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PM Meles' "Anti-Corruption" Campaign One Year Later: What has it really "achieved"? By a Citizen Observer (July 2002)

1. BACKGROUND 1.1 The demise of the dictatorial, pseudo-socialist regime of Colonel Mengistu Hailemarian, in May, 1991 and the establishment of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, comprising of the various parties, fronts as well as liberation movements that fought and toppled the military regime, opened up new vistas in the politico-economic hopes and aspirations of all Ethiopians. Having established itself both politically and structurally, the TGE was quick at realizing the challenges it faced in attempting to rehabilitate and revitalize the defunct economy it inherited from its predecessors; and therefore, wasted no time in subscribing to the advice and assistance of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) viz. the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). 1.2 This strange rapprochement between the Marxist-EPRDF led TGE and the arch-capitalist BWI (and the IMF especially) laid the foundations for the unholiest of relationships. The Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is a coalition of many ethnic-based parties, the core of which is the Tigrian Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF). Ideologically, all of the constituent parties were ardent Marxist-Leninists that narrowly associated themselves with the extremist Albanian brand. This extreme leftist ideological brand was clearly spelt out in the political doctrines and programs as well as economic models of the parties. The organizational structure, systems and procedures of internal control, appraisal and evaluation procedures, nomenclature and party jargon, etc. all testified to this ideological color and brand. It was an inside-out "revolutionary front" with the word "democratic" added hastily in 1989/90 to the tune of the new era. Despite all these ideological trappings and hang-ups; and without truly changing its colors and aspirations, the EPRDF had to come out with some acceptable pretensions and disguised programs of reform and restructuring, to the negotiating tables with the BWI. It had a huge appetite for aid and assistance, in almost everything, but nothing in the form of commitment and clarity towards the reform agenda. The BWI, on the other hand, were very clear of what they wanted to achieve through this relationship, and of the means of achieving it. They had clearly worked out programs, with time lines and expected outputs clearly mapped out. They had sufficient sticks as well as carrots to bend the other party into their programs. They also had sufficient people with all the skills and perseverance required to ensure strict adherence to agreed upon programs and rigorous measurement of results. Outputs were tenaciously linked to rewards and/or penalties. 1.3 All along the reform period of the last ten years; the relationship between the two parties was marked by guises and pretensions on the one hand; and sticks (whips) and carrots on the other. In May, 1998, Eritrea-invaded Ethiopia. This event was shocking to many Ethiopians, and more so to the unsuspecting EPRDF leadership. In as much as it sent powerful tremors to the nationalist fabrics of all Ethiopians, it also shook the foundations of the relationships between the Ethiopian Government and the Bretton Woods Institutions. Right after the invasion, Ethiopia began gearing up for an inevitable confrontation with Eritrea. This meant obvious retracking with regards to economic reform, renegading on fiscal commitments and serious reallocation of resources towards the war effort; provoking fury, curses and anathema in Washington. 1.4 Washington really tried hard to dissuade both Ethiopia and Eritrea from going to a full scale war. This effort included diplomatic initiatives like the one we all know as the US-Rwandan initiative. But it also involved pulling economic and financial strings, through the BWI and the European Union. The EU suspended all grants and loans, previously earmarked for Ethiopia. Despite the fact that Ethiopia had fulfilled all the agreed upon targets and bench marks, the IMF unilaterally suspended and withheld all disbursements. The west used all means at their disposal to dissuade the two parties. But the pressure on Ethiopia seemed unfairly heavy, because the west had more strings to pull against Ethiopia than the recluse regime in Asmara. This was however, seen as another plot by the west and on the sovereignty of their country by many Ethiopians, both ordinary citizens as well as the political elite. 1.5 Many people in Addis, began drawing parallels between the current behavior of the US administration and that of the administration of President Jimmy Carter in the 1970's, when Somalia invaded Ethiopia. Anti-American feelings began simmering, and the entire relationship with the west, including the reform program became a focus of debate or suspicion. In the meantime, all sectoral initiatives and programs like the Financial Sector Reform, Health and Education Programs, Energy and Telecommunications, etc were suspended. Except for few selected sales made to foreigners (notably BGI of France, and the Saudi tycoon Sheik Al-Amoudi) in order to raise badly needed foreign exchange, the privatization program was also put on halt. 1.6 With or without the West's support, war became unavoidable, and it was indeed successfully fought and brought to a swiftly victorious conclusion by the Ethiopians. It, however, left a lot of rancor and residual grudges, both in the internal relationships among the leaders of the EPRDF, as well as the relationships between the EPRDF and the Ethiopian people. Relationship between Ethiopia and the West, was at its lowest since May 1991. The Russians, as they were in the 1970's when they saved Ethiopia from shame and humiliation in the hands of Somalia, became the "Saviors" of Ethiopian Sovereignty. 1.7 This new phenomenon in the external as well as internal relationships of these agents led, I think to a fundamental rethinking of almost everything. Defense experts criticized the policy of aggressive demobilization pursued by the EPRDF led government, all along, since the Transition. Had it not been for this neglect and total unpreparedness, the Eritreans would not have dared to attack Ethiopia, they argued. The fact that, relationships with the East especially with Russia had been neglected and ignored; was also seen as a major policy failure. This failure contributed to the expensive price paid in order to create a capable army to repulse aggression. The Relationship with the BWI, especially the IMF was seen as extremely treacherous. In as much as the IMF wanted to bulldoze and level-off everything along the lines of the Zambian or Ugandan model; the EPRDF had ambitions of retaining some important vestiges of command and control. It also wanted to give some support and protection to its domestic businesses and investors, while the IMF was bent at creating a totally open situation. A review of the negotiations made during the past decade, between Ethiopia and the IMF, revealed a series of concessions on the Ethiopian side. And the trend pointed towards more concessions, especially in the crucial or strategic sectors of banking, telecommunications, energy and the liberalization of the capital account. The tariff level or regime and the investment proclamation were also identified as areas of tremendously heated debate and intense arm twisting between the two parties. These and many other assessments revealed that there were serious gaps, inconsistencies and failures in the EPRDF led government; for which Prime Minister Meles and his team in government were to be blamed. Add to this blame, the unpatriotic stance he took on the Ethio-Eritrean conflict, and then you have a completely crushed and isolated chairman of the EPRDF and Prime Minster of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. 1.8 These intense debates and broil in the party, finally culminated in the complete break up of its top leadership. Ato Seeye and Ato Tewolde, the leaders of the anti-Meles faction accused the Prime Minister of being "unpatriotic" and defeatist. For an apparent lack of an appropriate response, Ato Meles picked a page from his old Marxist books and authored his infamous treatise on Bonapartism; and accused his opponents of Bonapartist attitudes, undemocratic practices and corruption. He, then, took swift measures to isolate all his opponents in the party, the army and the government. But isolation or removal from power was not enough when it comes to some of the more powerful and more popular elements of the faction. Ato Meles, chose the vilest and the wilest of all means, and came out with what he called the "anti-corruption campaign" of May, 2001. 2. INTRODUCTION 2.1 Through vile or wile, Ato Meles neutralized his opponents within the party. In order to win the political support of the west he discoursed on the need to accelerate the reform program and skillfully portrayed himself as the "arch-reformer:" and his opponents as "dogmatic Marxists". He quickly patched up his old connections with the IMF and the World Bank, as well as established secret contacts with the Eritrean President Easayas Aferwerki. As a lynchpin between the reform agendas of the BWI and his domestic political discourse, he picked an item from the civil service reform package and enacted the anti-corruption laws in May 24/2001. One working day after the enactment of this proclamation, and on the morrow of his 10th year anniversary in power, Ato Meles personally (without any arrest warrants) authorized the arrest of his key opponents and the powerful leaders of the anti-Meles faction within the EPRDF; in guise of corruption. In the evening of May 29, 2001, the Office of the Prime Minster issued a statement officially admitting the arrest of Ato Seeye Abraha and Ato Bitew Belay, the two faction leaders, along with other business men and six family members of Ato Seeye, including Ato Assefa Abraha the Board chairman of the Ethiopian Privatization Agency; who also happened to be a younger brother to Ato Seeye. Furthermore, the statement invited the general public to come forward with information and evidences of any corruption crimes committed by especially the above mentioned officials; and hence designated offices or officers who would receive such information and evidence. The statement, finally "congratulated all of us" for the chances we all were given to redress our long awaited wounds and grudges against these corrupt officials of the EPRDF and their cronies, as it called them. 2.2 When Ato Melese officially launched his "anti-corruption" campaign, a year ago; he himself was the commander and the Prime Minster's Office (PMO) the command post. Arrest instructions and search orders were directly issued from the PMO. Members of the special forces (Body guards of the Prime Minister) were deployed to do the job. The courts and the police force were later engaged to formalize the drama. Twelve months down the line; where does the campaign stand now? What are its achievements so far? Where is it heading on? These are among the many questions that many of us will be raising for various reasons. A lynchpin as it is, this campaign was launched with the intention of fulfilling obligations to multitudes of stakeholders, both internal and external. In as much as internal party operatives and cadres of Ato Meles were bent to prove their political discourse; the skeptics and dissenters wanted to see it falter in the eyes of the whole nation and the world at large. Although, by and large suspicious and skeptic, the general public was also curious to see the finale of the drama. The international community, especially the IMF and the World Bank, seem to have the biggest stakes in the outcome, for they are the ones who paid the bills for such an expensive campaign. Further more, the name and reputation of these towering institutions of free market and free spirit seem to be at stake, for it appears that they have been guilefully manipulated for purposes much more sinister than they expected. 