjan shot three civilians from Burkina Faso. An eyewitness
reported that « at about 7pm, gendarmes asked these three people to
show them their identity cards and then took their money. They then
asked them to lie down on the ground on their stomachs. One of the
gendarmes took out his gun, the men from Burkina-Faso begged for forgiveness,
the two other policemen tried to dissuade their colleague from shooting
them but were not successful. Two of the men died instantly and the
third died the next day."(155)
4.5 Larger Arms Exports
Zimbabwe
In 1998 it was reported that France's ACMAT military trucks had been
selected by Zimbabwe for front-line use, with 23 already in use by
the Zimbabwean armed forces.(156) Reporting on the continuing human
rights violations in Zimbabwe by state-sponsored "militia" as well
as state security forces, Amnesty International has noted repeated
examples of soldiers arriving in trucks to commit such abuses. On
28 June 2000, for example, three days after the parliamentary elections,
soldiers beat Edwin Mushoriwa, the opposition MDC party parliamentary
representative for the Harare constituency of Dzivarasekwa, as well
as other MDC supporters. Around 200 MDC supporters were holding a
victory rally when the soldiers arrived in a military truck and beat
them with rifle butts. Many MDC supporters were hospitalised.(157)
In the court hearings reviewing the election in the Mutoko South constituency
of Mashonaland East Province, Matthew Rukwata Dovi, a parliamentary
candidate for the MDC, testified that ''militia'' members abducted
him on 20 April 2000 and held him for three weeks. He said that he
was often handcuffed, and repeatedly assaulted, and on one occasion
he and three other MDC party members were forcibly exhibited as ''MDC
turncoats'' upon a stage at a ZANU-PF rally. Amnesty International
reported that government trucks donated or provided by foreign states
were used to transport the abducted victims.(158)
In July 2001, civilians in Budiriro reported that army soldiers and
police were beating residents up, apparently in reprisal for their
observance of a two-day stay away organized by the Zimbabwe Congress
of Trade Unions. Tim Rhumba, who lived in Budiriro, was quoted in
a daily newspaper describing how armed soldiers arrived in five trucks
outside his home as they searched for someone identified as an MDC
official. He said the soldiers ordered him and other occupants in
the home to lie down on the floor, and then began to assault them.(159)
Given the recent escalation of violent political repression by
government armed forces in Zimbabwe, as well as abuses committed by
Zimbabwean soldiers in the DRC, it should have been foreseen that
military trucks transferred from France would be used to facilitate
human rights violations.
Côte d'Ivoire
In September 2000, there were 13 Véhicule de l'Avant Blindé (VAB)
amphibious armoured personnel carrier in service in Côte d'Ivoire.
The VAB was developed by Giat, the French state arms manufacturer,
to meet the French Army's requirements. However, by the year 2000,
one thousand of these vehicles had been exported and they were in
service in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. While the French Army's
version is normally fitted with a 7.62mm or 12.7mm machine gun, the
export versions have a wider range of weapons including a turret-mounted
20mm cannon.(160)
In October 2002 dozens of civilians were massacred at Daloa, after
the recapture of the town by government forces. The men in fatigues
who carried out the killings arrived in military vehicles and 'tanks'.(161)
Indonesia
In April 1996, Indonesian security forces with armoured personnel
carriers (APCs) violently suppressed a protest in Ujung Pandang using
excessive force; at least three students were killed. Three months
later, the US government explicitly included APCs in its arms export
ban on Indonesia citing human rights violations as the reason for
the ban. Amnesty International opposed the provision of such armoured
vehicles to Indonesia because of the potential to use the mounted
guns for political killings, to facilitate arbitrary arrests and torture,
as well as to command and control such operations. Yet in that same
month, July 1996, Indonesia ordered 18 VBL (Véhicule Blinde Leger)
amphibious scout cars from Panhard, a French company, for delivery
the following year to its armed forces. (162)
During 2000, Giat's VAB armoured personnel carriers were also in service
with the Indonesian security forces.(163) Armoured vehicles were used
by the security forces in Aceh to counter armed rebels during which
serious human rights violations were committed by both sides. Hundreds
of people were extra-judicially executed and thousands of villagers
have fled their homes and sought refuge in local mosques and schools.(164)
Republic of the Congo
France is heavily dependent on Africa for its oil. French companies
control significant oil fields in the Republic of the Congo. French
oil interests have apparently been linked with the supply of arms,
and this has sometimes had devastating consequences for the human
rights of the local population. For example, in 1998, France delivered
71 military transport vehicles to the government of the Republic of
the Congo (Brazzaville). Many civilians were killed and injured during
the armed conflict and some 800,000 people were displaced.
It could have been foreseen from the recent history of the violent
conflict in the Congo that soldiers there would misuse the vehicles
to facilitate human rights violations. Some 25,000 militias were estimated
to be involved in the fighting. The former president of the French
oil company Elf, which has significant interests in the Congo, admitted
that his company delivered arms to both main sides in the conflict.(165)
4.6 Security Equipment
Tear gas to Kenya
When Kenyan paramilitary police stormed All Saints Anglican Cathedral
in Nairobi on 7 July 1997, first they threw tear gas canisters, and
then they moved in wielding truncheons. Several dozen peaceful pro-reform
advocates sheltering inside were left bleeding and badly hurt; many
more, including an elderly opposition member of parliament, were injured.(166)
Amnesty International researchers retrieved some of the tear gas canisters
and plastic bullets used against peaceful protesters in Kenya and
traced them back to British companies. Following pressure from Amnesty
International, the UK government declared that it had rejected Ł1.5
million of licence applications for riot control equipment - including
batons and tear gas - to Kenyan police because of human rights concerns.
But human rights abuses by the Kenyan security forces continued. When
tear gas was misused again in June 1999 against a crowd of 2,000 peaceful
protesters, Amnesty International again put a name to the company
manufacturing the tear gas - and this time it was a French company,
Nobel Sécurité. So after the UK government rejected licences for export
of tear gas, it seems that the Kenyan authorities instead turned to
a French company to supply the equipment necessary for such brutal
acts of "crowd control".
This case illustrates the need for stringent, internationally consistent
arms control. However, a French decree of 20 November 1991 contains
a list of all the war material and other associated equipment that
is subject to a special export procedure, and tear gas grenades are
not considered war material and therefore are not subject to any specific
procedure.
Nor does French arms export law contain any specific reference to
the control of leg irons, thumb cuffs, electronic batons, stun guns,
stun belts and shock shields, all equipment which can be used for
torture. In 1998-2000, the French companies Le Protecteur SA, AKAH
(Albrecht Kind France), Equipol, Eclats Antivols SA and R-Plus were
offering to supply electro-shock stun weapons, Rivolier SA and Le
Protecteur SA were offering leg irons, and Le Protecteur SA was offering
thumbcuffs.(167)
In its third report to the French parliament (2001), the Ministry
of Defence admitted that Article 2 of the EU Code of Conduct mandates
all EU member states to exercise control over the exports of non-military
goods susceptible of being used for repression purposes or other human
rights abuses. However, the goods involved do not fit into the French
category of military goods or into the category of military-civilian
dual use goods, and are therefore considered to be civilian goods
to be regulated at the European level. A recently proposed European
Commission Trade Regulation will, if enacted unamended, ban the import,
export and brokering by companies and individuals of items that the
Commission has categorised as "torture equipment" including electro-shock
stun belts, leg irons, thumb-cuffs and shackles. It will also require
member states to introduce controls on exports of stun batons, stun
guns and riot control agents such as tear gas.
The French authorities have created a working group to assess the
legal consequences of such a future European controlling mechanism
for policing and security equipment. Amnesty International calls on
France to introduce export controls on police and security equipment
such as riot control batons and shields, tear gas and other chemical
irritants, stun guns and shock shields.
4.7 Licensing of Foreign Production
Turkey
Giat Industries manufactures a one-person power-operated turret armed
with a 25mm cannon and 7.62mm machine gun for the Romanian/Turkish
RN-94 armoured personnel carrier, developed as a private venture by
the Nurol Machinery and Industry Company of Turkey and the Romarm
Company of Romania to meet the requirements of the Turkish Land Forces
(TLF). TLF Command has so far purchased five RN-94s for extensive
trials.(168) Giat's turret is being manufactured under licence by
Nurol in Turkey for installation on locally built FNSS Defence Systems
Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFV).(169)
In June 1995 the US State Department published a report saying that
there was 'highly credible' evidence that Turkey was using armoured
personnel carriers, among other equipment, in instances of human rights
violations.(170) Amnesty International has documented the use of armoured
personnel carriers to perpetrate human rights abuses in Turkey. Safak
Akbulut is believed to have been abducted by Gendarmerie officers
on 24 November 1999, the day she was released from prison. While in
prison she was reportedly pressured to turn state's witness. The Minister
of Justice reportedly gave a statement after Safak Akbulut's "disappearance",
openly acknowledging that Safak Akbulut had not been released from
prison, as the court had ordered, but that she had been taken in a
military vehicle to the military service branch.(171)
4.8 Brokering arms supplies
Brokers of arms deals based in France must obtain government approval
for their general operations but they do not need to obtain prior
approval on a case-by-case basis if the arms transfer and brokerage
activity is outside France.
"Angolagate" first came to light when French judicial officials found
that Brenco International, a company owned by billionaire businessman
Pierre Falcone, was involved in arms transfers to the Angola government
and had made payments to a number of his French associates(172). Pierre
Falcone was a consultant to the French government agency SOFREMI,
which exports military equipment under the auspices of the French
Interior Ministry. He had also developed good contacts in the Eastern
European arms business through Russian émigré businessman Arcadi Gaydamak
who was based in Israel. In November 1993, Pierre Falcone and Arcadi
Gaydamak had allegedly helped arrange the sale of small arms to Angola
worth US$47 million. In 1994, they reportedly arranged a second deal
for US$563 million-worth of weapons, including tanks and helicopters.
The Angolan government paid for the weapons with oil.(173)
The civil war in Angola has taken the lives of hundreds of unarmed
civilians each year at the hands of both government forces and the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Human
rights abuses reported included torture, mutilation, abductions and
killings. In 2001 alone, the armed conflict and insecurity were responsible
for 300,000 people being forced to flee their homes, bringing the
number of internally displaced people to four million.(174)
A new draft law proposed by the French Senate provides for the creation
of a regime whereby a broker would have to apply for a licence before
each "intermediary operation", as well as a system for reporting each
brokerage operation under the threat of penal sanctions if these provisions
are violated. However, there is no provision for full control of extra-territorial
brokering by French nationals and residents, which means that brokers
could merely leave the country to be able to continue their business.
The draft law has still not been adopted.(175).
4.8.1 Trade supporting illicit arms trafficking
France, along with China, is one of the two largest markets for Liberian
timber. Yet the Liberian timber industry has strong links with the
arms trade to Liberia - an explicit finding of the United Nations
(UN) Panel of Experts established by the UN Security Council to monitor
compliance with UN sanctions imposed on Liberia in 2001.
The Panel's reports have shown that the government of Liberia is continuing
to procure arms, despite the UN ban on arms transfers. The Panel has
stressed concerns that revenue from the timber trade - a major source
of government income - is being used to purchase military assistance
and that timber companies have facilitated transfers of weapons. These
weapons are being used to pursue internal armed conflict between government
forces and the armed opposition Liberians United for Reconciliation
and Democracy (LURD).
Both sides continue to commit grave human rights abuses against civilians
as fighting has intensified and spread during 2003. Liberian government
forces and armed militia fighting with them are responsible for killings,
torture, including rape, and forcible recruitment of children under-18.
LURD forces have committed similar abuses, although to a lesser extent.(176)
4.9 French military aid
During the cold
war, one of the biggest fields of French cooperation was in Africa,
the countries engaged in these cooperation were called "Les pays du
Champ". France still has bilateral defence accords with countries
such Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire
(suspended since General Robert Guei entered in power), Rwanda, Togo
and Zaire.(177) The number of French military personnel in operation
in African countries is difficult to establish.(178) In 2000 François
Lamy a French deputy, noted that just 39 defence accords were published
out of a total of 90.(179)
4.9.1 Training
The Nationals Schools with Regional Vocations (NSRV):
There are 15 training centres, in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon,
Ivory Cost, Mali, Senegal and Togo for more than 840 trainees coming
from 20 countries in 2001 (690 in 2000). In these centres there are
French instructors.(180)
French military schools:
In 2000, 1473 places were offered to foreign military officers. Some
of the training involves maintenance of order but full details are
not available. The available information does not mention human rights
or humanitarian law, nor if inquiries are made about students' backgrounds
or the risk of their involvement in human rights violations.(181)
4.9.2 Military "Co-operation"
Although the reporting structures within the French cooperation policy
have recently been reformed,(182) there is still a great lack of transparency.
The French Parliament does not receive a complete report about French
military cooperation programmes abroad. An official of the MDCD told
Amnesty International that his agency was always prepared to answer
to questions raised by the French Parliament, but he refused to talk
about French military cooperation programmes in central Africa, as
'this was confidential information that could not be shared with the
general public'.(183)
4.9.3 Private Military Services
A new law in France was passed on 14 April 2003 aimed at preventing
French mercenary activity abroad. Any individual recruited for the
specific aim of fighting in an armed conflict in exchange for personal
advantage or compensation, without being a citizen of a state involved
in the armed conflict, a member of the armed forces of this state
or an envoy of a state other than those involved in the armed conflict,
will be subject to fines and imprisonment - 5 years and 75,000 euros
for an individual, 7 years and 100,000 for a recruiter and organiser
of mercenary operations. (184)
A new company, "Défense Conseil International" (DCI), 49.9 per cent
owned by the French government and 50.1 per cent by private investors,
now provides military and security training, advice, maintenance and
technical assistance. There appears to be no parliamentary control
of its activities. It has the expertise of around 700 French Army
or retired army personnel, and works closely with the General Arms
Delegation in the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Foreign
Relations. In a conference run by these two organisations with the
Institute of International and Strategy Relations, the president of
DCI, Yves Michaud, reacted strongly against an Amnesty International
(France) speech about the need for transparency and respect of human
rights.(185).
4.10 Specific recommendations
The government of France should actively promote the development of
an international "Arms Trade Treaty" with provisions for arms export
control based upon respect for international law, especially international
human rights and humanitarian law. The French government should also
takes steps to strengthen efforts to address the trade in small arms,
light weapons and security equipment, and to prevent the use of indiscriminate
weapons [for details on these measures, see the final recommendations
at the end of this report]
In addition, the government of France should:
· Adopt a law on arms brokering including extra-territorial applicability
for French nationals, and for permanent residents and registered companies
in France.