2.3 A progress report on the campaign is therefore long overdue. Every stakeholder will expect a report, but not all will get one. Ato Meles will obviously be reporting to his sponsors; although I don't think he will dare to do the same to any of his internal stakeholders. Nor will the commissioner (of the anti-corruption commission) dare to utter a word on something that she had no control at all. Report or no report, either from the PM or his commissioner; here is my version of it. I represent neither the PM nor his commissioner; I shall therefore have no reason to be apologetic, nor will I have any reason to be critical. I am just a citizen. A "national campaign" as it was; we all had reasons to follow its progress keenly. Information was also abundant; thanks to the private press and the Internet. 2.4 I shall therefore begin by presenting a brief outline of the process, highlighting land mark events that unfolded since the start of the campaign. This shall be followed by a brief discussion on the legal aspects of the process; especially focusing on major transgressions of law and violations of the Federal Constitution. 2.5 I shall then present the summary of the charges that have so far been filed against the current prisoners; followed by an overview of the current status of events. 2.6 My last chapter will then dwell on teasing out the direct or indirect consequences, effects and/or achievements of the campaign. I shall then comment on the desirability and beneficiaries of these achievements. 2.7 My final conclusion will just be a call for all concerned bodies and stakeholders to intervene, and bring the campaign into its proper course and direction. The whole purpose of my report will therefore be about provoking debate around this disastrous campaign of the millennium. I also intend my report to serve as a general platform; around which more detailed and specific reports can be appended. A critique is of course always welcomed. 3. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS 3.1 The campaign that kicked off by May 29/2001 with the massive arraignment of Ato Seeye Abraha and several other businessmen; had several tracks running both in series and in parallel to each other. However, all such tracks were designed to feed into the main track, which goes all along the court proceedings of the defendants. 3.2 The first process is about the identification of and the swift arrest of the prisoners. The dawn of May 29, 2001 witnessed the mobilization of soldiers comparable to that of the same date but 10 years ago. On May 28, 1991 early morning, thousands of EPRDF soldiers invaded the palace of the acting President Tesfaye Gebrekidan as well as several key government offices and facilities. Ten years later, i.e. on May 29/2001 a comparable operation was launched but this time invading the residence of several individuals in town and by the members of the so-called "Special Forces" of Prime Minster Meles Zenawi. They typically moved on Toyota pickups in dozens or so; went to the targets' residence, picked up the target and took him to the special prison at the Central Investigation Bureau. The residence and all other occupants inside, were then put under complete police control with no body coming in or going out. Even school children or working family members were prohibited from leaving their homes for several weeks. They were gradually allowed to leave in the morning and return back in the evenings but had to pass through a thorough body search both on leaving and returning back to their homes. Visitors were not allowed or were registered on a special book of register; presumably for the review and perusal of the intelligence service. This total blockade continued for weeks in most cases, but for several months (upto now) especially in Ato Seeye's case. 3.3 In a short span of upto six hours i.e. until noon of May 29/2001, more than twenty people were collected into the cells at the Central Investigation Bureau (CIB) of the Federal Police Commission. This is a very high security prison where the previous dictatorial regime of colonel Mengistu Hailemariam used to torture, kill and/or shut off his enemies. As the story goes, one of the current prisoners Ato Assefa Abraha had spent ten years of his life in one of these cells during Mengistu's time; on suspicions of being "anti-revolutionary" and also for being the brother of Ato Seeye, the then arch-enemy of the dictator. Ironically, Ato Assefa was back into his cell after 10 years; for more or less the same reasons; but this time by the order of Ato Meles instead of Colonel Mengistu. Among the current victims were:- 3.3.1 Ato Seeye Abraha, Ato Asmelash Abraha and Ato Fessaha Abraha, three brothers and ex-combatants in the TPLF/EPRDF army. Another brother called Woldesellassie Abraha, a major in the current Ethiopian army and an ex-combatant in the TPLF, was also put under custody while he was on duty in one of the garrisons on the Ethio-Eritrean border. Ato Mihreteab Abraha (another member of the Abrahas) and his wife Ajebnesh Samson (a house wife) as well as Timnit Abraha (a sister to all of the Abrahas) were also arrested along with their brother. Ato Assefa Abraha, included, all these eight members of the same family were the first and primary targets of the operation. Ato Bitew Belay another leader of the anti-Meles faction in the EPRDF was also arraigned along with the Abrahas. 3.3.2 Ato Minwuylet Atnafu, Chairman and share holder of the powerful Star Business Group (SBG), which had began to dominate the merchandising industry and the trucking business; along with his colleagues Ato Abebaw Desta, Ato Worku Megra, Ato Abebaw Gelay and Ato Asnake Jembere were the second major targets. Within this cross-link of businesses under one group were Mina, Tiss Abay and Ajema Trading Plc.s as well as Tana Transport Plc. By dominating the trucking and whole sale trading businesses, this group had literally cornered out of business all of the so-called party affiliated companies viz. Guna, Ambassel, Wondo and Dinsho trading Plcs; as well as Trans-Ethiopia, Tikur Abay, and Dinsho Transport companies. To make the list of the competitiors complete Yeshareg Zewdie of Yegeta Trading PLC and Berhane Gidey of Abeba Trading PLC were also included. Ato Abreham G/Kirstor a nephew to General Tsadkan (the ex-chief of staff), Ato Sammi Yusu, and a couple of other junior traders were included in the list for reasons not necessarily limited to competition. Besides being major competitors to the businesses of Ato Meles and his cronies, these people were very active in supporting as well as mobilizing support for the war against Eritrea. Some of them also had family ties with some of the politicians in the anti-Meles faction. 3.3.3 The third group consisted of senior executives in some of the public enterprise, especially the sugar mills and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. Vice president, Hailu Legesse and AVP Mulugeta Gebre Medhin were singled out from a dozen of VPs and AVPs in the Bank. Ato Alazar Dessie an ex-VP in the CBE who was later working for Abyssinia Bank was also arrested on his return from the US (he is a US citizen). Besides to being VPs of the biggest bank and the major lender to all the party affiliated businesses, these three gentlemen were heavily involved in retrieving loans previously advanced to some of the Eritreans deported during the war. This, involved foreclosing on some of the mortgaged properties, notably trucks, residential buildings, Ethio-Automotive PLC, Addis flour factory and many others. They also represented the CBE in several negotiations regarding the huge amount of non-performing loans advanced to the party companies. Among the possible grudges against the Star Business Group was also the fact that this group had almost dominated the lucrative sugar business, thereby completely crushing out the party-companies. The managers of the two biggest sugar estates viz. Ato Belete Alemayehu and Ato Sufian Ibrahim of Methara Sugar Factory and Ato Berhanu Jijo of Wonji/Shoa Sugar Factory were also included in the vendetta list of Ato Meles. Besides to being managers of the estates, they also played key roles in raising funds to support the war. Ato Belete Alemayehu was the chairman of the fund raising committee established to co-ordinate such endeavors among various state owned enterprises. This committee alone raised more than 42 million Birr for the war effort. Furthermore, Ato Shewaferaw Girma and Ato Demelash Arega were called in from the trading center of the sugar estates viz. The Sugar Industries Support Service Center. 3.3.4 The arrest of Ato Seeye and his family must have quenched the personal thirst for revenge and hate of Ato Meles, in addition to silencing political challenge and opposition to his absolute rule. The elimination of the Star Business Group, Yegeta trading and Abeba Trading PLC from the competition in both the trucking and trading businesses should also have opened up prosperous opportunities for his companies. The removal of inquisitive bankers from the credit department of the CBE will have eased the process of the never ending rescheduling or "ever greening" of the huge amount of debt accumulated on his party's business empire. Similarly, the removal of the old guard in the sugar estates will open up the road for completely dominating the sugar business. However, the most important vein linking all these victims is their role and stance during the Ethio-Eritrean conflict. The inclusion of General Tsadkan Gebre Tensae (the ex-chief of staff), General Abebe Tekle Haimanot (ex-Air force Commander), General Tadesse Berhe (Senior commander in the Ground Forces) into the list consisting of Ato Seeye Abraha will result in the Central-Command that led the war against Eritrea. This group along with the businessmen and managers that I briefly described above will give you the crux of the patriotic alignment during the war. 3.3.5 Few days after the arrest of Ato Assefa Abraha, the Board chairman of the Ethiopian Privatization Agency (EPA), Ato Beshah Azmite the General Manager of the EPA was called into the Central Investigation Bureau and requested, and then coerced to falsely testify against Ato Assefa. His refusal to "co-operate" (as they call it) resulted in his immediate imprisonment. Two other businessmen i.e. Mr. Hrair and Ato Fitsumzeab were also included in the list. The former is said to be the friend and previous prison mate of Ato Assefa, the latter is his brother-in-law, and both have bought business from the EPA, within the privatization scheme. Ato Fiturzeab Asgedom a brother to Ato Fitsumzeab was also arrested. Mr. Jerry the manager of AMCE (Automotive Plant for IVECO), Ato Eskinder Yoseph, a pioneer in the flower-farming and exporting business were also arrested in the same week. 3.4 Subsequent to their arrest, the victims started appearing at the Federal First Instance Court. The first group consisting of Ato Seeye and his family members, the Star Business Group, the Bank and Sugar estates' managers, etc. appeared on May 31/2001. The entire court was put under military cordon and all the victims crammed into one room. They were then called out in small groups, to appear before the judges. The judges asked very few and basic questions like: "Do you know why you have been brought to this court?" The answers were equally simple and straight forward "No! I don't know. Members of the armed forces (wearing green uniforms) came into my home, woke me up and drove me on their pickup to the Central Investigation Bureau. After spending 2 days and nights in one of the cells, they brought me here. That is all." The judges will then proceed and ask the police officers about why they arrested all these people and why arrest warrants were not given to them. The reply of the police officers to the first question was confusing. They mentioned words like "corruption, bank loans, privatization, sugar sales, employments, house renting, etc" but they had no coherent response. With regards to the second question concerning the issue of "arrest warrants" the answer was simpler "we were given urgent instruction from the Prime Minister's Office. We therefore had no time to bother about arrest warrants". But all the same the police officers demanded for 14 more days to rework their charges, initiate investigations and conduct searches at the offices and residence of the victims. The judges pressed for more details on the charges; and a picture of the following sort came out in response:- 3.4.1 Ato Seeye Abraha was accused of arranging bank loans and truck purchases for his brothers Fesseha Abraha and Mihreteab Abraha. He was also accused of receiving a gift of 10 trucks from the Star Business Group and giving them to his brothers. Ato Asmelash Abraha was accused of being employed in a private company that belonged to the brother-in-law of Ato Assefa Abraha. Timinit Abraha was accused of renting a house "illegally" etc. 3.4.2 Ato Assefa Abraha, Ato Beshah Azmite and Ato Bitew Belay were accused of "illegally" privatizing more than 20 public enterprises, while they were board members of the Ethiopian Privatization Agency. The list included a couple of hotels and restaurants including Taitu Hotel, more flour mills, Lega Dembi Gold mine, the Pepsi and Coca Cola factories, Kenticha Tantalum mine, Gojjam Gondar agricultural farms, Awash Tannery, the tea plantations etc., while Mr. Hrair and Ato Fitsumzeab were accused of buying from the privatization agency. 3.4.3 Most of the other businessmen were accused of "illegally" borrowing money from the CBE, "illegally" buying sugar from the estates or winning at the auctions, illegally buying trucks from AMCE (Automotive assembling plant for FIAT-IVECO) etc. On the other hand, the bankers were accused of lending money, and the estate managers of selling sugar. 3.5 The response from the defendants and their lawyers were indeed revealing: 3.5.1 Ato Seeye refuted the allegation as false and vile. He stated that he knew nothing about these allegations, and that he was imprisoned with his family due to political reasons. He gave the court a briefing of the basic political issues that split the TPLF/EPRDF leadership and of the reason that he thought had led to his imprisonment. He called the whole affair "a political vendetta being played under the pretext of an anti-corruption campaign". He also advised the court "not to allow the politicians, especially Ato Meles, use it as a stage for playing his dirty dramas and as a means of achieving his treacherous motives". 3.5.2 Ato Assefa admitted that he had been involved in decisions related to the privatization of these enterprises, but always with the full participation of his fellow board members and the fullest knowledge of everybody else, including the Prime Minister. He further explained that all these enterprises were sold through open tenders. The Board of the Agency included more powerful politicians like the Deputy Prime Minster Tefferra Walwa, Minister of Finance Sufian Ahmed, Minster of Health Kebede Tadess, Head of the PMO Mulugeta Alemseged; and therefore asked back as to why he was singled out of all these people? He flatly stated that he had no crime other than being a brother of Ato Seeye and compared this episode to the fact that the Dergue had also imprisoned him for ten years, just for being a brother to this same man - Seeye Abraha. The other members of the family argued along similar lines; while Ato Bitew denied his involvement in the sale of the said enterprises except that of Taitu Hotel. He explained that he was assigned to the Board of the EPA lately and hence attended only few board meetings. 3.5.3 The businessmen acknowledged to having borrowed money from the bank, bought trucks from AMCE, participated and sometimes won in the sugar auction; but asked back as to what is so "illegal" about all these. They also explained that all these transactions were legal and based on legal contracts; and had no problem related to the performance of any of these contracts. Similarly, the bankers and the estate managers refuted the allegation and stated that there was nothing illegal in whatever they did. Above all, the two bank executives, Ato Hailu and Ato Mulugeta told the court that they were not involved in the credit decision of most of the loans of these businessmen; for either the loans were beyond their discretionary limits or that they were not around when such decisions were made. 3.6 Having heard out both sides, the court finally adjourned the session, giving 5 to 14 days for the police officers to expedite their investigations. It however, ruled that Temnit Abraha, the sister of Ato Seeye Abraha, be released on bail. Besides her, Ato FIturzeab Asgedom, the ex-commissioner of the Basic Metals and Engineering Industries Agency and the brother of Ato Fitsumzeab Asgedom, Ajebnesh Samson as well as Mr. Jerry the manager from AMCE, were released without even appearing at court. Five days later i.e. on June 5, 2001, Ato Sufian Ibrahim of Methara Sugar Factory and Ato Asmelash Abraha, the elder brother of Ato Seeye were also released on bail. 3.7 On his 5th court appearance in 10 days, the Federal First Instance Court decided to release Ato Seeye Abraha on bail. It was on Friday, June 8, 2001, around 3:30 p.m. in the afternoon. The court room exploded with happy shouts and cries from the family and supporters of Ato Seeye. Ato Seeye thanked the court and acclaimed the judges for their courage and professional integrity. He thanked them for giving him a fair verdict despite evident pressures and intimidations from his political opponents. At the court compound and beyond the compound up to St. George Church, were gathered thousands of people awaiting the outcome of the court. Ato Seeye came out of the court jubilant and clearly victorious. He was received with jubilant chorus and acclamation from the crowd. Before he was guided into the police Land Rover that would take him back to his cell; he made, brief remarks to the effect of: "I am not a thief, I have not stolen a dime from my country. But I did quarrel with the Prime Minster over issues of paramount significance both to my people and my beloved country. It was my responsibility to stand by the side of the truth, and to stand for what I believed was good for my country. I shall continue to do so; come what way. Thank you all" 3.7.1 By about 5:00 p.m. Friday, 8 June 2001, i.e. few hours after the court decision was given, Ato Seeye's lawyers arrived at the gate of the Central Investigation Bureau with the release warrant in their hands, but to no avail, for the officials were nowhere to receive the warrant and release Ato Seeye. Then followed the weekend of June 9-10, 2001. Monday morning, June 11/2001, instead of signing the release warrant, the officials of the CIB appealed(!) to the Federal High Court against the ruling of the Federal First Instance Court. The Federal High Court endorsed the ruling and instructed the CIB to release Ato Seeye. The officials at the CIB instead of obeying the orders of the courts, appealed to the Prime Minster himself; which resulted in an immediate amendment to the 15 days old anti-corruption law. Monday afternoon, a one-page amendment was directly sent to the printing press from the PMO. It was neither reviewed by the Council of Ministers nor signed by President Negasso Gidada. A copy of the "amendment" was also sent to the then Minster of "Justice" Werede Wold Woldie with instructions to present it to the parliament by Tuesday morning, which he obeyed happily. Tuesday morning, when the parliament was supposedly deliberating on the draft amendment, it was already printed on the Negarit Gazetta, being effectively law as of the same date and hour on June 12, 2001. At noon the same day it was read out on the national radio. "The house of representatives today amended the anti-corruption law it endorsed on May 24/2001. Accordingly:- (a)Persons suspected of corruption shall have no right to bail, and (b)Corruption cases shall be seen by specially designated courts." 3.7.2 This amendment, popularly called "Seeye's law" effectively sealed any hope to bail and, at that, to fair trial of the victims of the campaign. However, since Ato Seeye's ruling was given before the enactment of this proclamation, his lawyers appealed to the courts. The Federal First Instance Court, consequently, ordered the officials of the CIB to bring Ato Seeye to the court by June 19/2001. Eleven days after the ruling to release him on bail, Ato Seeye appeared at the court at about 11:00 A.M. on June 19/2001. The Judge, Birtukan Midekssa, asked the police officer as to why Ato Seeye had not been released. The officer had no reply except some non-sensical mutterings regarding the new proclamation, the PMO's orders, etc. Justice Birtukan became furious about the whole thing and ordered the immediate release of Ato Seeye right away from the court. This announcement sent a tremor of shocks to the crowds in and around the court. Now, a free man Ato Seeye joined his wife and other relatives in the court room. With great up roar and applause they walked into his wife's' car and tried to drive out of the compound. The gates were however closed and the whole compound was surrounded by armed men belonging to the special forces of Ato Meles Zenawi. Leaving the car behind, Ato Seeye jumped out and walked along with his wife, into the crowd, awaiting outside the compound of the court. He walked indeed, but only a short distance. Right away, armed commandos jumped out of police Land Rovers and escorted him back into one of the Land Rovers; taking him back to his cell at the CIB. We all sang and chanted "Adieu constitutional democracy! Adieu the rule of Law! Here comes the old rule of brutal terror!" 3.8 Right away, after the enactment of the amendment, the First Instance Court closed all the files opened against all the victims of this campaign, after it officially told them that "as the recent amendment has proclaimed that corruption cases shall be seen by specially designated courts" and that this court has not been designated as such. The victims and their lawyers raised a lot of questions like "Whom shall we report to, then? If you close the files, why don't you release us now and let the new court arrest us again if it wishes? How come that you just leave us on the air without no where to go? etc, etc. But all to no avail, and all of them were escorted back to their prison cells at CIB. 3.8.1 Few days later Ato Seeye and his brothers, Ato Bitew, Ato Beshah, Ato Fitsumzeab and Mr. Hrair were assigned to the Federal Supreme Court. And all the rest i.e. the bankers, the business men, the sugar factory managers, etc. were similarly assigned to the Federal High Court. The previous routine of police demanding more days (usually 14 days more every 14 days) to finalize its investigations, and the court accepting or allowing it, began again and continued until the end of August 2001. 3.8.2 In the mean time, sometime toward the middle of July, the private press broke a shocking news to the residents of Addis and its environ, and especially to the fledgling private sector entrepreneurs and investors. It was bluntly reported by many of them that "all the properties of the people allegedly suspected of corruption have been confiscated and all their bank accounts blocked". For a nation that was just coming out of the era of socialism, nationalization and confiscation, this news provoked a lot of shock and terror as it invoked bad memories and experiences of just few years ago. 3.8.3 Apparently, as was confirmed later, the decision to freeze all assets belonging to these victims and their companies was taken in the absence of the concerned owners. Many of them learnt of it very late and through the private press. They were never called into the courts to witness the proceeding and to learn of the rulings first hand; nor was the decision reported in the government media or press. 