· Establish an effective system of parliamentary scrutiny of arms
export decisions, for instance via a regular reporting to a parliamentary
committee and office.
· Publish comprehensive and timely information about all exports from
France of military, security and police equipment and technology in
order to allow effective parliamentary and public scrutiny to ensure
they do not contribute to, or facilitate, such human rights violations.
· Prohibit the production and trade of equipment whose inherent effects
result in torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and prevent
the export of all other security and police equipment in cases where
there is a reasonable assumption that it will be used for cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment.
· Support the adoption of the European Council Regulation concerning
the trade in certain equipment and products which could be used for
capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment (COM 2002 - 770).
· Ensure that all French military assistance abroad, whether carried
out by state agents or by private companies, will include practical
training in human rights law and international humanitarian law. The
terms of agreement for French military and security assistance, whether
financial or practical, should be made public and conditional on establishing
human rights safeguards in the recipient country.
5. United Kingdom
5.1 Introduction
The United Kingdom is a permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council, a member of the Group of Eight and one of the top five arms
exporting nations in the world(186). Arms and security equipment produced
in the UK ranges from crowd control technologies such as water cannon,
plastic baton rounds and tear gas, to small arms, small arms ammunition,
major weapons systems such as aircraft, helicopters and warships,
and electronics, computer software and other dual-use items.
5.2 Arms Export Controls
Companies or individuals wishing to export items on the UK's Military
List or Dual-Use control list must apply for an export licence from
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). UK government policy states
that:
'An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing
so are outweighed by the need to comply with the UK's international
obligations and commitments, by concern that the goods might be used
for internal repression or international aggression, by the risks
to regional stability or by other considerations as described in
[the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria]'(187)
The consolidated criteria for approving arms exports modify the eight
criteria that were announced in 1998 when the UK agreed to the EU
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. They were announced on 26 October
2000 and consist of eight criteria against which export licence applications
must be judged, including the respect for human rights in the country
of final destination, the existence of conflict or tensions, the preservation
of regional stability and the risk that the equipment will be diverted
or re-exported to undesirable end-users(188). The consolidated criteria
form the basis of 'guidance' issued by the government to inform those
involved in the licensing process, and as such do not have legal force.
The legal basis for the regulation of UK export controls is the Export
Control and Non-Proliferation Act 2002 which became law on 24 July
2002. The Export Control Act, which is expected to enter into force
in the second half of 2003, is the result of a comprehensive overhaul
of the UK export control regime following the 'arms to Iraq' scandal
in the late 1980s and early 1990s investigated and reported on by
Sir Richard Scott.(189)
As a result of the findings of the Scott Report and sustained pressure
from civil society, the Labour government announced in its 2001 general
election manifesto that it would 'legislate to modernise the regulation
of arms exports, with a licensing system to control the activities
of arms brokers and traffickers wherever they are located'.(190) This
process, though flawed, is nearly complete. The new Export Control
Act sets out in primary legislation the extent of the government's
powers to impose export controls, but the actual controls to be imposed
under secondary legislation are still the subject of a three month
consultation period which finished on 30 April 2003. Shortcomings
in the proposed regulations are discussed below (see Holes in the
controls), but the bottom line is that according to government policy,
UK-supplied arms and security equipment (be it through direct export,
brokered transfer, overseas licensed production or other means) should
not end up in the hands of those who will use it to commit human rights
abuses.
In 2001 the UK granted export licences for goods on the military or
dual-use equipment lists to 181 countries around the world.(191) The
licences include those granted to "non-sensitive" countries such as
members of the EU, OECD and most NATO countries, those granted to
"sensitive" destinations which might give cause for concern on human
rights grounds depending on the nature of the equipment and the end-user,
and those granted to countries under embargo.(192)
5.3 Impact of the 'war on terrorism'
UK government policy states that it "will not issue an export licence
if there is a clearly identifiable risk that the proposed export might
be used for internal repression.' The government policy states that:
'Internal repression includes extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrest,
torture, suppression or major violation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms.'(193)
However, in 2001, many states neighbouring Afghanistan that persistently
commit human rights violations were benefiting from a UK government
open licence that, according to one detailed study, "appears to
authorise the export of almost anything on the military list, including
unlimited quantities of small arms and light weapons, light and heavy
artillery, armoured vehicles including main battle tanks, combat aircraft
and helicopters, and rocket systems and missiles with a range of less
than 300km".(194) The countries included Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan,
which provided bases and other help in the US-UK led military campaign
against Taleban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, as well as Turkmenistan.
Amnesty International has documented serious human rights violations
in these countries for many years.
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan's appalling human rights record has deteriorated even
further following an armed attack on President Niyazov in November
2002, which triggered a new wave of repression throughout the country.
Scores of men, women and children have faced detention, harassment,
house eviction, and confiscation of property. Many of them were reportedly
targeted solely because of their family relations with the regime's
opponents. There have been credible reports of torture and ill-treatment
in detention, and dozens have recently been sentenced to long prison
terms after grossly unfair trials.
In many cases the defendants' lawyers were given little or no notice
before the court hearings began.(195) Twenty-one-year old student
Aili Yklymov and his elder brother Esenaman - relatives of Saparmurad
Yklymov, a leading opposition figure - were arrested the day of the
attack on the President. According to credible sources, Aili Yklymov
was beaten so severely in the basement of the Ministry of National
Security in Ashgabat on 5 December that he was unable to walk and
had to be taken to questioning on a stretcher. Aili Yklymov was released
in mid December, but had to sign an undertaking not to leave Ashgabat.
His father told Amnesty International that as a result of the ill-treatment
in custody, his son has difficulties concentrating and is almost constantly
tired.
Esenaman Yklymov was reportedly also ill-treated in custody the day
he was arrested and his ears bled as a result; when he was released
the following day he was unable to hold a pen in order to write. At
the beginning of January, Esenaman Yklymov was forced to denounce
his parents on television and was reportedly sentenced to five years'
imprisonment. He remains at risk of torture. Both brothers reportedly
received no treatment for their injuries while in custody. Other members
of the Yklymov family have also been allegedly detained and tortured
or ill-treated. (196)
Other countries covered by the open-ended arms export system include
traditional British allies such as Qatar - the Gulf state where the
US military HQ for the attacks on Iraq was based - plus Pakistan,
now a UK and US ally, Jordan and Oman.
5.4 Small Arms & Light Weapons
Although the UK is not a major producer of small arms and light weapons
(the Small Arms Survey classifies it as a medium producer(197)), it
is home to the parent company of one of the world's most prolific
licensors of overseas small arms production. Since 1991, Heckler &
Koch has been a subsidiary of Royal Ordnance, the small arms division
of BAE Systems Plc. Heckler & Koch is one of the world's largest
producers of small arms, and its weapons are used in over 90 countries
worldwide(198). Through the setting up of licensed production facilities
overseas and the transfer of technology, the company has played a
key role in assisting various countries to establish domestic small
arms production capabilities.
Amnesty International has repeatedly raised concerns at the lack of
official UK control on the export of small arms made overseas under
licence, in particular with regard to Heckler & Koch MP5 sub-machine
guns made in Turkey and exported to Indonesia at the height of the
East Timor crisis(199). Turkey has also exported other H&K rifles
to other countries without having an export policy based on human
rights. Amnesty International has called for the UK Export Control
Act to contain comprehensive measures to ensure that individual licensed
production deals themselves require a very strict licence because
of the massive potential impact of such UK-sponsored foreign production
on human rights. Unfortunately current UK government proposals in
the draft secondary legislation are insufficient (see Holes in the
Controls below).
In addition, several UK licences issued for direct exports of small
arms and light weapons during 2001 give Amnesty International cause
for concern on human rights grounds.
Nepal
The human rights situation in Nepal significantly deteriorated in
late 2001 and 2002 as the conflict with insurgents belonging to the
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) - (CPN-Maoist) intensified. Increased
incidences of unlawful killings, "disappearances", torture (including
rape and mock executions) and arbitrary arrest and detention by the
Nepalese police and army were reported by Amnesty International.(200)
The organisation also reported and condemned widespread human rights
abuses by the Maoist insurgents.(201)
Despite this deterioration, in 2001 the UK granted standard individual
export licences for equipment worth Ł6m to Nepal, including 6780 assault
rifles, 11 semi-automatic pistols, 4 shotguns and 2 sporting rifles,
a total of 6797 small arms.(202) In addition, the UK government licensed
the export to Nepal of components for small arms (including assault
rifles), weapons sights and grenade launchers.
Although these licences may have been granted during a period of cease-fire
between July and November 2001, Amnesty International believes that
the UK government should have examined them in the context of the
ongoing conflict, and should have considered the strong likelihood
that such a large consignment of such weapons would be used for gross
human rights violations by the Nepalese security forces. Therefore,
the UK government should have suspended the transfer at least until
those responsible for serious violations have been brought to justice
and the Nepalese security forces have demonstrated that they can observe
basic human rights and humanitarian standards.(203)
Jamaica
The UK is the principal provider of external assistance to the Jamaica
Constabulary Force (JCF), including programmes in training and forensics.
Jamaica suffers from a high level of crime and police officers face
armed criminals on a daily basis, often leaving them with no alternative
to the use of lethal force to protect their own lives and the safety
of the public. However, over recent years, Amnesty International has
documented numerous cases where the evidence overwhelmingly indicates
that those killed were extra-judicially executed.(204)
With 140 deaths at the hands of the JCF in 2000 alone, Jamaica had
one of the highest rates of police killings per capita in the
world.(205) In April 2001, Amnesty International released major reports
documenting extra-judicial executions and violence by members of the
Jamaica security forces, including the "killing of Braeton Seven.(206)
However, in 2001 the UK government issued an arms export licence authorising
the transfer to Jamaica of 300 handguns. It also licensed the UK export
of small arms ammunition, weapon sights and gun mountings to Jamaica.
Amnesty International protested against such transfers and sought
assurances that the UK government would not export arms to Jamaica
for use by the JCF until significant steps have been taken to re-train
JCF officers to operate within existing UN standards on law enforcement,
criminal justice and human rights, and until effective monitoring
and accountability systems have been put in place. As long as impunity
for extra-judicial executions and other grave violations of human
rights continues, the perpetrators should not be armed.
In 2003. Amnesty International documented in detail the impunity with
which the JCF are able to kill and torture, and called for a worldwide
campaign for the protection of human rights in Jamaica.(207) Amnesty
International called upon the Jamaican government to hold police officers
accountable for committing extrajudicial executions - "not one police
officer has been convicted of an extrajudicial killing since 1999,
despite over 600 killings at the hands of the police since that date,
many in disputed circumstances."(208)
5.4.1 Police and security equipment
In 1997 the UK government banned the export and transhipment of certain
equipment that has been used in torture.
The then foreign secretary Robin Cook announced: "We are committed
to preventing British companies from manufacturing, selling or procuring
equipment designed primarily for torture and to press for a global
ban. There is clear evidence that certain equipment has been used
for torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
I can now announce that we will take the necessary measures to prevent
the export or transhipment from the UK of the following equipment:
· "Portable devices designed or modified for riot control purposes
or self-protection to administer an electric shock, including electric-shock
batons, electric-shock shields, stun guns, and tasers, and specially
designed components for such devices.
· "Leg-irons, gang-chains, shackles--excluding normal handcuffs--and
electric-shock belts designed for the restraint of a human being."(209)
Amnesty International welcomed this move as an important step towards
stopping the UK trade in torture equipment. The organisation also
welcomed the proposals under the Export Control Act draft secondary
legislation to prohibit the brokering of such equipment by UK nationals
or residents wherever they are located when they conduct their business.
As a result of recommendations made in the report of the Independent
Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland (the Patten report), the
Northern Ireland Office (NIO) in consultation with the Association
of Chief Police Officers is conducting research into alternative policing
approaches, and is looking in particular at the range of 'less lethal'
equipment which could be made available to the UK police(210). This
eagerly-awaited research is being carried out in cooperation with
officially recognised bodies in Europe, the USA, Australia and other
countries. Amnesty International is monitoring the research programme
to ensure that any equipment authorised by the Home Office for use
by the UK police has been rigorously and independently tested and
complies with human rights standards.
This official research programme has implications for UK export control
of police and security equipment. If certain restraint technologies,
kinetic energy weapons, electro-shock weapons and chemical irritants
are deemed suitable for use by law enforcement officials in the UK,
it is likely that other law enforcement agencies will also want such
equipment and that the UK government will come under pressure to allow
the export of such equipment.
There are currently five UK police forces conducting operational trials
with the dart-firing Taser electroshock stun gun.(211) Yet the UK
Foreign Office has banned the export of such weapons due to evidence
that they have been used in torture. It is currently reported that
the trials are limited to deployment alongside firearms with specially
trained UK firearms officers.(212) Amnesty International is concerned
that this type of equipment has not been subjected to sufficient independent
medical, legal and technical assessment to warrant wider deployment
to ordinary "beat" police officers or prison officers (as is the norm
in the USA), and urges the UK government not to do so without further
testing and consultation.
5.5 Holes in the Controls
The new Export Control Act 2002 is certainly an improvement on the
old system based as it was on a 1939 Act. Under new powers contained
in the 2002 Act the UK government will be able to control 'intangible
transfers' (fax and email), the transfer of technology and technical
assistance, and the inter-mediate trade in "controlled goods" (commonly
known as brokering and trafficking). The publication of an Annual
Report on Strategic Export Controls will also be a statutory requirement.
However the legislation is not fully comprehensive and there are loopholes
that could potentially result in UK-supplied arms and security equipment
being used to commit human rights violations in the recipient country.
5.5.1 Arms Brokering and Trafficking
There is growing evidence that UK arms brokers and shippers are among
those responsible for deliveries of small arms, light weapons and
ammunition into conflict and human rights crisis zones. Amnesty International
is therefore extremely concerned at the inadequacy of current UK government
proposals to regulate the activities of UK brokers and shippers.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Extrajudicial execution, torture and rape of civilians by all sides
continue to characterize the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC). The International Rescue Committee, a humanitarian
organization, has estimated that since August 1998 over 3 million
civilians have been killed or died from hunger and disease as a consequence
of the conflict. By the end of 2002 over 2.5 million had been driven
from their homes and many were beyond the reach of humanitarian assistance.
Despite this catalogue of human misery, British pilots and air cargo
companies have been allowed by the United Kingdom (UK) government
to supply weapons to armed forces in the DRC responsible for mass
human rights abuses. Under current UK law, as long as the weapons
are collected and routed outside UK territory to a destination not
embargoed by the UN, such arms trafficking is perfectly legal. The
traffickers have used links in other European Union (EU) countries
or outside EU jurisdiction to circumvent the 1993 non-binding EU embargo
on arms sales to the DRC.
In a taped video interview for Oxfam, a British pilot described how
in 1999 and 2000 he flew AK47 assault rifles from Rwanda and Uganda
into the rebel-held town of Kisangani in the DRC. He claimed the planes
were registered in Swaziland for Planetair and New Gomair. The UN
identified New Gomair as probably carrying illegal natural resources
from the DRC and Planetair was named by the US government as supplying
arms to eastern DRC. In the interview, the British pilot said: "Mostly
the stuff we carried were brand new AKs plus the ammunition. They're
all packed in plastic bags and in beautiful condition... It's quite
a standard operation for us... We know there is a war on. We are not
involved in it because we're just charter pilots... We were doing
about 80 to 90 hours flying a month... It is very easy. Leave the
hotel, do a little hour there and two hours on the ground and you
are back in time for dinner." In June 2000, six days of fighting
between Rwandese and Ugandan forces for the control of Kisangani left
over 1,200 civilians dead.
Amnesty International subsequently identified offices in London run
by Sky Air Cargo, a company that had operated a Liberian-registered
cargo plane known to have carried arms to Sierra Leone, Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Angola.(213) Strangely, the Liberian Civil
Aviation Regulatory Authority was run by a UK business in Kent, England,
during 1999 and 2000.(214) When too many questions were asked, the
Kent businessman switched to selling registrations for Equatorial
Guinea. UN investigations have shown that aircraft on these UK-run
registers were used for international arms trafficking to Angola,
Sierra Leone and Central Africa, including the DRC.(215)
Current UK law also fails to prevent UK transport companies being
used for arms trafficking abroad. In April 2000, a UK newspaper, the
Guardian and a UK NGO, Saferworld, identified an ageing Liberian-registered
Boeing 707 that had been contracted to fly arms from Bulgaria and
Slovakia to Harare in Zimbabwe. The arms were apparently destined
for Zimbabwean forces in the DRC.(216) The plane's handlers used the
offices and facilities of a UK cargo company with offices in Ostend,
Belgium, without the knowledge of its owners.
Zimbabwe
In October 2002, a report of the United Nations Security Council accused
two UK residents, John Bredenkamp and Andrew Smith, of illegally providing
services and military equipment to the Zimbabwean Defence Force (ZDF)
for use in the DRC. The UN said that Bredenkamp, a Zimbabwean businessman
and one of the richest people in the UK, (217) with a personal fortune
estimated at Ł720 million, was breaching EU and British sanctions
against Zimbabwe through his arms brokering company Aviation Consultancy
Services (ACS), in which he holds an active investment.(218)
ACS had offices in South Africa, Zimbabwe and the UK, and has worked
with Smith's company Avient Air. According to the UN, ACS has acted
as a representative for major European arms contractors such as Agusta
of Italy and BAE Systems of the UK. In the early 1980s, BAE supplied
12 Hawk jets to the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF). But the UK and the
EU respectively imposed an arms embargo on the country in May 2000
and February 2002. Contrary to those arms embargoes, the UN Report
alleged that BAE spare parts for the ZDF Hawk jets, worth $3 million,
were supplied by ACS in 2002. In addition, the UN obtained copies
of invoices from Raceview Enterprises, a company controlled by Bredenkamp,
for deliveries worth $3.5 million of camouflage cloth, batteries,
fuels and lubricating oil, boots and rations.
In a first reaction, BAE Systems acknowledged that ACS was "one of
our many advisers in Africa". But it denied supplying Hawk spares
in breach of sanctions. Bredenkamp says that the spares were legitimately
exported from other European manufacturers.(219) In the UK, these
reports prompted some members of parliament to ask serious questions
about British involvement in Zimbabwe arms supplies.(220)
Under the draft secondary legislation the government does not intend
to introduce controls on all UK brokers wherever they are located,
despite this being promised in its election manifesto in 2001. The
new proposal is that if 'any part of the deal' by UK residents and
registered companies takes place within UK territory, then it will
require a licence, but if the brokering takes place totally "offshore"
or "extra-territorially", then it will only become illegal if the
deal involves the transfer of torture equipment, embargo breaking
and long-range missiles.
However, these proposals are still too weak. The UK and other governments
usually only implement arms embargoes after time-consuming multilateral
consultations and when the human rights violations in a potential
recipient country are already at crisis levels. A UK-based arms broker
seeking involvement in a questionable arms transaction in a crisis
zone would be aware of the possibility that his application might
be refused, and could simply choose to conduct his business abroad
before an embargo is implemented to avoid any form of UK control or
scrutiny.
Those potential transactions that the UK government needs to control
most would thus escape the proposed system of UK regulation. For this
reason, Amnesty International has been consistently calling for full
extra-territorial application of the law on arms brokering – similar
to that which is already accepted by the UK government for trafficking
in illegal drugs, child and sexual bondage, landmines and corruption
of foreign officials.
Currently the UK government is proposing to keep a record of all those
who apply for licences to broker, but the list will fall short of
an official register with eligibility criteria.
5.5.2 Licensed Production Overseas
There is an increasing global trend for international arms deals to
include some aspect of licensed production overseas. These deals may
include the licensing of one overseas company by another to produce
complete weapons platforms or systems, the setting up of subsidiary
companies, joint ventures or other commercial relationships and structures.
In the UK, the trend is also increasing. For example, Jane's Defence
Industry reported in 2000 that the UK-based company Racal had
around 25 licence manufacturing arrangements with offshore licensees,
including in Bulgaria, Malaysia, Romania and Saudi Arabia.(221)
The implications of licensed production overseas for weapons proliferation
are greater than for standard arms exports. There is a risk that the
arms produced as a result of the licensed production agreement will
be exported to states to which the government would refuse to license
exports directly. There is also a risk that once the technical information
has been exported along with the manufacturing expertise, there is
the potential for unlimited future generations of production. This
is especially true in the case of small arms and light weapons which
often incorporate slight modifications and are then produced as a
'domestic' product(222).
One UK example illustrates the dangers the under-regulation of licensed
production of small arms. In January 1998, defence industry publications,
Jane's Defence Weekly and Defense News reported that
Heckler & Koch UK had won an $18 million contract to transfer
technology for the local production of 200,000 infantry rifles for
the Turkish Army. The rifles were reportedly to be manufactured during
the following ten years by a Turkish state run company called Makina
ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK).
On 9 December 1999, a UK Channel 4 Television Dispatches programme,
Licensed to Kill, alleged that MKEK were also making Heckler
and Koch MP5 submachine guns under licence and had sold 1,000 of these
to the Indonesian police. 500 of these were exported during the height
of the recent East Timor crisis. The UK Government refused to licence
direct exports to Indonesia for this category of weapon.
The Export Control Act gives the government the power to control all
methods of transferring technology, in whatever form. There are also
proposals to control the provision of technical assistance. The government
is satisfied that the existing controls on direct exports and the
new controls on transfers of technology and provision of technical
assistance will be sufficient to effectively regulate licensed production
deals. Amnesty International is concerned that without a specific
licensing requirement for each individual licensed production deal
judged against the same criteria as direct exports, it will be impossible
to place limits on production levels, and the UK will have no control
over sales or transfers to third countries from the production facility.
5.5.3 New Export Guidelines for 'incorporation cases'
One of the problems with the UK system of export controls identified
by Amnesty International is the extent to which the Secretary of State
can issue or change the guidance given to those involved in the licensing
process. In a statement on 8 July 2002, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw
announced that he had allowed British military equipment to go to
the US for onward export to Israel. He did this by issuing new guidance
on how export licences for components and spare parts, which are destined
to be incorporated into larger weapons systems and then exported on
to another country, are to be considered(223).
The new UK guidelines can override the human rights criteria in the
EU Code of Conduct because, for the export of UK components for incorporation
into larger weapons systems in another country, the UK government
will now also take into account:
· the export control policies of that country
· the UK's defence and security relationship with that country.
Israel
In 2002, Head-Up Display (HUD) units from the UK were to be supplied
to the USA for incorporation into F-16 fighter jets destined for the
Israeli Defence Force. The HUDs enable pilots to see targeting and
weapons information without having to look at separate instruments.
Amnesty International has previously called on all governments to
cease all transfers of the military equipment being used by the Israeli
Defence Forces to commit human rights violations.(224) The suspension
should remain in force until the Israeli authorities demonstrate that
the equipment will not be used to commit human rights violations in
Israel and the Occupied Territories and the areas under the control
of the Palestinian Authority. Israel regularly uses F-16s for assaults
on the West Bank, Gaza Strip and areas under the control of the Palestinian
authority.(225)
On 22 July 2002, just before midnight, Israeli F16 jets were used
to drop a one-ton bomb on a densely populated neighbourhood of Gaza
city killing 17 people, including nine children, and wounding more
than 70 others, many seriously. The youngest killed was 2 months old,
and others were infants. The Israeli authorities claimed that the
Hamas official killed in the attack had organised suicide attacks
on Israeli civilians.(226)
The new guidance makes a mockery of the government's claim that the
Export Control Act contains tough new measures "to ensure that British
arms do not contribute to internal repression or external aggression."
The UK government cited the 'new reality' of the multinational defence
industry in justifying its willingness to allow indirect arms exports
to the Israeli government – but the reality is 'business as usual'
for the UK repression trade. By exporting arms and related equipment
to an intermediate destination and not insisting on any UK government
control over the final export, weapons with UK parts can easily be
exported to human rights abusers in other countries. The government
is prepared to allow this even when it would not allow the sale of
the same components directly to the country of final destination.
Currently the guidelines for granting export licences state that a
licence will not be issued: 'where there is a clear risk that the
proposed export might be used for internal repression'; 'for exports
which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing
tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination'; or where
there is 'existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted
within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions'.
UK parliamentarians and media questioned the wisdom of the Foreign
Secretary's statement and the nature of the UK/US relationship(227).
5.6 Specific Recommendations(228)
The government of the UK should actively promote the development of
an international "Arms Trade Treaty" with provisions for arms export
control based upon respect for international law, especially international
human rights and humanitarian law. The UK government should also takes
steps to strengthen efforts to address the trade in small arms, light
weapons and security equipment, and to prevent the use of indiscriminate
weapons [for details on these measures, see the final recommendations
at the end of this report]
In addition, the UK government should:
· Introduce full extraterritorial controls on UK-based arms brokers
- residents, nationals and registered companies.
· Establish mandatory registration for those intending to function
as arms brokers and shippers, with removal from the register as a
penalty for professional misconduct. Removal should have the force
of rescinding the right to trade as a broker and voiding all current
licences
· Require all transportation agents who wish to arrange arms deliveries
to meet strict registration criteria and to obtain licences and keep
records of each authorised shipment they may carry out, including
the source country, the authorising licence, and the transit roots
and intermediate consignees
· Refuse to authorize UK companies to licence production overseas
if the recipient state cannot demonstrate sufficient accountability
in terms of export and end-use control and may licence the export
of the resulting equipment to forces that would commit grave human
rights violations.
· Establish a system of post-export end-use monitoring so that where
serious human rights violations are committed the licence is revoked
along with all subsequent deliveries and support (e.g. provision of
spares or technical assistance).
· Support the adoption of the European Council Regulation concerning
the trade in certain equipment and products which could be used for
capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment (COM 2002 - 770).
6. Germany
6.1 Arms production and trade
Despite successive German government statements that regularly assert
their arms export policy is very restrictive, the reality of German
arms transfers is quite different. According to Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) aggregated export figures between
1997 and 2001 Germany was ranked fifth of the world's largest arms
suppliers, having exported major conventional arms worth US$ 4,821
billion.(229)
German arms producing companies offer nearly the whole range of conventional
weapons such as war ships, particularly conventional submarines and
the MEKO class of frigates and corvettes, Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)
and components, artillery and other armoured vehicles.
But German companies also supply a much wider variety of military,
security, police (MSP) equipment, ranging from restraint equipment,
so-called "less lethal" tear gas and stun grenades, to communication
and surveillance systems and small arms - most notably the range of
small arms designed and produced by Heckler & Koch (HK). The direct
export of HK weapons and the proliferation of licensed production
of such weapons are detailed later in this report.
6.2 Arms export controls
The German arms export control system does not effectively restrain
arms transfers likely to contribute to human rights violations in
the recipient countries. There is also the danger that ongoing initiatives
from the arms industry may further weaken the control system with
potentially serious consequences for human rights.
German arms exports legislation consists of two laws based on Paragraph
26(230) of the German Constitution ("Grundgesetz") which states
that "arms production" and "transfers of weapons designated for warfare"
are under the direct and extensive control of the German government.
The Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz (KWKG, War Weapons Control Act),
introduced in 1961 covers all major weapon systems and components,
from fighter aircraft and warships, to tanks, armoured personnel carriers
(APCs), artillery including semi-automatic small arms. To export arms
listed in the KWKG, an export licence from the German government is
obligatory. The law prohibits any export of the listed weapons, if:
· they might be used in an action disturbing peace,
· obligations under international law would be violated, and
· good and peaceful relations with other countries would be threatened.
The second law Außenwirtschaftsgesetz, (AWG, Foreign Trade
and Payments Act) was also introduced in 1961 and deals with other
weapons, ammunition, fabrication equipment, nuclear, chemical and
biological goods as well as "dual use" goods and licences. The AWG
provides for similar export restrictions as those in the KWKG, but
the restrictions under the AWG are not obligatory. Transfers of goods
under the AWG, listed in the accompanying decree (Außenwirtschaftsverordnung,
Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance) may be restricted. Due
to arms and technology transfers to Iraq and Libya disclosed during
the Gulf War in 1991, the German legislation, especially the AWG,
was changed, adding better regulations for dual-use goods (such as
chemicals or insecticide plants), and more recently, Germany adopted
the common EU regulations for controlling exports of dual-use goods.
However, until 1997 neither the KWKG nor the AWG controlled the export
of police and security equipment such as "non-lethal" weapons and
electroshock and restraint equipment (stun batons, hand, leg and thumb
cuffs). In April 1997 the German government passed an amendment to
the export list(231) to introduce controls on electroshock equipment
as well as thumbscrews and leg shackles.