3.8.4 By a simple application lodged by a single officer of the CIB, on behalf of the unborn anti-corruption commission, the Federal Supreme Court of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia ruled that: (a) the saving accounts of Ato Seeye's family including of the businesses of his two brothers Ato Fesseha and Ato Mihreteab opened in the various branches of the CBE, be blocked and their balances be transferred to a collecting account to be designated by the court. (b) the trucks and small vehicles that belonged to Ato Mihreteab and his business be frozen and put under the custody of the government through one of its public enterprises. (c) the accounts of Mr. Hrair, his family, his various businesses including the flour mill he bought from the privatization agency viz. Debrezeit flour mills be blocked, and the said mill be put under the custody of another state owned flour mill; and (d) similarly the account of Ato Fitsumezeab Asgedom, his family and his various companies including the three businesses he had previously bought from the EPA, viz. Taitu Hotel, Harar Printing Press and Gulele Soap Factory, be blocked and the companies be put under the custody of various state owned enterprises. (e) Although the accounts of a certain Assefa Abraha (a name sake) were blocked by mistake and then unblocked later on; neither money nor property was found under the names of Ato Seeye, Ato Bitew, Ato Beshah and Ato Assefa or their wives. 3.8.5 By similar manners, the Federal High Court ruled that:- (a) The businesses (several of them, employing up to 3000 people), the trucks (about 800 of them) and other properties of all the business people allegedly suspected of corruption be frozen and be put under the custody of various government agencies or committees, and, (b) The accounts of the individuals and their businesses be blocked. All these draconian rulings were given without the knowledge of the owners. And no considerations were given to the financial needs of the prisoners, their families or their lawyers. It was, therefore, in a way, a ruling to starve the prisoners and their families as well as to disable them from getting proper defence and legal support. 3.8.6 In addition to leaving the accused and their families penniless, this "restraining order" has a lot of negative ramifications. By freezing all assets and accounts of the businesses, it has also frozen the operations of the companies. This endangers the livelihood of many employees as well as the very survival of the businesses themselves. It had been confirmed by the inspectors of the bank and its auditors that all the loans of these victims and/or their businesses were "regular or current" as the bankers refer to loans being paid in accordance with their programs. However, now that all accounts have either been frozen or put under the custody of a government agent, it has become impossible to service the loans or renew overdraft facilities. So, by now most of them will be in arrears. This will obviously give a good excuse for the government to foreclose on these properties and thereby wipe out every one of these companies from the competition. 3.8.7 Most of the properties now restrained, especially the trucks, had already been mortgaged to the banks or the CBE for loans that it advanced to the victims or their companies. The title deeds of most of these properties are actually still in the hands of the bank(s). The restraining order, therefore, had an equally damaging effect on the vital interests of these banks. Despite this fact, not a single bank has dared so far, even to let its concerns be known to the courts. The CBE might either have been granted security by its owners or is a party to the whole plot, but I cannot really understand the silence of the private banks. The additional fact that a couple of the newly appointed "executives" of the CBE were heavily involved on the side of the investigation (to the extent that some had permanent offices at the CIB); and that inspection reports prepared by the internal inspectors of the bank and reported to the inspection department head through internal memos have been presented in the courts, as evidence against the accused, clearly lend to the argument that some of the "cadre-executives" of the CBE have been conniving behind the scenes. 3.9 Another important track in the campaign was that of evidence/crime searching and investigations. In addition to officially inviting(!) the general public to come forward with information and evidences incriminating these individuals, the PMO also initiated a series of tasks to the same effect. 3.9.1 They launched extensive search operations in almost everywhere; they hoped would get something incriminating. They searched the residences of all the victims and also their offices. These searches were made both, with or without search warrants. But, this did not really matter, for even if they had search warrants, the officers never cared to read them. Search warrants normally are explicit in terms of why and what needs to be searched. In the case of the CIB officers, they felt and were really free to take anything they believed would help them to find crime, and not to prove an already identified one. This proved the fact that they were trying to find faults, after having arrested innocent citizens in the pretext of "an anti-corruption campaign". Computers, floppy disks, books, party related documents, guns, family albums, private diaries and note books, etc. were hauled from several residences, including that of Ato Seeye Abraha. From the offices of most people; especially that of Ato Besah, the businessmen, the bankers and the sugar estate managers; were also hauled; several letters, minutes of meetings, technical and operational reports, etc, etc. Truckloads of "every thing" were then transported to the CIB, which still retains them in its stores (except those of Ato Seeye and Ato Assefa, which were returned by court orders) 3.9.2 The PMO also established several task forces, committees or experts to meticulously review every decision or transaction made by these people and their companies during the last ten years. Under the broad guidance and umbrella of the Office of the Auditor General: (a) Special taskforces were established to review the valuation of assets made by the privatization agency when it tendered out several businesses for sale. These groups of engineers and technicians, hand picked from various government agencies were also tasked to review the mortgage valuations made by the CBE for its collaterals from the victims. (b) Auditors and "special experts" were assigned to the sugar estates, the Ethiopian Privatization Agency, the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, Customs Authority, Inland Revenue Authority, AMCE, the business of the suspects, etc. and were tasked with reviewing and auditing every single transaction relating to the suspect. (c)These "experts" were promised rewards and appointments; the offices, drivers and cars of the prisoner-managers were assigned to them, and also were paid up to Birr 300 per day as their daily allowance in Addis. 3.9.3 The Internal Audit Department or the Controller of the CBE also initiated "special inspection" on the accounts of everyone imprisoned. Afraid that the Board of Management and the executives of the bank will not accept his unlawful orders; the official at CIB directly ordered the Controller of the Bank, who happened to be a close relative of Ato Meles, which he obeyed with great zeal and enthusiasm. Subsequently, the Controller passed over the instructions to his subordinates and prepared a "special inspection report" for every suspect. Once prepared, the reports were then presented to the Board of Management for its approval and blessing; to which the Board responded negatively, for the reports were heavily biased and intentionally "incriminating". Despite the rejection of the Board and the Management of the Bank, the Controller decided to duplicate and hand deliver these unsigned and unauthorized inspection reports to his controllers at CIB. 3.9.4 The PMO, working through its top officials and party leaders, has also tried hard to recruit false witnesses that would testify especially against Ato Seeye and Ato Assefa Abraha. In its endeavor to establish crucial witnesses, it tried to use every means conceivable. (a) Senior officials in government and the Prosecutor of the Commission himself, have repeatedly tried to persuade and then to intimidate the ex-Prime Minister Tamirat Layne, who is serving an 18 year jail term for alleged corruption. His refusal resulted in his inclusion into the charges against Ato Seeye. (b) Ato Abate Kisho, Member of the Executive Committee of the EPRDF, and Regional Administrator of the Southern Region was imprisoned just because he refused to testify against Ato Seeye. (c) Ato Tilahun Abay, the ex-President of the CBE was similarly approached by senior party members and the Prosecutor. His refusal to "co-operate" resulted in his immediate imprisonment, on charges of corruption. (d) Ato Michael Zigbele and ex-Commercial Manager at Meta Brewery, a state owned company, fled the country due to similar intimidations by the CIB and the prosecutor. (e) It is also widely rumored in town that the CIB has employed the best "forgers" in town in order to produce false documents as evidence for its charges. (f) In addition to these multi-faceted efforts to dig out crimes or fabricate them, the investigators at the CIB had also tried hard to persuade almost all of the businessmen to testify against their fellow inmates, especially against Ato Seeye and Ato Assefa Abraha. 3.10 While the coordinated campaign to recruit witnesses, to create crimes and organize evidence was underway, the prisoners continued to routinely appear in the courts almost every week. Their appearances were daily reported in the media, especially the government and party media. Senior officials of the Party as well as the government, gave public statements on the progress and the achievement of the campaign. The Prime Minister reported on the progress to the Parliament. 3.10.1 Ato Woredeweld Weldie the ex-Minister of Justice, in a statement he made to the Parliament, while defending the notorious amendment stated that "these were criminals that murdered a nation and not just one single individual, and, therefore, should be treated much more severely than the murderer ... and hence no right to bail at all". 3.10.2 The CIB in its report to the Federal High Court, stated that the imprisoned businessmen had "taken" (and not borrowed mind you!) more than 1.26 billion Birr among themselves from the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. This was continuously and deliberately aired through the ETV, Party and Government press, Party and Government radio, as well as the private press. The names of Ato Seeye Abraha and Ato Assefa Abraha were in one way or another insinuated or mentioned in almost all corruption related stories. 3.10.3 Ato Seyoum Mesfin the Minster of Foreign Affairs and the senior staff in the party echelon, repeatedly called Ato Seeye and Ato Bitew "thieves" in live interviews on the party and government radio. Ato Meles, the Prime Minister openly wrote and spoke along similar lines in various meetings and party discussions. While reporting to the parliament he once said that "all those in jail are thieves, and their appropriate home being the jail, they shall stay there". 3.10.4 The government daily, Addis Zemen, the party weeklies of the EPRDF/TPLF and various party related publications came out with editorials applauding the successes of the campaign, citing exaggerated accusation and defamatory statements against the suspects. Many of them dedicated columns and hired cartoonists to this effect. 3.11 August 30, 2001, at 3:00 p.m., Ato Seeye's group routinely appeared at the Federal Supreme Court. After the routine roll-call by the presiding judge Ato Fessaha Workneh, the letter submitted from the CIB to the court was read. Police, in its letter, at last declared to have finished its investigations and requested the court to order for the prisoners to stay in the Central Prison of Addis Ababa, until the prosecutors prepare their charges. Right away the lawyers of the accused, opposed the request, and demanded instead, that their clients be released on bail. They also argued that the amended law, which prohibits the right to bail for reasons of corruption is unconstitutional since "the right to bail" according to our Constitution is one of the basic and inalienable rights of all citizens. Similarly, they also argued that since the amendment was enacted 12 days after the imprisonment of their clients; it cannot be allowed to apply retroactively. The Federal Supreme Court chose to take the most simplistic attitude and ruled that "it was not mandated to challenge the constitutionality of any law enacted by the parliament; and therefore no rights to bail will be allowed". (An interesting article on this position of the Supreme Court titled "Suicide of the Judiciary", by Hailu Abera, expounds well on this tragic ignominy). Accordingly Ato Seeye, Ato Assefa, Ato Beshah, Ato Fessaha, Ato Mihreteab, Ato Bitew, Ato Fitsumzeab and Mr. Hrair were transferred from the cells at CIB to the Central Prison of Addis Ababa. The other groups that were assigned to the Federal High Court, never the less, continued to appear at the court for the usual routine, until the first week of October; by which date, they were also transferred to the Central Prison (CPAA). 