6.2.1 Export Criteria
Any company wanting to export military equipment must apply for an
export licence. In most of the cases, a FRG authority "Bundesamt
für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle, (Federal Office of Economics
and Export Control - BAFA- an agency of the Federal Ministry of Economics)
makes the licensing decision. In more serious or controversial cases,
mostly covered by the KWKG law, such as submarines for Taiwan or main
battle tanks for Saudi Arabia, the decision is made by the government
itself (usually by an intra-governmental committee). Any decisions
on arms export licence applications are supposed to take account of
the 'Political Principles' governing the Export of War Weapons and
other Military Equipment. These Political Principles were introduced
in 1973, and amended in 1982 and 2000 but are not legally binding.
Following many years of campaigning by Amnesty International and other
NGOs and the political change of the 1998 elections, the Social Democratic
and Green parties committed themselves to introducing a more restrictive
arms export legislation incorporating a human rights criterion for
export licences. It also took another year and public pressure for
the new Federal German government to adopt a new version of the Political
Principles governing arms exports. The German government has now incorporated
the human rights and other criteria in the EU Code of Conduct that
must be considered for arms export licences to third countries (although
not for EU, or NATO destinations), and in line with the EU Code has
also announced the publication of an annual report on arms exports
to be submitted to the parliament and to the public.
6.3 Direct Exports
All planned or authorised weapon exports from Germany are considered
confidential or secret. Governmental (non-commercial) transfers such
as NATO support or military/police assistance programs are also confidential
but are regularly discussed by elected Members of Parliament. However,
MPs have little or no participation in decisions about arms transfers
or the application of controls.
Such government secrecy and lack of transparency makes it very difficult
to ensure parliamentary oversight and public accountability for the
German arms trade. German companies claim, as one has, that "Export
declarations are no problem to the company - irrespective of Germany's
strict legislation - as we do not manufacture any "dual use products".(232)
The company, Metallwerk Elisenhutte GmbH (MEN) is a small arms
ammunition manufacturer and its company brochure shows a world map
highlighting some of its clients which it says include the following
places: Canada, USA, Latin America, Ireland, UK, France, Spain, Italy,
Scandinavia, North Africa, South Africa, Pakistan, Indonesia, Australia,
New Zealand.
In 2001, the German government issued individual export licences for
arms, ammunition and other military goods with a value of some 7.2
billion DM to countries all around the world including many countries
with systematic, serious and widespread human rights violations. Exports
of "war weapons" alone amounted to some 718 million DM. Unfortunately,
the figure for exports of "war weapons" does not include all arms,
ammunition and other MSP equipment for which the German government
issued export licences. Due to this statistical gap it is impossible
to get a realistic official figure for all arms transfers from Germany.
When Amnesty International has questioned German MSP transfers to
countries because of human rights concerns, the German government
answers that human rights are always "taken into account" and that
arms transfers are restrictively and responsibly controlled. However,
the very limited data presented in the German governments annual reports
on arms exports (233) means that it is almost impossible for Members
of Parliament or the public to assess whether human rights criteria
are taken into account before arms exports are permitted. In practice,
the German government's application of arms export controls appears
inconsistent.
Despite the human rights concerns raised about past arms exports,
the German government continues to issue export licences for questionable
transfers such as the export of small arms components to Saudi Arabia
and Mexico, and ammunition to Yemen and many other countries.
Nepal
Each year between 1999 and 2001 the German government authorised the
export of equipment for the production of small calibre ammunition
to Nepal, despite the ongoing internal armed conflict and increasing
human rights abuses in Nepal during this period.(234)
In 2002, the German government refused to issue an export licence
for the export of H&K G36 rifles to Nepal, after Amnesty International's
German Section raised concerns about the possible impact of such a
transfer on human rights in Nepal.(235)
In February 2002, Jane's Defence Weekly reported that "the
Royal Nepalese Army has selected the H&K G36E 5.56mm assault rifle
to fulfil a longstanding requirement for some 65,000 weapons. The
initial delivery of some 5,000 weapons is intended for this month,
but German export controls may yet block the deal. Deliveries of the
full order will be phased over 10 years with the bulk obtained over
the initial 2-3 year period. All details of the contract are not yet
known."(236) In 2003, Jane's Infantry Weapons reported that
G36 rifles are now in service in Nepal.(237)
The German company H&K has had a long-standing licensed production
arrangement with Royal Ordnance, a UK company. In 2001, the UK government
issued an export licence for the export of 6,780 assault rifles to
Nepal. (238)
In the absence of meaningful transparency by the German government
concerning arms export deliveries, Amnesty International has not been
able to ascertain whether these rifles were exported to Nepal directly
or indirectly from Germany. However, given the serious reports of
firearms being used by the Nepalese security forces for serious human
rights violations, Amnesty International is calling upon the German
and UK governments to announce a freeze on the export of such equipment
to the Nepalese forces until the danger of deliberate and serious
misuse no longer exists.
6.3.1 Armoured Personnel Carriers
In addition to small arms and light weapons, Germany delivered several
times other equipment to countries with a poor human rights record,
such as 105 BTR-60 APCs to Turkey in 1992 or 115 Hermelin APC in 1999
and 60 BTR-70 in 1998 to Macedonia.(239)
The German company, Thyssen Henschel has exported armoured vehicles
to many countries worldwide. With upgrades, such vehicles often remain
in service for decades and in many countries are used by police forces
rather than by the military. For example, Thyssen has exported UR-416
armoured personnel carriers to at least 17 countries including: Ecuador,
El Salvador, Germany, Kenya, South Korea, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain (National
Police), Togo, Turkey, Venezuela.(240)
The UR-416 armoured personnel carrier is still in service in Venezuela.
In August 2002, nine people were injured - the majority with gunshot
wounds - in violent disturbances in Caracas, Venezuela, after the
Supreme Court decided not to put on trial four military officers accused
of orchestrating an uprising against President Hugo Chávez in of the
same year. Pro-Chávez protesters clashed with police outside the court,
which was protected by members of the metropolitan police and troops
backed by armoured vehicles and at least one tank. Three policemen
were also reportedly wounded.(241)
6.4 Indirect Exports
Recently, the German government has authorised the Fritz Werner Company
to sell equipment for the construction of a munitions plant in Turkey.(242)
Since the Turkish government has a past record of tolerating its own
armed forces' human rights violations, as well as a weak practice
of controlling arms exports, this factory will vastly increase the
danger of munitions falling into the hands of human rights abusers
either within Turkey or its trading partners such as Indonesia.
6.4.1 Proliferation of small arms production
The ineffectiveness of German arms export controls is illustrated
by the widespread proliferation and use of German designed and made
small arms in war torn countries or by human rights violators. For
example Heckler & Koch (HK) G3 rifles are used in about 50 countries
including Myanmar (Burma), Turkey and Iran, while MP5 submachine guns
are used in 40 countries. Human rights violations committed by security
forces using these weapons have been documented in countries ranging
from Brazil, where the military police killed 111 prisoners in October
1992 during a prison riot at Sâo Paulo(243) to Thailand where silenced
MP5 submachine guns (MP5SD) delivered from Germany were used to execute
prisoners at various times during the mid-1980s.(244)
Many H&K weapons were regularly exported directly from Germany
with licences issued by the respective German government. However,
more recently, these weapons have been found in countries which had
never been official recipients of German arms export licences. For
example, in Sierra Leone after the horrific abuses committed in the
armed conflict, the UN reported the collection of some 940 G3 assault
rifles out of a total of 12,695 small arms and light weapons collected
as of May 2000.(245) Many countries have been authorised by successive
German governments to undertake the licenced production of Heckler
& Koch small arms. These counties have included Turkey (G3, MP5,
HK55), Iran (G3), Pakistan (G3, MP5), Mexico (G3) and Saudi Arabia
(G3). The H&K-designed weapons that reached Sierra Leone
might have come from one of these, or might have re-sold or brokered
by arms dealers operating in other countries. Whatever their route,
German weapons ended up in a country which would not have been a recipient
of official German arms exports.
Such uncontrolled or under-regulated licensed production has had a
serious impact on the proliferation and misuse of small arms and of
production technology. More recently Iranian produced MP5 submachine
guns have been reported to be in Herat, Afghanistan.(246) A 1998 Iranian
Defence Industries company brochure shows photographs of arms production
machines including one clearly marked "Fritz Werner".(247)
Pakistan
In 1992, a top company officer from Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF)
in a remarkably frank interview, claimed that "we [POF] provide end-use
certificates to Germany to cover shipments to Kuwait."(248) One reason
for this "service" was perhaps because arms exports to the Middle
East were illegal under German law, and frequently aroused controversy.
By going through Pakistan - a legal destination - many German companies
had found a convenient route to enter the Middle East market. Some
of Germany's largest weapon manufacturers have granted production
licences to the Pakistan Ordnance Factories over the years, so sales
to Pakistan barely raised eyebrows in Bonn. The same company officer
said that another variation of the EUC scheme was for German companies
to negotiate the contract with a Middle East destination, and then
turn it over to POF for the actual deliveries, in essence, "selling"
their contract to the Pakistanis.
6.4.2 Direct and Indirect Exports
Other German small arms companies have received government permission
to directly export weapons to countries with poor human rights records
as well as to establish licenced production in other countries with
weaker arms controls. For example, Mauser-Werke has licenced
SACO Defense Inc (USA) to produce the Mauser MK25 x 137mm Model E
cannon for the North American market and has exported the 20mm MK20
Rh 202 automatic cannon to the Armed forces in: Argentina, Germany,
Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi
Arabia, Spain, Thailand and others.(249) In 2001, Carl Walther claimed
to have more than 500,000 pistols in service with police and armed
forces worldwide.(250) Walther also has a co-operation agreement with
Smith & Wesson (USA), with licensed production based on the P99
pistol.
The 7.92mm MG42 and 7.62mm MG1, MG2 and MG3 machine guns, produced
by Rheinmetall Industrie AG are reported to be in service with
the armed forces of Austria, Chile, Denmark, Greece, Iran, Italy,
Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sudan and Turkey.(251) In addition
the MG3 is made under licence in Greece, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.(252)
Rheinmetall ammunition was also reportedly made under licence in Saudi
Arabia.(253) In 2002 it was reported that Diehl had tested MLRS bomblet
submunitions in Slovakia and that the company had suggested the establishment
of a "a production line in Slovakia for joint procurement from this
source."(254)
6.5 Security Equipment
German companies also manufacture and distribute a range of police
and security equipment ranging from tear gas and stun grenades, to
electroshock weapons and restraint equipment such as leg irons and
shackles.
Afghanistan
In 2002, the UK Independent newspaper reported on a raid by
US and Afghan forces on the village of Hajibirgit in Afghanistan.
The report quotes a villager who said: "the Americans were throwing
stun grenades at us and smoke grenades. They were throwing dozens
of them at us and they were shouting and screaming all the time. We
didn't understand their language, but there were Afghan gunmen with
them too. Afghans with blackened faces. Several began to tie up our
women - our own women - and the Americans were lifting their burqas,
their covering, to look at their faces. That's when the little girl
was seen running away."(255) The little girl referred to was three
years old and called Zarguna. Terrified by the use of stun grenades
she ran away and fell into the village's 60ft deep well, where she
drowned, her back apparently broken during the fall. The next day
the few villagers who had run away collected the stun grenades, small
cylindrical green pots with codes and names stamped on them, such
as "7 BANG Delay: 1.5 secs NIC-01/06-07)". These were the stun grenades
that terrified Zarguna.
Such stun grenades are reportedly a regular part of US Special Forces
equipment and are manufactured in Germany by Nico-Pyrotechnik of Hamburg.(256)
In 1981, Nico-Pyrotechnik started the Chartered Pyrotechnic Industries
Pte joint venture in Singapore together with Chartered Industries
(now known as ST Kinetics).(257) Nico-Pyrotechnik also manufactures
the Tracer Impact Marker ammunition and CS/OC grenades for the General
Dynamics Armament Systems (USA) MK19 40mm Grenade Launcher which was
in service during the Iraqi conflict.(258)
6.5.1 Electro-shock weapons
Since 1990, Amnesty International has documented at least 30 German
companies offering electroshock equipment. Despite the introduction
in 1997 of legal restrictions for the export of such equipment, several
companies supply catalogues or offer electroshock weapons as well
as restraint equipment via the internet in various languages or offer
their goods at so called "security fairs". In August 1998, in response
to a parliamentary inquiry, the German government reported for the
first (and since then only) time some statistical data about exports
covered under number B0101 of the export list. Over the period from
April to December 1997, 22 export licences worth a total of DM 167,013
(some € 80.000) were granted. Most of these licences were for the
export of "electric cattle prods" or "electric pincers to stun pigs".
However, in three cases electro shock weapons for "personal protection"
purposes were granted. Recipient countries included Botswana, Canada,
Czech Republic, Lithuania, Namibia, Norway, Poland, Saudi Arabia,
Switzerland, Slovenia, South Korea, Thailand and the USA.
Abuse of persons in custody using modern electro-shock weapons has
been spreading but is often difficult to detect.(259) This is what
"Muhammad" allegedly experienced in a prison in Saudi Arabia.
" For many hours they tortured me on the soles of my feet. Being
hit with an electric baton not only made me vomit, but I lost control
of everything. I lost control of my bowels, my water, I just could
not control anything in my body. I was left in my own vomit and urine
all night. That is how they want you to be during a torture." (260)
6.6 Arms brokering and trafficking
In Germany, Section 4a of the 1961 War Weapons Control Act(261) requires
a licence for: "(1) Anyone who intends to broker a contract on
the acquisition or transfer of war weapons located outside federal
territory or to show that an opportunity exists for concluding such
a contract shall require a licence; and (2) Anyone who intends to
conclude a contract on the transfer of war weapons located outside
federal territory shall also require a licence."(262) However,
if a German-based arms broker does not take possession of the arms
and s/he is involved outside the territory of Germany in mediating
and negotiating an arms deal, then the activity falls outside current
German law.