3.12 Ethiopian law required that "prosecutors file their charges within 15 days, after the conclusion of investigation by police". Accordingly, the prosecutor was expected to file his charges by at least mid-September. Failing to receive any notice, the prisoners lodged their complaints, according to the provisions for "Habeas Corpus" of the laws. One month later, the Central Prison Administration was ordered to present Ato Fitsumzeab and Mr. Hrair on the 24th of October 2001, at the civil bench of the Federal First Instance Court. They indeed appeared at the said court, and the judge asked the escorting warden, to explain why and by whose orders, these two gentlemen were imprisoned. The warden had not much to say and requested to call his boss, the administrator of the prison. The boss, however, was no better than the warden in terms of answering the question. He explained that they first came to his prison with a warrant for 15 days by the orders of the Federal Supreme Court, but then he failed to justify the extra 45 days after the expiry of the court orders. Immediately, judge Amha Tesfaye ordered the release of the two victims; to which the administrator of the prison Ato Negussie Tesfaye refused to comply with on the spot. He responded that he cannot release the prisoners without the knowledge and instructions of his bosses (the PMO), even if the court orders it(!) And hence, he escorted back Mr. Hrair and Ato Fitsumzeab to his prison. This in effect was a sad instance where the judge was overruling by the police. 3.13 The CPAA was similarly, ordered to bring Ato Seeye and the rest in the group, to the same court that ruled on Habeas Corpus pleas of Ato Fitsumzeab and Mr. Hrair. But, right away after the ruling to release the latter was given and the administrator refused to obey, he had reported it to his bosses, and they tried to repeal the decision through the Federal Supreme Court, thereby forestalling the requests of Ato Seeye. This time, however, the Supreme Court failed to cooperate, obliging the prosecutors to file their charges by October 28/2001. When Ato Seeye and his brothers appeared at the court on October 26/2001, the prison administrator presented the newly issued orders of the Supreme Court, demanding that the group be presented to the court by October 28/2001. Although the lawyers argued that the orders do not explicitly demand the accused to stay in prison in the meantime, this time around judge Amha ruled in favor of the prison administrator, and hence, all the prisoners were escorted back to their cells at CPAA. 3.14 Forewarned by the experience with Ato Seeye's case, the prosecutors had to forestall all possible pleas to Habeas Corpus. They had now managed to lodge their concocted charges against Ato Seeye, but they were not able to do the same with the group assigned to the Federal High Court. Instead, they somehow were able to reopen the closed investigation files of the CIB, and restarted the old 14-days routine. After a couple of 14-day appearances at the Federal High Court, the prosecutor of the anti-corruption commission finally charged the prisoners and several other executives of the CBE including Ato Tilahun Abay, the President. In a statement, presented on January 8/2002, the prosecutor accused 41 bankers and 13 businessmen, of corruption and abuse of power. 41 of these persons were new additions while 13 of them have been in prison for over 6 months. Ato Bitew Belay and Ato Abate Kisho were similarly charged by a separate application. The Sugar estate managers were also charged in the same way but in a separate file. 4. FEW OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROCESS 4.1 The campaign that began with the arrest orders of the PMO, has so far reached a new stage. A total of 76 people have been formally charged in four separate files and two courts. I have tried to highlight the process, with the intention of giving every body the opportunity to feel it and make observations from various perspectives. I for one shall make a few of them from the perspective of the rule of law and justice. 4.2 The main purpose of initiating or supporting a campaign against corruption is not to arrest people, nor to confiscate properties. It is rather to restrain the greed to become unlawfully rich, and ensure transparency and accountability in public as well as private businesses. Any process aiming at achieving such noble ideals shall itself be free from any suspicions of unlawfulness, dubiousness or unaccountability. But looking back at the process I just described: 4.2.1 The campaign kicked off from unlawful grounds. Arresting people without an arrest warrant issued by court is unlawful according to Ethiopian Law. Searching their residences and offices without a court permit makes the process doubly unlawful. 4.2.2 Right after the start of the campaign, three of the first victims were released on bail by court order. Next came Ato Seeye's turn, and he was also released on bail. Police made all possible efforts to stop the release of Ato Seeye, but when all efforts were about to fail, Ato Meles intervened with his new proclamation. The process by which this amendment was enacted is dubious and unlawful; its contents are unquestionably unconstitutional. This unlawful and unconstitutional amendment is serving a purpose, but obviously a purpose completely different from the one an honest anti-corruption campaign ought to serve. 4.2.3 Even after the enactment of this perilous amendment, Ato Seeye was released by another court order, but he was immediately kidnapped from the gates of the Federal First Instance Court. He was kidnapped by the Prime Minister's special body guards and re-arrested by the order of the Prime Minister. Another blow to the notions of justice, democracy and the rule of law. 4.2.4 Another incident that blew-off any remaining illusion about the commitments of Ato Meles to the rule of law and justice was the one related to the issue of Habeas Corpus. When a Federal Judge ordered the release of Ato Fitsumzeab Asgedom and Mr. Hrair, the Deputy Head of the Central Prison Administration of Addis Ababa refused to obey in public. He instead bluntly told the court that he would not release anyone of them without the knowledge and approval of his bosses at the PMO. 4.2.5 And finally, when police declared to have finished its investigations on Ato Seeye et al, and the issue of the right to bail was again raised at the Federal Supreme Court, it ruled against the request, citing the new amendment. The court also declared that it was not its job to doubt the constitutionality of proclamations enacted by parliament. This sealed the hope and aspirations of many Ethiopians to see a balanced and counter balanced system of governance, as well as the dream of seeing an independent judiciary. 4.2.6 It is barely a decade since the new era of free market economy and pro-private sector polices dawned in Ethiopia. Although the rights to private ownership of property and to the free pursuit of economic endeavors have been enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic; the scars of the previous socialist regime are still abundant. The attempt to restitute illegally confiscated properties to their previous lawful owners has not yet been concluded. No compensation has still been paid to any of the previous owners of the public enterprise now in the hands of the government. A shocking event that added salt to this bleeding wound was the restraining order issued by the courts, on the private properties and businesses of the defendants. The fact that this paramount decision was made by the highest courts of the Republic and without the knowledge of the owners; gives a shattering blow to the notion of "respect to private property" and the nascent confidence of the private sector in the whole system. 4.2.7 Last but not least, the chronological sequence of the events, starting from the split in the party, enactment of the corruption laws and detention of the dissidents 4 days after the law was proclaimed, and the banning of bail 12 days after their arrest, clearly testify to the fact the aim of the campaign was to corrupt the law rather than to combat corruption. 4.2.8 The above mentioned few incidents clearly testify to the unlawfulness and unconstitutionality of the campaign process. Furthermore, the efforts made by senior party and government officials to recruit and prepare false witnesses, the amount of time and money spent to dig out faults through the so called auditors, inspectors, experts, etc. as well as the attempt to establish crime from documents and diaries gathered through illegal searches, belie the declared motives of the campaign while shedding light on the true motivations driving the campaign and its commanders. 5. OVERVIEW OF THE CHARGES AND EVIDENCES 5.1 The first group to be charged was that of Ato Seeye et al. In a statement read out at the Federal Supreme Court on October 28/2001, the anti-corruption commission accused 12 people for a total of 6 offences. 5.1.1 The list of the defendants included Ato Seeye and his brothers Assefa, Fissaha, and Mihreteab. His sister Temnit Abraha, who was previously released on bail was also called in and charged. Ato Tamrat the ex-Prime Minister during the Transitional Government and also ex-Deputy PM of the FDRE was included, for failing to "co-operate" in falsely testifying against Ato Seeye. Ato Beshah, Ato Fitsumzeab Asgodom and Mr. Hrair were also in the list of the accused. Three others were accused in absentia. 5.1.2 Here is an overview of the charges, evidences and the current status of the proceedings. 5.1.2.1 The charges are based on the provisions of the Revised Special Penal Code Proclamation No. 214/1981 Art. 23. This proclamation was especially enacted by the previous fascist regime to deal with what it called "counter-revolutionaries". The said article reads as follows: "Art. 23. Abuse of Authority 1/Any public servant, any elected member of any mass organization or co-operative society or any member of any revolution defense committee who, with the intent to obtain for himself or to procure to a third person, unlawful advantage or to do injury to another person: (a) misuses his official position or the powers proper to his office, whether by commission or culpable omission; or (b) misuses his authority in a manner that is prejudicial to government or public interest; or (c) performs official acts when he is not or is no longer empowered to do so, or exceeds his power especially in the case of incompetence, suspension, removal from office; is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from three to fifteen years." 5.1.2.2 Articles 32, 33 and 35 of the Ethiopia Penal Code have also been cited to show the degree of involvement of the defendants; i.e, primary offender, collaborator or inciter. 