Documents found in the offices of the ousted government of the Republic
of Congo showed that, between June and September 1997, an arms broker
of German nationality and a Belgian arms broker supplied millions
of dollars worth of military equipment to the forces of the beleaguered
President in Brazzaville(263). The German dealer negotiated orders
totalling $42.4 million, and received $27.1 million based on finance
from Congo's oil supplies(264). The German broker operated from South
Africa and Namibia using companies registered in a number of countries,
including French, Belgian and UK bank accounts(265). The dealer also
used a trading company in London.(266) Arms appear to have been shipped
from South Africa and Central Asia using large Ukrainian-registered
Ilyushin 76 cargo aircraft that flew via airports in Egypt and Namibia.(267)
The arms were used by government forces in the civil war during which
several thousands of civilians were killed indiscriminately and over
300,000 fled into the forests to escape violence.(268)
6.7 Specific Recommendations
The government of Germany should actively promote the development
of an international "Arms Trade Treaty" with provisions for arms export
control based upon respect for international law, especially international
human rights and humanitarian law. The German government should also
takes steps to strengthen efforts to address the trade in small arms,
light weapons and security equipment, and to prevent the use of indiscriminate
weapons [for details on these measures, see the final recommendations
at the end of this report]
In addition, the German government should:
· Improve the transparency and parliamentary scrutiny of German arms
exports, particularly with regard to foreign co-production or licensed
production deals. Parliament should be provided with clear, detailed,
regular and comprehensive information regarding all transfers by both
private companies and government agencies. The recent "Military Equipment
Export Report" of the German government is not sufficient.
· Ensure that the export control legislation covers a comprehensive
list of arms particularly small arms, "non lethal weapons" such as
tear gas and stun guns, security equipment (electro shock weapons,
tear gas, rubber bullets), ammunition and "dual use" technologies.
· Regulate the activities of all German-based arms brokers and shipping
agents including nationals and companies who conduct an arms brokering
deal entirely outside Germany. The government should introduce a strict
"Register" for all brokers and shipping agents with all arms brokering
deals being subject to the licensed approval of the government.
· Establish effective end-use monitoring systems of German-supplied
arms in order to ensure that if such arms are used for serious human
rights violations this will result in the cancellation of future contracts,
and the provision of spare parts and servicing to the abusing party.
· Strictly control all foreign licensed production arrangements by
German companies so that German government agreements will prevent
any arms sales or exports from foreign production facilities to recipients
who are likely to use such arms for serious human rights violations.
· Prohibit the production and trade of equipment whose inherent effects
result in torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and prevent
the export of all other security and police equipment in cases where
there is a reasonable assumption that it will be used for cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment.
· Support the adoption of the European Council Regulation concerning
the trade in certain equipment and products which could be used for
capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment (COM 2002 - 770).
7. Italy
7.1 Production and Trade
Italy is one of the largest producers of handguns, shotguns and corresponding
ammunition. These small arms and munitions have been exported to almost
100 countries including Turkey, Algeria, Brazil, Philippines, Lebanon,
the Republic of the Congo, Peru, Thailand, Slovenia and the USA, where
the most important buyers are located. But while the turnover of Italian
companies specializing in the small arms sector has increased, the
state controls governing this trade have been reduced.(269)
Establishing the final destination of small military weapons authorized
by the Italian government is difficult; companies invoke the need
for commercial confidentiality, and government data on exports lacks
transparency. Finding information about the export of "civil arms",
using the data compiled by the Italian Institute of Statistics concerning
foreign trade, is easier.
In 2002, Italy authorized arms transfers worth 920 million Euros and,
in 2001, 827 millions Euros. NATO countries are the recipients of
one third of the whole Italian exports and developing countries are
the majority of destinations for Italian weapons with roughly 55 per
cent of the total transfers.
7.2 Arms Export Control Principles
During the 1980s, Amnesty International and other civil society organisations
and parliamentarians campaigned in Italy for a strict law on arms
exports. Italian Law Number 185 was passed on 9 July 1990, which prohibits
the export of arms to countries:
· Engaged in conflict (in violation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter).
· Acting in contravention of Article 11 of the Italian Constitution
("l'Italia ripudia la guerra come strumento di offesa alla libertŕ
degli altri popoli e come mezzo di risoluzione delle controversie
internazionali[...]" .... "Italy rejects war as an instrument
of aggression against the freedoms of others peoples and as a means
for settling international disputes [...]"), violating international
obligations, national security, the struggle against terrorism and
good relations with other states.
· That are embargoed by the United Nations.
· Whose governments are responsible for proven human rights violations.
· Benefiting from Italian civil aid program whose military expenditure
exceeds the requirement for self-defence.
· Where there are inadequate guarantees on final destination.
In 1998, the Italian Government declared its support for the EU
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. This Code has similar criteria
to the 1990 law and requires regular cooperation and information sharing
with other EU Member States, as well as an obligation for annual reporting
on arms exports. However, the amount of publicly available information
from the Italian authorities concerning arms exports from Italy has
been reduced in recent years, apparently to protect the "commercial
confidentiality" of Italian arms-exporting companies. This has reduced
the oversight ability of the Italian Parliament with respect to arms
exports.
More importantly, there is a growing body of evidence that the existing
Italian arms export controls are being flouted or circumvented. Various
Italian organizations, including Amnesty International Italy, have
pointed out loopholes in the current regulations and inadequacies
in the law that allow arms traded from Italy to fall into the hands
of human rights violators. These loopholes in Italian law, and some
examples of the terrible impact on human rights, are discussed further
below.
7.3 Arms Exports
One serious loophole is that Italian legislation does not cover "civilian"
small arms designated for hunting, sporting or personal protection.
Italian research institutes "Archivio Disarmo"(270) and "IRES Toscana"
reported that there had been an increase in exports of such small
arms in recent years, especially to countries where they are likely
to be used to violate human rights.(271)
Weapons routinely used by the police are normally not considered "war
arms". This categorisation has led to a liberalisation in the trade
in most semi-automatics. The result in terms of human rights has been
disastrous. Italy is able to export "small civil weapons" to countries
devastated by armed conflict and gross human rights violations, even
if the transfer of "military arms" to these same countries is under
a UN or European Union embargo.
Sierra Leone
Italian small arms were supplied to the Sierra Leone government throughout
the 10-year internal armed conflict which was officially declared
over in January 2002. The conflict was marked by widespread and systematic
human rights abuses against civilians. These included deliberate and
arbitrary killings, torture, including rape and deliberate amputation
of limbs, abduction and forced recruitment, including of children,
by the armed opposition Revolutionary United Front. Government forces,
including the Civil Defence Forces, were also responsible for extrajudicial
executions, torture and ill-treatment, and recruitment of children.
Despite Italy's arms export law, between 1993 and 1997 Italian companies
were the primary providers of explosives and small arms to government
forces in Sierra Leone, supplying "civil arms" with a value of some
US$1.6 million. In 1997, 1.6 million rifle cartridge cases were sent
from Italy to Sierra Leone. Between 1997 and 1998, arms to the value
of US$70,000 and US$34,000 of explosives and detonators for industrial
purposes were exported to Sierra Leone. Nothing about these exports
was declared in the Italian government's public reports to the Italian
Parliament.(272)
In Italy 14 companies, including the public-owned Finmeccanica (Breda
Meccanica Bresciana), as well as FIAT and above all Beretta Holding
S.p.A., supply small arms and light weapons and their related ammunition.
Beretta Holding S.p.A. is a family-owned multinational company controlling
13 companies and operating in more than 60 countries, with both civilian
and military production. In 1999, Beretta's overall turnover was 448
billion lire, of which 207 billion was from firearms production.
Other companies, including Agusta S.p.A. and Alenia Marconi Systems
are major exporters of conventional weapons and dual use equipment.
Republic of the Congo
Between 1993 and 1996, a time of escalating violent conflict and human
rights abuse, Italy exported arms, munitions and explosives worth
US$7 million to the former Zaire, now the DRC. During the first months
of 1997, at the height of the civil war between the armed forces of
President Mobutu and the AFDL armed opposition, 15 tons of cartridges
arrived from Italy. At the beginning of October 1997 armed clashes
between different political factions in the country resulted in at
least 5,000 deaths and many more injuries.
Yet the export of weapons did not diminish. During the first six months
of 1998 Italy exported ammunition worth nearly US$1.2 million to Congo
and between 1997 and 1998 arms and munitions worth some US$2.2 million
and explosives worth US$627,000 were exported from Italy to Congo.(273)
Algeria
Between 1996 and 1997 Italian companies exported pistols, rifles and
ammunition worth 13 billion lire (approximately US$6 million) to Algeria,
a country which has been ravaged by serious human rights abuses resulting
in the killing of more than 100,000 people by security forces, state-armed
militias and armed opposition groups. In 1999, the Italian government
authorized the export to Algeria of 5,000 sub-machine guns - type
Berretta PM12S - worth about 2.875 lira or 1.5 million Euros, and
these were transferred the same year. Italian licensing officials
questioned by Amnesty International about this delivery could not
verify any procedures carried out to ensure adequate levels of accountability
and training of the Algerian security force units due to receive such
weapons.
During 2000, the number of attacks by government and opposition forces
escalated through ambushes, massacres, crossfire and bombing, and
hundreds of civilians were killed, sometimes in groups of over 20
people in one attack. Nevertheless, in 2000 the Italian government
authorised the transfer of "military items" to Algeria worth 2 million
Euros and allowed the delivery of 13 million Euros of unspecified
military equipment.
In 2001-2002, the Algerian security forces shot dead some 100 unarmed
citizens in the context of demonstrations in the northeastern region
of Kabylia. An official commission of inquiry which was established
to look into the killings committed between April and June 2001 concluded
that the security forces had repeatedly resorted to excessive use
of lethal force during the demonstrations. Despite the authorities'
repeated announcements that the security force personnel responsible
would be brought to justice, as this report went to press only two
had been. Torture remains prevalent and systematic in nearly all cases
involving alleged links to what the government describes as "terrorist"
activities. The overwhelming problem of impunity for human rights
violations continued to block the search for truth and justice in
relation to the thousands of reports of torture, "disappearances"
and killings committed by the security forces, state-armed militias
and armed groups since 1992.
In the first 10 months of 2001, more than 16 million euros-worth of
Italian small arms arrived in Africa. Among the recipients were Nigeria
(6 million euros) and Kenya (2.5 million euros), both countries where
security forces persistently carried out gun-related human rights
violations.
Nigeria
The Nigerian security forces continued to use excessive force in response
to protests against oil company activities and during 2000 were allegedly
responsible for large-scale killings of civilians in Benue State.
No independent investigations were carried out into allegations in
connection with these incidents, or into other killings by the security
forces since the return to civilian rule in May 1999.(274) The Nigerian
security forces had in their inventory Beretta M12 sub-machine guns
and Beretta M951 9mm pistols.(275)
Kenya
In Kenya, security officials committed violations with impunity. In
2001, Kenyan police killed at least 18 people in circumstances suggesting
that they may have been extra-judicially executed. Torture remained
widespread and police used violence to disperse peaceful demonstrations
by human rights groups, opposition politicians, environmental activists
and others.(276)
Colombia
The principal civilian hostage rescue teams in Colombia were the Unidad
Antisecuestro y Extorcion (UNASE) units. Founded in the summer of
1991 following a large number of kidnappings in the capital city of
Bogota, the original UNASE received overseas training from several
foreign units, including the Spanish Civil Guard in Madrid. Each unit
is reportedly made up of 35 volunteers: a colonel commander, four
officers, 15 NCOs and 15 special agents. Operatives are equipped with
weapons such as AR-15 rifles, 9 mm Beretta pistols and specialized
equipment including fast rope for rappelling and secure-voice communications.
These units are in operation in most of the major Colombian cities,
including Bogota, Bucaramangara, Barranquilla and Cali.(277) Amnesty
International has received credible reports that members of UNASE
were involved in torture and human rights violations against suspected
kidnappers and also in kidnapping themselves.
Brazil
Italian Berretta handguns are the second most numerous foreign small
arms confiscated by the police in Brazil, a country where the government
has failed to exercise due diligence in curbing the use of small arms
by civilians, and sometimes by police, in persistent acts of murder,
kidnapping, robbery and intimidation.
Turkey
In the Italian government report covering exports for the year 2001,
Turkey was listed as a recipient of 45.2 millions euro
of Italian weapons. During 2002, more than 50,000 light weapons were
confiscated from the armed opposition PKK in Turkey and of these,
the origin of production of about 16,000 have been identified. Italian
landmines and light weapons were at the top of the list.(278)
Central African
Republic
On 29 October 2002, an Italian-made Aeromacchi warplane was used in
an attempt by armed forces fighting for the President of the Central
African Republic to bomb armed opposition targets in the capital city,
Bangui. Several hundred Libyan troops and at least two aircraft were
deployed to help the Presidential forces. At least 20 civilians were
reportedly killed and civilians fleeing towards the border told reporters
that there were many more casualties.(279)
7.4 Law on arms exports
Italy does not have a consistent legal framework to control the arms
trade from Italy. The oldest law, dating back to 1931, is the "Testo
Unico delle Leggi di Pubblica Sicurezza" ("Consolidation Act of
Public Safety Laws"), followed by Law 110/75 (concerning civilian-use
weapons) - passing through many regulations and norms - and the more
recent and innovative Law 185/90 (concerning military-use weapons).
The regulation is divided into two sections, war weapons and common
firearms, whose products fall within the UN definitions. While the
legislation seems to be quite strict and clear in both cases, nevertheless
it has discrepancies as far as the procedures for exports and sanctions
are concerned.(280)
Italian arms export controls include provisions to ensure the protection
of human rights. Applications for the authorization of arms exports
must currently specify the type of weapon, the value, the payment
to intermediaries, the name of the intermediary, and the final recipient.
An end-user certificate issued by the authorities of the receiving
country must be attached to the application. Current Italian legislation
also requires a high degree of transparency by requiring that annual
reports on arms exports from Italy are presented to Parliament. The
report, drafted by the Prime Minister, contains detailed data on manufacturing
firms, type of materials exported, value, final recipient and the
banks involved.(281)
In Italy, as in many other countries, the category "small arms" is
not precisely defined. Officially a distinction is made between small
arms for military purposes and civil arms generally used for sport,
hunting and self-defence. "Military arms" require a specific government
licence for export and their transfer is supposedly checked and monitored
by parliament. The export regulations governing the second category
of weapons - "civil arms" - are very weak and it is possible to export
handguns from Italy by merely obtaining the permission of a local
police commander.
A few small arms are categorized as military weapons or "war arms"
and so come under the Arms Control (185/90) Law. Arms which fall within
this category include rifles, machine-guns and machine pistols, which
are automatic arms and specifically built for military purposes.