5.1.2.3 The first charge is about bank loans advanced by the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia to Ato Seeye's brother Ato Mihreteab Abraha and his business called MFAM PLC. It accuses Ato Seeye and Ato Assefa, of having ordered or persuaded the president of the CBE, Ato Tilahum Abay to give the loans to Ato Mihreteab Abraha. It further alleges that the loans were advanced by the orders of the president and hence outside the standard loan approval procedures of the Bank. To prove this, the prosecutor called in Ato Tilahun as a witness. A "Special Investigation Report" allegedly prepared by the inspection department of the Bank was also presented as evidence. Despite the fact that this report was specially prepared by the orders of the police (CIB) and presented to the court without the knowledge and approval of the bank's management; it confirmed that: (a) The truck loan advanced to MFAM was approved not by Ato Tilahun as the charge alleges, but the Board of Directors of the Bank along with other similar loans amounting to about Birr600 million intended for the purchase of close to 600 trucks. It was a project, initiated to fill the capacity gap created during the Ethio-Eritrean war, monitored and approved by the highest organs of the government including the then Defense Minster and Deputy Prime Minster Teffera Walwa. Out of 600 trucks and 600 million Birr, MFAM borrowed 5 million Birr and bought 5 trucks. (b) The overdraft facility mentioned in the charges is not Birr 10 million, but only Birr 1.5 million. This loan was approved through the normal process of hierarchical loan committees and not by Ato Tilahun as alleged. (c) Finally all loans were based on properly documented mortgage and loan contracts; and were performing regularly. 5.1.2.4 The second charge alleges that Ato Assefa and Ato Seeye have, in 1992, enticed (persuaded) the then Prime Minister, Ato Tamrat Layne to order the duty free importation of five trucks, belonging to a certain Kahsay Abbay. A letter signed by Ato Tamrat has been presented as evidence, but this letter does not in any way mention Ato Assefa or Ato Seeye. Furthermore, nothing is known about what links Ato Kahsay to Ato Tamrat or Ato Seeye. 5.1.2.5 The third charge alleges that Ato Seeye in his capacity as the General Manager of a private company called EFFORT (a TPLF conglomerate) and as a member of parliament, has through some other officers of EFFORT requested the General Manager of a truck dealer (called AMCE), to give discounts to his brother. A member of the TPLF politburo and an ally of Ato Meles has been called as a witness in this case. 5.1.2.6 The fourth charge accuses Ato Seeye of requesting in, 1993, the then Deputy Health Minister, Dr. Abdi Adem, to assist his sister Temnit Abraha get employed in one of the hospitals under the Addis Ababa Administrative Region. Subsequent presentations by the defendants have, however, revealed that: (a) Temnit, a pharmacist by profession, got employed in the hospital in order to fulfill a mandatory requirement to serve in a government run health institution, she did so through her own merit and by directly applying to the head of the autonomous health bureau of the Region. (b) Dr. Adem being a federal minister (deputy) had no authority over the regional bureau, and therefore could not have helped even if he wanted to; and (c) Temnit worked in this hospital for few months in fulfillment of her obligation but left it soon due to low pay (about USD 60/month). 5.1.2.7 The fifth charge accuses Ato Assefa of having, in 1996, ordered the then Manager of Meta Abo Brewery to cancel the distribution license of a certain Hagos Hadera and give it to his brother Ato Mihreteab. The General Manager who allegedly received the orders (by phone) is currently deceased. The CIB tried to coerce a commercial manager of the Brewery to falsely testify but the guy instead fled the country, leaving his family behind. Furthermore, the defendants established that: (a) Ato Mihreteab was in the business of beer distribution since 1994, while Ato Assefa was not even in this country. (b) Ato Hagos relinquished his distribution license due to his own reasons and by his volition. 5.1.2.8 The sixth charge concerns Ato Assefa, Ato Beshah, Ato Fitsumzeab and Mr. Hrair. It is about the sale of five public enterprises through the Ethiopian Privatization Agency (EPA). It accuses Ato Assefa the then chairman of the Board of EPA, and Ato Beshah the General Manager, of having unlawfully sold these enterprises. However, by citing the evidences presented by the prosecutor himself; the defendants established that: (a) Most of the allegations mentioned in the charges were blatant lies and contradicted the truth stated in the minutes of board meetings, tender documents, sales contracts, etc. that were presented to the court. (b) Neither Ato Beshah nor Ato Assefa had the power to approve transactions; and more precisely the sale of each enterprise was first accepted by the full board and finally approved by a written instruction to go ahead from the Prime Minster's Office. (c) Ato Assefa was one among many board members, which included the Deputy Prime Minster-Teffera Walwa, Finance Minster-Sufian Ahmed, Minster of Health-Kebede Tadesse, Minister of Justice-Mahteme Solomon, Head of the PMO-Mulugeta Alemseged, etc.; and had no special powers; while Ato Beshah as a General manager implemented decisions taken by the Board or the Prime Minster's Office. (d) There is nothing exceptional about these transactions, except that Ato Fitsumzeab happened to be brother-in-law to Ato Assefa while Mr. Hrair is alleged to be his friend or former prison mate. 5.1.3 These are the charges against the most senior officials targeted by this campaign. Ato Seeye has been charged for "abusing his authority" by "requesting a car dealer through friends"/ by "enticing his boss the PM 10 years ago" by "requesting the deputy health minister" etc. etc. This charge, besides being the crux of the whole campaign is also expected to exemplify the depth and breadth of the problem of corruption within the EPRDF. His brothers and a sister have been charged as collaborators and beneficiaries: by borrowing money from a Bank that has over 40,000 clients, by being employed in a public hospital, and more importantly for just being his brothers as is the case in Ato Fessaha Abraha and Weldeselassie Abraha who have nothing to do with any of these allegations. Ato Assefa has been charged for transactions that were approved and sanctioned by the highest office and people in the government; his only unique attribute being that he is a brother to Ato Seeye. 5.2 Next to Ato Seeye et al, were charged his colleagues Ato Bitew Belay and Ato Abate Kisho. Their charge was filed at the Federal High Court, and stated that Ato Abate and Ato Bitew "had approved an illegal purchase of construction machinery in 1995". The purchase was deemed "illegal" because it allegedly was done outside the so called "standard procurement procedures". As accomplices were included three businessmen, one of which is Ato Negussie Hailu, the one who declined the offer to falsely testify against Ato Bitew Belay in exchange for a reduction in his current prison term. 5.2.1 These charges are also based on the same proclamation and provisions of the penal codes. The prosecutor has also presented a list of his witnesses and evidence to the court. Among the witnesses were senior officials of the Southern Regional Government, including the deputy to Ato Abate Kisho. 5.2.2 In their responses to the presentations of the prosecutors, the defendants argued that: (a) Neither Ato Abate nor Ato Bitew were involved in the said transaction. And, as clearly established by the evidences of the prosecutor, it was rather the Deputy Administrator (who has now been recruited to testify against his former boss) who approved it. (b) Ato Bitew, who had never been an official in the Region or the Federal Government has nothing to do with the approval of procurement contracts; and (c) Finally, neither of them had anything to gain out of this transaction. 5.3 The third file was that of the sugar factory managers. Included here are Ato Belete, Ato Shewaferaw, Ato Berhanu and Ato Demelash. Ato Solomon Baraki the ex-manager of Wonji-Shoa sugar factory and who is said to have died in Asmara after being expatriated during the Ethio-Eritrean war, has also been included here. 5.3.1 The legal provisions mentioned as a basis for this charges are similar to those mentioned for the others. This file is unique in the sense that no businessmen have been included, and the charges are more ridiculous. (a) Ato Shewaferaw Girma, the General Manager of the Sugar Industries' Common Service Center, is charged for corruption for selling 80 quintals of sugar to the Ministry of Defense(!). He has been charged for violating a directive allegedly issued by the PMO and prohibiting the sale of sugar out of the auction market. (b) Ato Solomon Baraki has also been accused of selling 700 quintals of sugar to the trade union of his factory workers. (c) Ato Demelash has been accused of accepting a cheque from one company for settling payment from another sister company. (d) The other two gentlemen have been charged with the failure to put ceilings to the amount of sugar that a single bidder would buy at the auctions; and thereby allegedly encouraging monopolistic concentration of sugar stock. 5.3.2 The "respected" office of the Auditor General, had been employed for over 10 months, to dig into the operations of the sugar estates, with the hope of finding more serious mistakes to incriminate these honest gentlemen who had served the nation for over 25 years each. They were (probably) targeted because General Tsadkan, the ex-chief of staff used to be the board chairman of Methara Sugar Factory. Failing to find any crime whatsoever, the prosecutor has charged them with the above mentioned "allegation" and the four of them are still in jail since May 2001; awaiting trial. 5.4 The fourth group to be charged by the Anti-Corruption Commissions consists of 41 top executives of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) and 13 of its "prime/corporate customers" as they are called in the Bank. Most of the businessmen and two vice presidents were in jail since May 2001. The rest, including the president, Ato Tilahun Abay were sent to jail, the day the prosecutor filed his case at the Federal High Court. Included in the list were all the vice presidents, most of the assistant vice presidents; every branch manager and credit analyst that had been involved in the approval or appraisal of loans to the targeted businesses, etc, etc. It appears that the names were picked from the Loan Approval Formats (LAFs) and Analysis Reports related to these businesses. The ex-Vice Governor of the National Bank of Ethiopia, Ato Nesredin Ahmed has also been included, just because he approved an overdraft loan of 2 million Birr to one of the targets, 10 years ago. Many of the bankers were in their retirement, some were arraigned from their hospital beds, some of them had left the CBE over six years ago and were employed in other banks. Among them all, these bankers represent both the old guard of the banking sector as well as the new generation of bankers the nation had groomed and trained for years. 5.4.1 The prosecutor filed four charges in one application. The basis of the charges were the same articles of the special penal codes and the criminal code. I shall still try to present the overview as follows: 5.4.1.1 The Central Investigation Bureau (CIB), right after arresting the businessmen, in May 2001; dispatched special teams to the CBE, with the task of conducting special investigations on the loan files of the detainees. These teams disguised as "inspectors" and closely working with the Acting Head of the Inspection Department at the CBE (a cousin of Ato Meles newly promoted to the job) prepared their "Inspection Reports" wherein they listed a series of acts which they called were "irregular" and allegedly contravened the procedures and systems of the CBE. About forty of them have been listed in the preambles to the first charge in the prosecutors' application. 5.4.1.2 This list of the so called "irregular acts" is then followed by a list of 12 sub charges (i.e. 1.1 up to 1.12). Each sub-charge lists the loan facilities and amounts allegedly advanced to the businessmen and/or their businesses. The employees of the bank i.e. credit analysts, branch managers and loan committee members along with the borrower are then clustered around each sub-charge. 5.4.1.3 Finally, the bankers are then accused of approving the loans and the businessmen for taking them. The charges deliberately avoid mentioning the loan contract. It also says nothing about the performance of the loans while accusing the businesses of unlawful enrichment, and the bankers of abuse of authority. 5.4.2 The second charge involves an export operation, that allegedly required the proceeds to finance a reverse import contract of merchandise, whose bills of lading are said to have been lost somehow. The third and fourth charges concern properties or businesses that were foreclosed by the CBE and sold off through open tenders. The ex-owners of the two businesses were Eritreans that were expatriated during the Ethio-Eritrean conflict, and the buyers are business people in the targeted group. 5.4.3 Subsequent to the presentation of his charges; the prosecutor has also submitted a list of his witnesses as well as copies of the evidence he shall use to prove his charges. 5.4.3.1 The cardinal document presented as evidence in almost all cases is the so called "inspection" or "special investigation report" prepared by the teams assigned by the CIB and under its close monitoring and guidance: (a) Each report states in its first page that it was prepared subsequent to the special instruction given by the Acting Head of the Inspection Department of the CBE, sometime towards the end of June 2001 (one month after the targets were detained) (b) The methodology the inspectors employed, was a targeted review of each loan file of the detainees. No sampling was made to make comparative analysis with other loan files outside the targeted group. (c) The so-called "irregularities" or acts that allegedly contravene the procedures of the bank are then listed for every loan approved since the last 10 years; irrespective of the loan status now. The total sum of the irregularities constitutes the list in the preamble of the first charge. The total sum of the loans approved during the last ten years constitutes the figures mentioned under each sub-charge of the first charge. (d) This report after being reviewed and accepted by the so-called Acting Chief Inspector of the CBE and his cousin at the CIB, is said to have been presented to the Board of Directors of the Bank for its blessing and final approval. The Board, unfortunately, is said to have severely criticized the intent, the methodology and the conclusions drawn there from; and finally disowned it. Having thus failed to secure the endorsement of the Board or the Management of the CBE, the CIB and through it the Anti-Corruption Commission directly presented this "disowned" report as evidence to its charges. The Commission, in the meantime, is said to be negotiating with office of the Auditor General for its blanket endorsement of these reports, and hence give them some sort of legitimacy and authenticity. 5.4.3.2 Another evidence presented by the prosecutor is the Loan Approval Format or LAF of the Bank. This is a format that captures the entire loan approval process, starting from the application of the client, and going up to the final approval of the loan by the appropriate committee in the hierarchy. It also summarizes opinions or recommendations of lower committees as well as those of credit analysts. One observation I want to make at this point is that in as much as junior bank managers, credit analysts and senior credit committees forwarded their recommendations for or against the approval of the targeted loans; more than 85% of the loans were approved by the Board of Directors of the Bank. Ironically, those who recommended for or against the approval have been charged indiscriminately and are languishing in jail while not a single board member has been charged. Shameful as it may sound, the ex-minister of justice and the current head of the committee that oversees the anti-corruption campaign, Ato Woredeweld Woldie is one of the board members who approved all these loans. 5.4.4 Another important issue the prosecutor deliberately avoided mentioning in his presentation, is the issue of loan performance and contract administration. Bank loans are based on contracts. Any litigation between the bank and the borrower should be based on the performance or non-performance of this contract. A brief review into the loan documents of these businesses had revealed that: (a) Almost all of these loans were performing very well and hence classified as "Regular" as at June 2001. In a bank where loan non-performance is a chronic problem and where more than 40% of its loans are classified as "Bad", being classified as "Regular" is the exception rather than the norm. Accordingly, the bank had classified these businesses as its "Prime Customers" and issued a special "Pass" that would enable them to be easily identified by its staff anywhere in the network. (b) Substantial amount of the loans listed in the charges had already been settled. To cite some examples: 1. In its applications to the High Court for restraining orders, police claimed that Star Business Group's loan from the CBE was Birr 105 million. In its charges, it stated the amount to be 45.5 million Birr. But even the 45.5 million Birr indicated in the charge against Star Business Group and its General manager Ato Worku Megra had been settled, and the current balance is just zero. (Sub-charge 1.1) 2. Out of the 190.219 million Birr indicated against Mina Trading PLC and its General Manager Ato Minwuyelt Atnafu only 39.42 million (over draft) remain outstanding. (Sub-charge 1.2). 3. Similarly only 19.0 million Birr is still outstanding out of the 35.4 million Birr advanced to Tana Transport PLC. (Sub-charge 1.3) 4. Tiss Abay PLC has been charged for a total amount of Birr140.643 million, whereas the actual outstanding balance is just 77.44 million (Sub-charge 1.5). 5. Sami Yusuf Import Export Enterprises has been charged for over 117 million Birr; whereas the actual balance is a mere 16 million over draft facility. This deliberate exaggeration of figures, coupled with the extensive media coverage accorded to it, belies the true motives and intentions of the whole campaign. 5.5 In its "inaugural" statement released on May 29/2001, the Prime Minster's Office (PMO) declared that the campaign against corruption had kicked off that very morning, with the arrest of what it called "corrupt officials and their collaborators". The so-called "corrupt officials" were Ato Seeye and Ato Bitew; "their collaborators" were then the owners and managers of these companies targeted by Ato Meles. In the same statement, the PMO called on the general public to co-operate by giving up more information and evidences incriminating these officials. But it also explicitly warned that it was not interested in petty issues and rather called the public to focus on the big fish and big money. 5.6 Only the gods and probably also Ato Meles, would know the full details of the information and evidences gathered from the public through the temporary offices opened for this purpose and closed after a week or two-(rumor has it that the information submitted overwhelmingly pointed at and specifically identified a couple of the highly placed accusers with acts of gross corruption and that this was immediately quashed). But, from what have been trashed into the courts, after one full year of auditing, investigation, inspection, witness cajoling or coercing, etc., we can forward a lot of remarks and make observations on the whole farce and drama. 5.6.1 First and foremost the so-called "collaboration" does not exist and never existed. It even appears that the officials and the so-called "collaborators" did not know each other on the personal level. The first charge read against Ato Seeye, in his first appearance at the Federal First Instance Court, stated that Ato Seeye had received a gift of ten trucks from the owners of the Star Business Group. This utterly false allegation had been stated in several meetings and party conventions, by Ato Meles and his close associates. Immense efforts were made to some how create this link, but to no avail. 5.6.2 Despite all the time and resources deployed to dig into crimes or create them, the final outcome is disastrously shameful. (a) Even if there truly existed a PMO directive prohibiting the sale of sugar out of the auction market, selling 80 quintals of sugar to the Ministry of National Defense, especially at a time when the nation was at war with Eritrea or much worse, selling 700 quintals of sugar to the trade union of the workers that produced it, can never constitute an offence of any size. But this is what Ato Meles called the "big fish" and the "big issue" in his address. (b) A member of parliament has no authority over a bank manager or a car dealer. But true or untrue, the "big issue" for Ato Meles has turned out to be "a member of parliament requesting a car dealer through friends for reduction in car prices". Much worse, Ato Bitew has been accused of approving a transaction that took place 8 years ago and in which he had no involvement at all and being a brother to Ato Seeye has become a crime punishable by law. (c) "Borrowing from a Bank" no matter whether you pay it back or not, has become a criminal offence punishable up to 15 years, in this era of free market and private sector economy. Properties worth hundreds of millions of Birr have been "confiscated" for nothing, other than belonging to the wrong owners. This is also done in this era of capitalism and private ownership, and during broad day light in the eyes of the whole world. (d) The attempt to establish criminal offence and penalize a third party on the basis of the operating manuals of one party is incomprehensible. Executives of the borrowing companies are being accused, because officers in the lending bank allegedly violated their internal procedures. To see such a non-sensical sense of legality driving the campaign is really disturbing. 5.6.3Even if all the allegations stated in the charges were true; they will never constitute any criminal offence of any sort, leave alone a "big offence" as the PM would want to. But, by deliberately delaying the process and denying the right to bail, Ato Meles will have achieved his personal and political goals. As he himself once told the parliament the home of these people shall be in jail for some time to come. And surely they are there for over a year already and, with the sluggish, docile and opportunist judicial system in place, it will be years before the courts have time to rule on the merits of the case. 5.7 One final thought. The casual reader unversed in the nature and dealings of tyrannical regimes, and especially of the true insidious nature of the TPLF/EPRDF leadership, might wonder if these 'ridiculous' sounding charges are indeed the charges being used to hold the defendants behind bars, albeit with the consent and blessing of an accommodating judicial system. Nevertheless, it remains that, however ridiculous or flimsy these charges may sound, they are indeed the charges the government has managed to concoct and bring against the defendants and these same charges are the charges the judiciary has selected to go along with. On the other hand and true to the hidden political agenda of the whole farcical drama, the charges have numerous instances of sensational phrases that should have no place in a legal charge document such as "...disregarding the responsibility the Motherland has bestowed on him...", etc., but otherwise are devoid of any clear evidence of alleged wrongdoing whatsoever. 6. "ACHIEVEMENTS" OF THE CAMPAIGN 6.1 I have thus far tried to highlight the process and the current status of the campaign. My hope is that I have created an opportunity for people, not that closely involved, to get a feel of what has been happening under the guise of fighting corruption. This feel shall then crystallize into opinions and a commitment to act. To further assist this opinion formation process, I shall now try to outline what I think are the major achievements, results or consequences of this campaign. 6.2 The consequences of the campaign can be broadly classified as direct and/or indirect. Direct consequences shall be those that came as immediate results of the decisions or orders given by the various agents involved in the operations of running the campaign i.e. the police, the courts, the PMO, the commission, etc. On the other hand, indirect consequences are derivatives or multiplied effects of the direct ones. 6.3 The most direct casualties of this campaign are the detainees and their immediate families. The businesses of these people, their assets and properties, the employees and managers are also directly hit by the decisions and actions taken in relation to the campaign. The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, the Sugar Estates and the Ethiopian Privatization Agency have also sustained substantial damages as a consequence of this campaign. 