However, the vast majority of the individual weapons exported from
Italy are categorized as intended for "civilian" use and so fall outside
the remit of the 1990 Arms Control Law. Among the weapons exported
under this category are not only semi-automatic firearms, but also
manually charged canna-rigata rifles, canna rigata muskets,
semi-automatic pistols, revolvers, and spare parts, ammunition and
explosives that can, in any case, be used for military purposes. All
such weapons can also be used for human rights violations. Companies
are, therefore, able to exploit the lack of stringent categorization
to export arms to countries involved in armed conflicts and to governments
responsible for human rights violations - even though the Arms Control
Law supposedly prohibits such exports.
7.5 Arms brokering and trafficking
Italian police arrested Leonid Minin near Milan on the night of 5
August 2000. A stack of documents were found in his hotel room reportedly
detailing illegal sale of arms to one of the most brutal insurgencies
in Africa - the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone.(282)
In June 2001, Leonid Minin was charged in Italy with illegal arms
trafficking. However, Italian judges said they found it very difficult
to prosecute a man accused of illegally trafficking arms that originated
and were transferred outside of Italian territory. On 17 September
2002, the Italian Supreme Court stated it could not find any justifiable
basis for Leonid Minin's prosecution, "not even in the fact that the
trafficking of arms has taken place in violation of an embargo established
by a UN resolution." The Court said it could not act against Leonid
Minin as long as he did not "threaten the internal security" of the
state, and it demanded more evidence from the public prosecutor before
a case could be made to convict him for arms deals in Africa and Ukraine.
On 18 December 2002 a court in Monza concluded that it was not able
to prosecute in the case of Leonid Minin. As a result, he was temporarily
released from prison, pending a final hearing on 17 June 2003. The
assistant to the Monza public prosecutor publicly blamed the Supreme
Court for stating that Leonid Minin's acts were not punishable on
Italian territory. In a previous similar case, the Supreme Court had
ruled that the law on arms trafficking "also prevails with reference
to arms that are not present on national territory and are not destined
to enter there."
The documents discovered in Leonid Minin's possession included contracts,
faxes discussing arms deals, weapons catalogues and forged end-user
certificates. He was found with large amounts of cash, including Mauritian
rupees, Hungarian forints and polished diamonds worth nearly $US500,000.
Minin, an Israeli citizen, was holding passports from the former Soviet
Union, Russia, Germany and Bolivia.
In December 2000, a UN Panel of Experts reported that in March 1999
Leonid Minin had been responsible for delivering 68 tonnes of weapons
from Ukraine via Burkino Faso to Liberia destined for the RUF in Sierra
Leone. The UN also established that a BAC-111 plane owned by Leonid
Minin had delivered arms from Niger to the RUF via Liberia in December
1998, just before widespread human rights abuses by rebel forces in
Freetown in January 1999. In October 2001 the UN again reported Minin's
involvement an arms delivery of 113 tonnes to Liberia via Côte d'Ivoire.
The RUF and Liberia have been under a UN arms embargo since 1997 and
2001 respectively.
7.6 Italian NGOs' campaign
Since 2002, Amnesty International Italy has been running a joint campaign
with a number of Italian organizations "Contro i mercanti di armi.
Difendiamo la 185/90" (Against the arms industry lobby' -Let's
defend the arms control law) to demand the full implementation and
strengthening of existing human rights safeguards in Italian arms
control legislation. During 2002 and 2003 the Italian Campaign sent
more than 150,000 petitions to the Italian Parliament and organised
meetings, conferences and a sit-in. The Parliament approved six important
changes to the bill proposed by the government, impeding the government's
original intentions to water down the existing Law. These six changes
included, in particular, ensuring transparency and the highest standards
of control over arms trading. Amnesty International and the other
Italian NGOs presented a number of motions to the Parliament, and
many of them were not accepted, but in recent months after a substantial
discussion among politicians and the government, three of these motions,
including the consultation of NGOs and the role of the Parliament
in monitoring the new Law, were approved.
In February 2002, Amnesty International Italy joined a number of other
organizations to campaign against a proposal to restructure the European
defence industry. The supposed purpose of this restructuring is "to
make the European defence industry more competitive in the global
market place." However Amnesty International is concerned that these
changes to the current regulations on arms transfers may further weaken
already lax controls, leading to increased exports to forces that
use arms and security equipment to violate human rights.
7.7 Specific Recommendations
The government of Italy should actively promote the development of
an international "Arms Trade Treaty" with provisions for arms export
control based upon respect for international law, especially international
human rights and humanitarian law. The Italian government should also
takes steps to strengthen efforts to address the trade in small arms,
light weapons and security equipment, and to prevent the use of indiscriminate
weapons [for details on these measures, see the final recommendations
at the end of this report]
In addition, the Italian government should close the existing loopholes
in the arms exports legislation by:
· Including all small arms and light weapons, including "civil arms",
in a strict export control regime that prevents arm exports to forces
that would use such arms for human rights abuses. ·
Introducing legislation to regulate the activities of Italian-based
brokers of small arms and light weapons, and to prevent illegal trafficking
of arms by Italian citizens, residents and companies where the arms
originate and were transferred outside of Italian territory.
· Establishing in law that a violation of a UN arms embargo by anyone
resident or trading from Italy is a criminal act.
· Support the adoption of the European Council Regulation concerning
the trade in certain equipment and products which could be used for
capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment (COM 2002 - 770).
8. Canada
8.1 Production and Trade
Canada's arms companies, among the largest of which are General Motors
Defense Canada (purchased in March 2003 by US-based General Dynamics(283)),
CAE Inc, Bombardier Inc, General Dynamics Canada and Pratt & Whitney
Canada, produce military equipment ranging from aircraft and helicopters
and their components to light armoured vehicles, unguided rocket systems,
mortars, automatic rifles, ammunition, electronic equipment and military
training. A large proportion of Canada's military exports are of military
aerospace or electronics products.(284)
The Canadian Government reported that it exported $592 million(285)
of military equipment in 2001, the fourth year in a row that the amount
had climbed. After adjustment for inflation, the 2001 figure was 22
per cent higher than the equivalent total for 2000, and the highest
reported for the post-Cold War period since 1990.
The government has published an annual report each year since 1990,
listing exports by country and weapons category. But it does not list
exports to the United States, the largest importer of Canadian arms
- a long standing policy, the government says, dating from the integration
of the North American defence industry during World War II. (286)
So the figure of $592 million does not represent all of Canada's military
exports. Project Ploughshares, an NGO that tracks Canada's military
exports, says: "it is safe to assume that the value of Canadian
military exports to the US in 2001 exceeded the estimated figure of
$950 million for 2000. It is likely that the US total for 2001 was
close to twice the value of Canadian military exports to all other
countries combined."(287)
8.2 Arms Export Control
Military exports are controlled through the Export and Import Permits
Act (EIPA) administered by the Department for Foreign Affairs. Permits
are required for the export of military goods to anywhere except the
US; the definition of "military goods" is based on that of the Wassenaar
Arrangement's munitions list, that is, items especially designed or
modified for military use. This means that items such as target pistols
and hunting rifles are included,
regardless of whether the foreign recipient is a private, non-military
end user or a government and/or military end user.
Direct exports are strictly controlled, says the government, to countries
that (a) pose a threat to Canada and its allies, (b) are involved
in or under imminent threat of hostilities, (c) are under UN Security
Council Sanctions and (d) whose governments "have a persistent record
of serious violations of the human rights of their citizens, unless
it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods
might be used against the civilian population."(288)
The Canadian Commercial Corporation, a government corporation that
assists Canadian companies with export sales to foreign governments
and acts as a guarantor, identifies the Philippines, Saudi Arabia
and United Arab Emirates as among the Canadian defence industry's
target markets: all countries about whose human rights violations
Amnesty International has expressed concern in recent years.(289)
Moreover, since 1987 Canada has directly shipped military goods valued
at almost $400 million to countries involved in hostilities, often
where human rights abuses are prevalent.(290) During 2001 military
goods were transferred to five countries engaged in hostilities: Colombia,
Indonesia, Israel, Philippines and Turkey. Military goods were also
transferred to twelve countries where government armed forces were
involved in serious violations of human rights, including Saudi Arabia,
Philippines, and China.(291)
Philippines
The Philippines is a regular recipient of transfers of Canadian military
equipment. Canadian aircraft parts and engines as well as handguns
(see further below), worth $11.6 million in total, were transferred
to the Philippines between 1990 and 2001.(292) It appears that reliable
reports of indiscriminate aerial bombardment of civilians by the Philippines
Air Force as part of the government's attempts to defeat opposition
groups were not taken seriously by the Canadian authorities when considering
such exports.
In 1993 Amnesty International detailed full military operations in
the Cordillera mountains in Northern Luzon, an important base area
for the New People's Army (the armed wing of the Communist Party of
the Philippines), including aerial bombardment, forced evacuations
on a massive scale and widespread destruction of property.(293) Again,
in 2000 Amnesty reported periodic aerial bombardment of villages suspected
of harbouring members of opposition groups that led to mass displacement
of civilians, particularly in Mindanao;(294) and in 2001 it said that
over 400,000 civilians in central Mindanao were internally displaced
amid reports of indiscriminate aerial bombardment of civilian areas
suspected of containing forces of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.(295)
Aircraft parts and aircraft engine parts continued to be transferred
to the Philippines during 2000 and 2001.(296)
Israel
During the 1990s $3 million worth of military vehicles, tank weapon
control systems, thermal imaging equipment, ammunition and other electronic
equipment were transferred to Israel.(297) During 2001, vehicle, aircraft
and weapons systems parts worth $660,000 were transferred.(298) In
November 2000, shortly after the beginning of the current intifada,
Amnesty registered its concern at the escalation in violence leading
to further human rights abuses. It urged governments to refrain from
the supply of those types of arms likely to be used in serious human
rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law.(299)
Indonesia
Government figures show that during the 1990s, $24.9 million worth
of equipment was transferred to Indonesia, including tanks, helicopters
and specialised military training equipment. In a 1998 report Amnesty
International registered concern at the continuing high incidence
of excessive use of force by the Indonesian army when dealing with
both violent and peaceful demonstrations,(300) as did other Amnesty
International reports on Indonesia throughout the 1990s. In 2000,
the Indonesian armed forces were engaged in widespread extra-judicial
executions, "disappearances", torture and arbitrary detentions.(301)
8.3 Indirect Arms Trade
Licensed production of Canadian military technology abroad as part
of a joint venture by Canadian companies does require a government
permit, the issuing of which takes into account the risk that the
final destination might not be one to which Canada would sanction
a direct arms transfer. However, detailed information of permits granted
for licensed production is not made available to the public. (302)
During the late 1990s, the Sudamex Export Trading Company was registered
in both Canada and the USA as providing a wide range of police, military
and prison equipment including leg irons and electro-shock weapons.
The company had its head office in Montreal and stated that 1998 had
"proved very successful" and that the company had "gained wide acceptance
from suppliers and importers alike. Sales to the Latin American market
as of 1998 had recorded remarkable growth."(303)
Currently, the brokering of military and security goods that originate
in Canada is subject to the usual permit regime. But for military
goods that originate elsewhere, the only control on Canadians' foreign
arms dealing activity is when automatic firearms are involved: it
is illegal to export automatic firearms from Canada or anywhere else
to a country that is not on Canada's Automatic Firearms Country Control
List(304). Anti-terrorism laws cover the brokering of equipment that
would "facilitate the commission of an act of terrorism", regardless
of destination. Otherwise, there is no control on Canadian nationals,
residents or companies brokering military equipment that originates
outside Canada, even if the destination is under UN embargo.(305)
A glaring loophole is that millions of dollars worth of Canadian military
and security equipment and parts have been transferred without transparency
to the USA. These can in turn be exported from the US to armed forces
that violate human rights [see Chapter 1 on the USA]. Interlocking
company ownerships between the US and Canada can help facilitate such
trade.
Jet fighter parts for Israel
US-made F-16 fighter jets have been transferred to Israel. In July
2002 Amnesty documented that the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) responded
to the attacks from Palestinian forces and suicide bombers, using
armour piercing rounds, grenade launchers, F16 aircraft and missiles
from Apache helicopters against installations of the Palestinian security
services and Palestinian residential areas. By the end of February
2002 more than 860 Palestinians had been killed, including more than
180 children.(306) The Canadian government should have suspended the
transfer of computer parts for F-16s to the US, given the US's transfer
of them to Israel and the Israeli Government's ongoing and documented
use of F-16s to commit such grave human rights violations.
Helicopters to Colombia
Amnesty International Canada reported that between September 1998
and February 2000, 40 Huey military helicopters were sold and transferred
to the US State Department, 33 of which were upgraded in the US and
then redirected to the Colombian military as part of Plan Colombia,
a US aid package purportedly to dismantle the drugs trade. That the
helicopters were sold to the US State Department shows how this huge
loophole in Canadian export policy can be exploited.
Canadian law requires that a permit be issued for the transfer of
military equipment to any country other than the US. This system is
intended to control the transfer of Canadian military goods to their
final destination, i.e. the point where they enter into military use.
But if they are refurbished or used in manufacturing in another country
they do not require a Canadian permit for transfer to their final
destination.
Canadian arms trade policy would not have allowed these helicopters
to be sold directly to the Colombian military precisely because of
the danger that the helicopters would be used to commit human rights
abuses [see further below].(307) However, the sale was permitted because
under Canadian export policy, the end user was considered to be the
US and not Colombia.(308)
A letter from the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade (DFAIT) explained to Amnesty International Canada that:
"Canada's policy regarding exports of military goods to the US
is based on a long-standing defence production arrangement which continues
to serve the mutual interests of Canada and the US. Military goods
exported to the US do not require export permits nor does the US provide
re-export assurances. Further regulation of defence exports to the
US would simply result in the movement of production to the US or
the replacement of Canadian suppliers with suppliers from other countries.
The only impact would be a loss of jobs for Canadians with no benefit
to global peace and security."
It continued:
"Forty surplus Canadian Forces CH-135 helicopters, originally manufactured
in the US, were sold by the Department of National Defence to the
US government. The helicopters were to be reconfigured and used for
State Department assistance programs in a number of different countries.
Military goods which are destined to the US, i.e. where there is a
US end-user, or where the goods will be incorporated in a US product
or modified in the US, do not require an export permit. Once these
helicopters were sold to the US government, they ceased to be "Canadian"
and became subject to the very stringent export control process of
the US government."(309)
This loophole in Canadian export policy is a serious one, because
many Canadian military exports are of components and systems used
in the importing country, once they "cease to be Canadian", to manufacture
weapons which are then sold on to third countries.
8.4 Small arms and light weapons
Canada ranks as a "small" rather than medium or large producer of
small arms, according to the Small Arms Survey in Geneva.(310), but
its exports of small arms and light weapons can still contribute to
human rights abuses.
Philippines
In addition to larger military items sent to the Philippines, the
export controls report for 2000 details a transfer of large-calibre
ammunition components to the Philippines,(311) where Amnesty International
has publicised reports of alleged drugs dealers, including street
children, being shot dead in the community by suspected police officers
or other armed men;(312) of extrajudicial executions
allegedly carried out by members of the security forces;(313) and
of the shooting of a human rights worker by a government-backed militia.(314)
Canada's small arms companies include Para Ordnance, which builds
handguns for the military, police and civilian markets and claims
"export experience" in the Philippines in its report to Industry Canada;(315)
as well as SNC Industrial Technologies, which produces ammunition
and hand grenades for the Canadian Armed Forces and increasingly for
foreign military customers worldwide, including the Philippines.(316)
Serious human rights abuses, including unlawful killings, have been
committed in the Philippines by government forces and opposition armed
groups in the context of the continuing conflicts in the country.
Through loss, theft or illegal sale, Philippine government munitions
sometimes end up in the hands of criminal and armed political groups.
The lucrative black market for small arms can prove an irresistible
temptation to underpaid and ill-disciplined soldiers. In Mindanao,
for example, over 70 per cent of the population owns one or more guns.(317)
Argentina
The latest Canadian export controls report details transfers of $100,000
worth of firearms to Argentina during 2001.(318) Amnesty International
has repeatedly expressed its concern over police killings and excessive
use of force in Argentina. In July 2002 Amnesty International reported
that two demonstrators were killed and many others injured during
clashes between police and demonstrators as crowds protested at the
continuing economic crisis. Although police sources initially claimed
that the men were killed by infiltrators among the demonstrators,
photos subsequently released to the media clearly demonstrated police
involvement in the events leading to their deaths.(319)
Turkey
Firearms were also transferred during 2001 from Canada to Turkey,(320)
where Amnesty International has expressed concern at excessive use
of force by the police. Amnesty International called for an investigation
in November 2001 after four protesters died and 14 others were wounded
when Turkish police forces conducted a raid on the Istanbul neighbourhood
of Küçükarmutlu, which had been the centre of hunger strikes against
a new prison system. Eyewitnesses reported that the police repeatedly
fired their weapons both at specific targets and at random as they
moved towards the fast house. The eyewitnesses alleged that there
was no armed resistance from the protesters.(321)
8.5 Exports of "Dual Use" Technologies
Canada regularly exports equipment categorised as civilian to military
forces and thus these exports are excluded from its reports on military
exports. The Export Control List already contains a "dual-use" category
which should be expanded to include all equipment, including helicopters,
which, although built to commercial standards, is sold to foreign
militaries.
Turkey
Bombardier Aerospace, currently the third largest Canadian military
contractor,(322) was contracted at the end of 1999 to build and deliver
a $21.8 million Challenger 604 aircraft to the Turkish National Intelligence
Agency for cross-border operations.(323)
The Challenger 604 aircraft transfer did not appear, however, on the
government's export list, which illustrates another loophole in the
Canadian export licensing system. Items that are certified as being
for civilian use, even if the end user is a military one, do not need
to appear on the list, even as dual-use items. This happens most frequently
with aircraft and helicopters, items which have both military and
civilian use and whose makers are engaged in manufacturing for both
civilian and military markets. Project Ploughshares estimates that
in this way, up to $100 million worth of additional transfers are
not recorded on the publicly available export control lists.
The Turkish government is one of Canada's larger customers for military
equipment. $27.7 million worth of equipment was transferred between
1993 and 2001,(324) including Bell helicopters in 1993 as well as
aircraft for cross-border operations in 1999.(325) During 2001 another
$31,500 worth of aircraft parts and $343,000 of electronic aircraft
equipment were transferred.(326) In August 2000 thirty-eight civilians,
including women and children, were killed when Turkish jets bombed
a group of pastoralists near Kendaxor, near Irbil, in Northern Iraq.(327)
Colombia
In 2001 Vector Aerospace Corporation overhauled and supplied components
for aircraft owned and operated by the Colombian armed forces, but
military export permits were not required because the specific aircraft
and parts were designated as civilian.(328)
Likewise, when Bell Helicopter Textron Canada shipped 12 Bell 212
helicopters to the Colombian police and military between 1994 and
1996, the transfers did not require Canadian export permits because
the 212 helicopter, a model based on an earlier military design, had
received commercial certification from Transport Canada. Both of these
contracts contributed to the operations of the Colombian military
forces whose units were involved with impunity in serious human rights
violations and protected paramilitary groups responsible for gross
human rights abuses.(329) Therefore, the contracts should first have
been subject to the licensing control system.(330)
China
It is not just arms manufacturers who are involved in trade that is
implicated in human rights violations. Technology developed for commercial
purposes by Nortel Networks, Canada's telecommunications giant, is
reportedly being used by police and security forces in China to refine
the targeting and repression of political dissidents.
Amnesty International has documented the cases of democracy activists
in China who have been detained or tortured for Internet-related offences
perceived as "subversion".(331) Forty two people in China believed
to be prisoners of conscience were detained or are serving long sentences
in prison or labour camps for Internet-related offences. Three have
died in custody, two of whom reportedly died as a result of torture,
and there are reports that others have been tortured or ill-treated
in detention. Internet use is increasing rapidly in China - 73 per
cent up between June 2001 and June 2002 - and as a result, the so-called
"Great Firewall of China"- the Chinese government's previous attempt
to control Internet traffic through a handful of international "gateways"-
is giving way under the increasing weight of traffic. It is being
replaced by a new, much more comprehensive system, Golden Shield.
Ultimately the aim of Nortel Network's supply of technology for China's
"Golden Shield" project is to create a gigantic online database with
an all-encompassing Chinese government surveillance network of smart
cards, credit records, closed-circuit TV, voice and face recognition
and Internet use surveillance. The Chinese authorities envisage the
system offering immediate access to records on every citizen in China,
while linking to networks of cameras to increase police efficiency.
Crucially, with the help of Nortel's technology, Internet surveillance
and filtering of available content is being moved from the international
gateway level down to the level of individual computers in homes,
Internet cafes, universities and businesses, in direct conflict with
the rights to freedom of information and expression. Nortel is also
reportedly involved in research on voice recognition technology to
facilitate the automatic surveillance of telephone conversations,
and in providing technology that allows video surveillance data to
be transported from remote cameras back to a centralised surveillance
point.(332)
Between 1995 and 2000, Export Development Canada (EDC), a government
agency, provided nearly $842 million in financing and risk insurance
to Canadian companies doing business in China in the field of advanced
technologies and telecommunications. There is no process for screening
the end uses to which technology exports supported by the EDC will
be used. Some projects in China have reportedly been turned down because
they were considered unsuitable on human rights grounds, but EDC will
not release a detailed breakdown on what projects have received financing
or insurance, despite its recently improved disclosure policy.(333)
8.6 Specific Recommendations
The government of Canada should actively promote the development of
an international "Arms Trade Treaty" with provisions for arms export
control based upon respect for international law, especially international
human rights and humanitarian law. Canada should also takes steps
to strengthen efforts to address the trade in small arms, light weapons
and security equipment, and to prevent the use of indiscriminate weapons
[for details on these measures, see the final recommendations at the
end of this report]
· The Canadian Government should undertake a comprehensive review
of the military, security and policing goods export control system.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade should implement
immediately a more strict interpretation of its existing export control
guidelines, especially those calling for strict control of military
exports to countries at conflict or with a record of human rights
violations. ·
Arms export permits should be required for any commercial equipment
or components sold to foreign military, security or police end-users.
· There should be meaningful transparency of arms and security equipment
and technology export data to allow for effective parliamentary oversight
and public accountability. The current reports lack sufficient detail
about the numbers and types of equipment being transferred for an
adequate assessment to be made of their impact on human rights.
· Permits or licences should be required for all military and security
exports to the US and should be refused if there is a danger that
the US recipient will in future transfer the items to others likely
to commit human rights violations.
· More meaningful information about Canadian licensed production of
military and security technology should be published in order to ensure
that equipment manufactured abroad under licence is not diverted for
use in countries where it is likely to contribute to human rights
violations.
· Arms brokering activities outside Canada, or where the arms in question
are transferred outside Canada, by Canadian citizens, residents and
companies should be brought within the law.
· Canada should ratify and implement two key international conventions
related to small arms to which it is a signatory:
the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of
and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related
Materials, which it signed in 1997;
the UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking
in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, which it signed
in 2002.
9. Japan
9.1 Production and Trade
Japan is not one of the world's major arms exporters, but it nevertheless
has an international responsibility to improve the control of its
arms and dual use exports so they do not contribute to human rights
violations. In 1967 Japan banned military exports to communist countries,
those under UN embargo, and those in or near a state of hostility.
In 1976 this ban on military exports was effectively extended worldwide,
and included defence production equipment and technologies. Japan's
domestic arms industry is restricted by law to supplying the country's
own forces.(334)
However, in 1983 the Japanese government signed a bilateral Exchange
of Technology Agreement with the US, which makes an exception to the
1976 ban on arms exports and allows for cooperation in the sharing
of military technology.(335)
9.2 Transfers of Advanced Technology
The flow of technology between Japan's military and civilian sectors
runs in a different direction to that of many other arms-producing
countries, particularly the US. Whereas in the US, research on military
technology developments is done by the big arms contractors and "spin-off"
technology then benefits the civilian sector, in Japan civilian research
and development activity takes the lead, with "spin-on" into the defence
sector. Even the big manufacturers such as Mitsubishi have relatively
small defence arms, so there is greater reliance on technology from
the civilian sector. Japan is regarded as advanced in its putting
to use of civilian technologies in the military field.(336)
But the fact that most Japanese arms manufacturers also make civilian
goods raises the question of dual usage. As is the case with other
G8 nations, that a particular technology can have both a civilian
and military application means that items categorised as civilian
can find their way to military end-use by those with a history of
human rights violations, even though Japanese law prevents exports
of military goods. There is no airtight definition of arms, and the
operation of the controls is dependent on the changing interpretations
of the Government. During the 1980s, for example, Japanese jeeps went
to the Nicaraguan army, helicopters were sold to military or paramilitary
forces in Burma and Saudi Arabia, while aircraft and trainer aircraft
went to the Philippines, all countries with disturbing human rights
records.(337)
9.3 Foreign Licensed production
Japanese law does not permit licensed production abroad of military
technology. Civilian technology can be produced under licence in other
countries.(338) However, civilian technology can easily be adapted
to military purposes.
Helicopters to Indonesia and Iraq
Kawasaki Heavy Industries has a joint venture with Germany's MBB to
produce the BK 117, a dual-use light transport helicopter which is
most often used for purposes such as medical evacuations. However
it has "hardpoints" or points at which weaponry such as guns or missiles
can be attached to convert it to military use. In 1985 a military
version of the BK 117 was unveiled at the Paris airshow, fitted with
eight anti-tank missiles, a roof-mounted sight for the missiles, a
sight for the turret-mounted machine gun and radar warning sensors.
German airworthiness authorities had certified an increased weight
version of the model, allowing for weapons and equipment to be attached.
(339)
Japan has had agreements with Indonesia to produce Kawasaki's BK 117
helicopter under license in that country as the IPTN NBK 117.(340)
Amnesty International has reported instances of helicopters being
used to violently disperse otherwise peaceful protests in Indonesia.
In April 1994, tens of thousands of workers from factories around
the city of Medan were involved in a peaceful demonstration over wages
and working conditions. Open clashes erupted as thousands of workers
from the industrial centres outside Medan were prevented by security
forces from entering the city to meet the Governor. They were met
by thousands of fully-armed troops of the Police Mobile Brigade, soldiers
from the District Military Command (KODIM), as well as crack airforce
troops (LINUD), military police (POM), and regular police units. At
least nine armoured vehicles were deployed nearby and helicopters
patrolled overhead. An estimated 25,000 workers, unable to enter Medan,
gathered and continued their protests in the surrounding industrial
areas. In an attempt to disperse the crowd, troops fired their weapons
over the heads of protesters, who sought cover within the walls of
nearby factories.(341) Cases such as this demonstrate the necessity
of full transparency from the Japanese government about where its
technology ends up.
Cabins and electrical equipment manufactured by Kawasaki for the BK
117 helicopter were still being transferred to Germany in 2001.(342)
The resulting helicopters were exported from the German production
line.(343) This raises the question of end-use controls, as once those
Japanese parts reach Germany, the issue of where the resulting helicopters
end up and for what purpose is beyond Japan's reach.
Twenty BK 117 helicopters were on the Iraqi air force inventory in
1995; the fact that their point of origin is not easily traced, highlights
the need for greater transparency in transfers of dual-use goods.(344)
In another example, Nissan's 4x4 Patrol utility vehicle and several
other Nissan trucks are sold across the world under production arrangements
with local distributors. The Jabalpur Ordnance Factory in Madhya Pradesh,
India has adapted the 4x4 Patrol utility vehicle for military use.
Such vehicles are used, among other purposes, as carriers for anti-tank
missiles. The same Indian plant, which has been producing Nissan vehicles
since the 1960s, has also produced Nissan's Z4W73 light military 4x4
truck under licence as a "carrier".(345)
9.4 Small arms
Japan is a very large exporter of "non-military" firearms, such as
sporting and hunting rifles, but its exports of such weapons are not
revealed by the government, thus making it very difficult for parliament
to oversee or the public to hold the Japanese government accountable
for ensuring the responsible management of small arms exports.
Exporters do have to apply first for a government license, but details
of licenses granted are not made available to the public, so no oversight
can be exercised over government export decisions.(346) This trade
was worth over US$30 million in 1999. Japan is ranked third in the
world, after Brazil and Germany, for exports of sporting rifles from
companies such as Miroku Firearms, with 1999 exports valued at US$15.1
million. In 1999, it was also the second biggest exporter, after Italy,
of "non-military" shotguns, with total exports worth US$15.2 million.(347)
Amnesty International has documented the use of "non-military" guns
such as hunting rifles in human rights violations. For example, it
was reported in 1997 that large-scale massacres of civilians in Algeria
were being perpetrated by death squads using, among other weapons,
hunting rifles.(348) In 1997 the organisation drew attention to the
case of a Bulgarian traffic policeman who shot at and injured three
teenage boys with a hunting rifle loaded with shotgun pellets.(349)
In 2000, Amnesty International reported that tensions between ethnic
groups in the Solomon Islands, from Malaita and Guadalcanal island,
escalated into violent conflict.(350) In October 1998, armed political
groups later calling themselves the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM),
started a campaign of threats and intimidation against Malaitan settlers
on Guadalcanal island, killing and injuring scores of civilians and
causing an estimated 20,000 people to abandon their homes. In addition,
up to 10,000 mostly Guadalcanalese indigenous people have fled into
remote areas. The IFM is said to draw most of its fighters, estimated
to number between 300 and 2,000, from impoverished villages along
the rugged Guadalcanal south coast, known as the ''weather coast''.
They have, at times, included at least 100 child soldiers aged 12-17
and are armed with hunting rifles, some stolen police guns and explosives,
traditional weapons and home-made pipe-guns or refashioned World War
II rifles.
Clearly the designation of a gun as for recreational or hunting purposes
does not prevent it being used to commit human rights abuses, and
thus such weapons should be subject to the same controls as explicitly
"military" goods. Canada, another member of the G8, includes hunting
rifles in its definition of military goods to be subject to export
controls. (351)
9.5 Electronic equipment
High-specification electronic and radio equipment that appears on
the Wassenaar Agreement's list of dual-use technologies require an
export license to be exported from Japan. However, standard police
radios do not require licensing. As with hunting and sporting guns,
information on licenses granted for export of high-tech electronic
equipment are not made publicly available.(352)
Indonesia
The Japanese ICOM Inc company makes portable police radios; it was
represented at the International Police and Security Exhibition in
Tehran in 2002. ICOM radio equipment is used by police forces worldwide,
including, for example, in Indonesia.(353) Reports by Amnesty International
have highlighted the lack of accountability of the Indonesian police
and their continued involvement in human rights violations.(354)
Secom, which manufactures and exports electronic surveillance and
security equipment, set up joint venture security services operations
in the 1990s with Indonesian companies affiliated with the Indonesian
armed forces and police.(355) The human rights record of these armed
forces and police has long been a concern expressed by Amnesty International
and other human rights organisations.(356) Secom still had operations
in Indonesia at the start of 2003, and the Indonesian armed forces
and police were reportedly continuing to commit grave human rights
violations.(357)
ICOM's radios have also made their way into military hands. ICOM HF-transceivers
were being used in Sierra Leone in 1995 by Executive Outcomes, the
now-dissolved South African mercenary company which supported the
Sierra Leonean government in its fight against rebels of the Revolutionary
United Front. Executive Outcomes' mercenaries were using them to communicate
with company bases in Angola and, when conditions permitted, with
their head office in Pretoria, South Africa.(358) It is unknown whether
Executive Outcome's equipment came from the Japanese, American, German,
Australian or British branches of ICOM - which in itself demonstrates
the lack of transparency about how such equipment came to be transferred
to forces involved in hostilities.
The Yaesu Musen Company Ltd manufactures and exports radio transmitters
that can have military and police applications. By 1998 they had been
sold to over 100 countries, including China, India and countries in
the Middle East.(359)
Japanese companies are moving into the field of cyber-security in
China. Amnesty International has recently expressed its concern that
foreign companies are reportedly providing technology which could
be helping the Chinese authorities to censor the Internet and monitor
its use, given that democracy activists in China are being detained
or tortured for Internet-related offences perceived as "subversion".(360)
9.6 Security Equipment
Japan does not have any controls on the export of electro-shock stun
weapons and leg irons.(361) In early 2003, for example, a Japanese
company was reportedly involved in the manufacture wholesale and export
of items including electric shock batons and tear gas sprays. These
were advertised under the category of "self-defence", along with its
other product lines of used tyres and incense.(362)
Amnesty International continues to campaign for governments worldwide
to ban the manufacture, promotion and trade to other countries of
equipment whose use is inherently cruel, inhuman or degrading, including
leg irons and electro-shock stun belts. Regarding electro-shock stun
guns and batons, Amnesty International has called for such weapons
to be suspended from export and use in law enforcement pending independent
examination of the medical and other effects of each type, sub-type
or class of such weapon to ensure that their usage would not contradict
international human rights standards, particularly the UN Basic Principles
on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.(363)
9.7 Specific Recommendations
The government of Japan should actively promote the development of
an international "Arms Trade Treaty" with provisions for arms export
control based upon respect for international law, especially international
human rights and humanitarian law. The Japanese government should
also takes steps to strengthen efforts to address the trade in small
arms, light weapons and security equipment, and to prevent the use
of indiscriminate weapons [for details on measures, see the final
recommendations]
In addition, the Japanese government should specifically:
· Tighten up the
controls on export of dual-use technologies so that the end-use is
taken into account in order to prevent international transfers of
weapons or technologies likely to be used for human rights violations;
· Ensure greater transparency on exports of dual-use technology and
small arms so that the Japanese parliament can be held accountable
for respecting international human rights standards; "Non-military"
sporting and hunting guns to be included in military export controls.
· Ban the export of "security" or "crime control" equipment that can
easily be used for torture; suspend the export and use of electro-shock
weapons pending independent studies to ensure any uses can be consistent
with international human rights standards;
· Implement the principles included in the Wassenaar Arrangement,
which Japan approved in July 1996, on transparency, exchange of information
and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional weapons and
dual-use technologies.
10. Overall Recommendations
The governments
of the G8 should urgently review the human and other costs of their
inadequate arms export policies and make a determined effort with
their allies to reach an effective international agreement without
delay to address the key problems outlined in this report. Given the
long lifecycle of most arms and security equipment and technology
- and therefore a risk of possible abuse for an extended period -
there should be a rigorous interpretation of the basic principle that
no exports of such goods should be permitted where it is reasonable
to assume that these items will contribute to grave human rights violations.
10.1 Call for a Global Arms Trade Treaty
Amnesty International is calling on all governments, especially those of the G8, to negotiate an International Arms Trade Treaty which ensures full respect for international human rights and humanitarian law. This Treaty should include the following:
10.1.1 A Framework
Treaty
Contracting Parties shall not authorize international transfers of
arms:
· which would violate
their obligations under international law - including the Charter
of the United Nations, arms embargoes and other decisions of the United
Nations Security Council and international treaties prohibiting the
use of weapons that are indiscriminate or that cause unnecessary suffering.
· In circumstances in which they know, or should know, that the arms
due to be transferred are likely to be:
1. used in breach of the United Nations Charter or corresponding rules
of customary international law, in particular those prohibiting the
threat or use of force in international relations;
2. used to commit serious violations of human rights;
3. used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian
law relating to armed conflict;
4. used to commit genocide or crimes against humanity;
5. diverted and used to commit of any of the above acts.
Furthermore there should be a presumption against the authorisation
of those arms transfers likely to:
· be used for or
to facilitate the commission of violent crimes;
· adversely affect political stability or regional security;
· adversely affect sustainable development;
Contracting Parties will submit an annual report on international
arms transfers from or through its territory or subject to its authorization
to an International Registry, in accordance with the requirements
of this Convention. The International Registry shall publish an annual
report and other periodic reports.
10.1.2 A Protocol on the export of licensed arms production
Contracting Parties shall:
· Require that all
Licenced Production Agreements are authorised by governments.
· Not permit the export of licenced arms production in circumstances
where it would result in international arms transfers contrary to
the International Arms Trade Treaty.
· Not permit the export of licenced arms production without a specific
mutually binding agreement with the recipient state to seek prior
authorization for any exports from a licensed production facility
on a case-by-case basis, stating maximum production quantities to
be exported and requiring in each case end-use certification and provision
for end-use monitoring.
10.1.3 A Protocol on arms brokers and traffickers
Contracting Parties shall:
· Require that all
arms brokers or traffickers operating or having residence or business
dealings on their territory be registered.
· Not register anyone to act as an arms broker or trafficker if they
have aided or committed crimes set out in the International Arms Trade
Treaty, or been convicted of a crime of armed violence, illegal trafficking,
or money laundering.
· Require a license for the conduct of any particular arms brokering
or trafficking deal, wherever conducted by any of its nationals or
permanent residents, and refuse such a licence if the applicant is
not registered, or if the deal in question would result in arms transfers
that violate the principles of the International Arms Trade Treaty.
10.2 Oppose Indiscriminate Weapons
Amnesty International calls on all parties to any international armed
conflict to take all necessary precautions to avoid civilian casualties,
in accordance with binding principles of international humanitarian
law. These include a prohibition on direct attacks on civilians or
civilian objects; attacks which do not distinguish between military
targets and civilians or civilian objects; and attacks which, although
aimed at a military target, have a disproportionate impact on civilians
or civilian objects.
10.2.1 Chemical and biological weapons
The use of chemical and biological weapons in armed conflict is prohibited
by international law. They are inherently indiscriminate weapons,
incapable of being used in a manner that does not violate the principle
of distinguishing between civilians and combatants -- a customary
rule of international humanitarian law.
Even if they could be targeted solely against combatants, attacks
with biological or chemical weapons are still prohibited because they
cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering to combatants,
and thus violate a customary rule of international humanitarian law.
10.2.2 Depleted Uranium
Amnesty International calls on governments to refrain from the transfer
and use of depleted uranium (DU) weapons, pending the outcome of investigations
into their long-term health effects. DU ordnance may pose a long-term
threat to civilians and the environment. Some studies suggest that
DU dust, which remains in the vicinity of targets struck by DU weapons,
poses a significant health risk if inhaled or ingested.
10.2.3 Anti-personnel landmines
Amnesty International is completely opposed to the use, manufacture
stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. In many conflicts
landmines are intentionally laid in areas where they will cause maximum
disruption to civilian life. They continue to maim and kill unsuspecting
civilians long after conflict has ended. Amnesty International calls
on all governments to:
· sign, ratify, implement and monitor the 1997 Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty;
· ban the use, production, stockpiling, sale, transfer or export of
landmines;
· provide resources for community-based de-mining and mine awareness
programs;
· assist and help the victims of landmines.
10.2.4 Cluster bombs
Since October 2001, Amnesty International has called for a moratorium
on the use of cluster weapons. Cluster bombs are munitions which carry
hundreds of sub-munitions or bomblets. Cluster bombs present a high
risk of violating the prohibition of indiscriminate attack, because
of the wide area covered by the numerous bomblets released. At least
five per cent of them do not explode upon impact, becoming de facto
anti-personnel mines and remaining a continuing threat to people,
including civilians on the move, who come into contact with them.
10.3 Curb Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons encourages abuse
and is a growing problem recognized by the international community.
Amnesty International considers the UN Programme of Action to Prevent,
Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons
in All its Aspects (July 2001) to be a positive step but insufficient
to address the misuse of small arms for human rights violations by
states' armed forces and law enforcement agencies. Amnesty International
calls for full respect for international human rights and humanitarian
law by all states with regard to the use and export of such arms.
In addition to an International Arms Trade Treaty (see above), other
stronger measures are required as follows:
10.3.1 Transparency
· All small arms and light weapon transfers should be included in
a UN Register for global transfers; regional transfers should be included
in regional registers.
· States should publish comprehensive and detailed annual reports
on arms transfers and identify and set up mechanisms to ensure effective
parliamentary scrutiny of arms transfer policy.
· Systems should be established for adequate and reliable marking
of arms during manufacture or import and for adequate record-keeping
on arms production, possession and transfer. These should include
state-to-state, and international arrangements for tracing arms by
relevant authorities.
10.3.2 Loopholes should be closed
· There should be strict national registration of each arms manufacturer,
broker, transporter and financier, even if they only operate through
"third countries". Those convicted of criminal offences involving
money laundering, trafficking, and firearms-related violence should
be removed from the register.
· Licences for export, transit and import should be controlled on
a case-by-case basis, and should include full details of brokers,
transporters and financiers involved. They should be issued by the
sending, receiving and transit governments after direct consultation
with each other and with the home governments of any brokers, transporters
and financiers involved, only if the arms transfers proposed will
not reach anyone likely to violate international human rights and
humanitarian law standards.
10.3.3 Accountability
· National laws should conform to international law and standards,
including standards on the use of force.
· Each national legislature should be notified in advance of arms
transfers and of follow-up checks made on how the transferred arms
will be used in order to prevent serious human rights abuse.
· An international framework should be agreed, based on international
law which includes rigorous criteria for arms transfers, mechanisms
for reviewing their implementation, and model regulations governing
the import, export and transit of state-to-state transfers.
10.3.4 International assistance
· International aid projects to prevent the proliferation and misuse
of small arms should promote strict adherence to international human
rights standards and humanitarian law.
· Projects should include concerted efforts to increase the capacity
of law enforcement agencies to control the proliferation and misuse
of small arms, in accordance with international standards, including
the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials.
· An international fund should be established to provide resources
to assist countries in the collection and destruction of small arms
which are not in legal civilian possession or acquired for legitimate
national defence or internal security purposes.
10.4 Police and
Security Equipment
Amnesty International is calling on all governments, especially those
of the G8, to:
· Ban the use of police and security equipment whose use is inherently
cruel, inhuman or degrading. Ban the manufacture and promotion of
this equipment and its trade to other countries. This should include:
leg irons, electro-shock stun belts and inherently painful devices
such as serrated thumb-cuffs.
· Suspend the use
of equipment whose medical effects are not fully known, pending the
outcome of a rigorous and independent inquiry into its effects. This
should include equipment such as high-voltage electro-shock weapons.
International transfers should be suspended pending the results of
the inquiry.
· Conduct an independent and rigorous review of the use of equipment
where its use in practice has revealed a substantial risk of abuse
or unwarranted injury. Suspend the transfer of such equipment to other
countries pending the results of the review. This should include equipment
such as legcuffs, thumbcuffs, shackle boards, restraint chairs and
pepper gas weapons.
· Introduce strict guidelines on the use of police and security equipment
such as handcuffs and tear gas. Set up adequate monitoring mechanisms
to keep the guidelines under review and to ensure that they are adhered
to.
· Ensure that all relevant research on the safety of new law enforcement
equipment and weapons is placed in the public domain before any decisions
are taken on their deployment.
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