6.3.1 A total of 76 people have been charged of corruption and abuse of authority; about 20 of which are being tried in absentia. The rest, i.e. 56 people are still in jail with their right to bail denied. Some of these detainees are old and sick, so much so, they are unable to physically appear at court. In a very sad and tragic consequence of this injustice, one of them, Ato Nesredin Mohammed, the ex-Vice Governor of the National Bank of Ethiopia, has just passed away while in prison. He was unable to appear in court for more than 2-3 sessions, but that did not convince the court to release him on bail, for proper medical treatment. A lot of them have been charged for cases that they don't know of: (a) The credit decision of a bank involves a lot of people. Some make analysis, others recommend, some others approve or disapprove, still others implement and follow up. More than 85% of the loans in question were approved by the Board of Management (Directors) of the CBE, but still not a single board member has been charged. On the other hand, credit analysts, branch managers and lower level credit committee members have been jailed; irrespective of their opinions or the recommendations they made. (b )The final decision to sell any enterprise in the privatization scheme was made by the PMO and/or the Board of EPA, while the General Manager and the Board chairman have been charged for approving the sale of enterprises. (c) Managers or employees have been accused in relation to loans that were taken by their companies, or transactions that took place long before they were even employed by the companies. Many of them have been accused in relation to loans that had already been settled. 6.3.2 The loss of their leaders and managers, coupled with the fact that most of their assets have been restrained and their accounts frozen; have effectively put most of the companies out of business. After they were put under the custody of committees or competing public enterprises (for example, a flour mill administering another flour mill), the productive assets (trucks, factory machinery, etc) were made idle or at least substantially underutilized. Furthermore, whatever meager revenues they generated, were put into separate accounts under the control of the custodian, hence no provisions for loan servicing and maintenance. Despite the fact that almost all the loans these companies borrowed were regular as at June 2001, almost all of them are now in arrears; thereby creating good grounds to foreclose on whatever asset or property remains. This eminent danger of foreclosure, added with the already restrained business situation will make bankruptcy and collapse totally unavoidable. The livelihood of about 8000 employees, managers and their families will also be endangered. 6.3.3 All the companies that have now been restrained were among the so-called "Prime Customers" of the CBE, and hence its major sources of revenue. The loss of these customers, plus its entire leadership and managerial staff, have seriously endangered the very existence of the CBE. Ironically, the loans that were regular and good sources of income to the bank just a year ago, have now become non-performing and hence sources of concern and worry to the bank. Although to a reduced scale, the private banks are also bound to be negatively affected. In addition to the loss of business and income that I just described, the fact that most of the properties restrained by court order were also collaterals to the loans advanced to the companies, will limit the ability of the banks to retrieve their loans through foreclosure. 6.3.4 The Sugar Estates were highly profitable. In addition to their normal profits of hundreds of millions every year, they also used to generate surplus cash to the Treasury through the auctions. Every income beyond Birr 250/quintal used to go into the so-called "Sugar Development Fund" under the Treasury. Since the average market price in the auctions was much higher than Birr 250, (usually upto 560/quintal) the said fund was a lucrative source for the Treasury. More importantly, the factories never faced any problem with regards to sales. However, as things stand now, the sugar market has collapsed, prices are as low as Birr 400 per quintal, even then the estates are overstocked; and hence barely profitable. This total collapse coupled with the fact that the market has been totally flooded by illegally imported (contraband) sugar, make the prospects for the entire industry look terribly bleak. 6.3.5 The privatization program was a lynchpin in the entire economic reform program. Besides to being a good source of revenue to the Treasury, it is pivotal in the whole effort to redefine the roles of the public and the private sectors. Furthermore, it provides an easier and profitable exit for the government, from many of its unprofitable investments in the Public Enterprises under its ownership. It also provides a good hope of survival and continuity to many of the almost defunct Public Enterprises and their employees. After a difficult and more hesitant start in 1995, the privatization program had gathered steam and momentum for a real jump. Thanks to the support and guidance of many institutions, including the BWI, the EPA had defined a clear plan to windup itself as quickly as possible; tentatively by 2004. Come, May 2001, everything charged. The Board Chairman and General Manager of the Agency were imprisoned. Almost all the experts and staff of it were arraigned for questioning by the CIB. Every thing they did during the previous years became a suspect. Knowing that nothing was done without the full knowledge of the PM, this puzzled and shocked every body. Out of hundreds of transactions made in a very similar way, five of them were selected and 2 buyers picked up for jailing. Since May 2001, not a single new transaction has been effected by the Agency. All the preparations to privatize the Construction and Business Bank, Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, and many other State Owned Enterprises still remain frozen. The head office of the Agency still serves as the operating base for the army of auditors, inspectors and so called experts mobilized by the PMO in order to search for crimes against the detainees. Privatization has almost been forgotten, and only the gods know, what it shall take to revive it, or whether it shall ever be revived, again. 6.4 The above mentioned direct results of the campaign have several knock down effects, in almost all directions. Our political system and its leaders have been seriously discredited. The powers and responsibilities vested on the executive branch of government have been abused with impunity. The entire justice system has been corrupted and jeopardized. Our National Assemblies have been tarnished and the members fooled. The allegiance and integrity of our security forces have been severely tested. Our social fabric values and references have been tampered with. And finally, our collective hopes and aspirations to build a prosperous and democratic Ethiopia have been shattered. 6.4.1 The EPRDF has never been the favorite of the urbane and particularly the Ethiopian elite. However, no matter how much any body doubted its intentions or hated its leaders, there were certain virtues that seemingly permeated the system as well as its leadership. One such virtue was truthfulness. Many people used to believe very much of what it said. This trust and belief in what the party and its leaders did or said was one critical factor in the capability of the party to mobilize public support against aggression as well as for peace and development. But, during the last 12 months, it has completely depleted whatever trust or confidence it had accumulated during the previous 10 years. Its leaders have repeatedly lied in public and on record. Almost every body, both in and outside the party now sincerely believes that all the discourse on Bonapartism, corruption, democracy, etc. was deliberate lie and cover up. And many more people believe to have been cheated in supporting the so-called "renewal" and particularly the "anti-corruption campaign." 6.4.2 This campaign has also exposed the extent to which the executives can stretch their powers to serve their own narrow concern and purposes. Proclamations were pushed down the throat of the legislative, court rulings were fragrantly disobeyed. Laws and procedures were either bent or crushed to suit the requirement of the day. And all these abuses of power and authority were made in the name of fighting corruption and abuse of authority, in the name of ensuring the rule of law and the prevalence of democracy. By the same token our hopes and aspirations of creating a balanced and accountable government have been seriously undermined. 6.4.3 Judges have been fired, suspended or reprimanded for being disobedient or unco-operative to the demands and orders of politicians. The constitution has effectively been suspended in order to create room for this campaign. Laws that were declared fascist and hence incongruent with the current setup, were suddenly resuscitated and put in full force. New proclamations were hastily enacted to cope up with the particular needs of a particular group. In the meantime, the whole system of law and justice has been reduced to a mere extension or rubber stamp of the executive. 6.4.4 The national assembly was fooled to "discuss" an already approved and printed amendment to a 15 day old proclamation. The Federal Supreme Court shied away from deciding on the constitutionality of this infamous amendment. Despite the confirmation of the unconstitutionality of the amendment by its own standing committee, the House of the Federal Assembly, has been deliberately prohibited from discussing the issue. It was actually hastily disbanded when it was about to deliberate on the report of the committee, during its mid-year session. Its end of year session might probably be skipped. Three of our most important institutions were serially corrupted and made worthless. 6.4.5 The lies and distortions disseminated by and from the highest office of government, the deliberate attempt by the government through its public prosecutors to establish false crimes, coupled with the relentless efforts made to recruit false witnesses have shattered our confidence and trust in whatever is "public". But more importantly, it has already begun to erode or eat into our social fabric and trust. 6.4.6 One important achievement we made during the last decade was what we had attained in the areas of economic recovery and private sector confidence. Starting with the Economic Recovery and Rehabilitation Programs (ERRP) of the early 90's, we had progressed remarkably up to the era of sustained growth and expansion in the late 90's. This progress had required the efforts and commitments of many people. Substantial resources, both material and financial, went into the attainment of these encouraging results. We had almost started to win the confidence and trust of many foreign investors. Several Ethiopians in the diaspora had began to look homewards. Quite encouraging signs had started showing up with regards to creating a sizable domestic entrepreneur class. Alas! All this has been devastated in one year's time. Forget about new or foreign investors, domestic investment and investors have been terrorized. Some of them have already fled the country, many others are on their way out. The economy is in a shock, we seem to be retracting to where we were 11 years ago. Thanks to the international community, the EU, the IMF and the World Bank, we were once given a life-line, to swim and get out of the mess we inherited. Eleven years later, we seem to be bent at recreating the mess in a much deeper and wider scale; but only the gods know if we will ever have a second life line. 6.5 These are some of the results or consequences that I could associate with the anti-corruption campaign. Direct or indirect, they are of course results, but can we really call them achievements? According to any English language dictionary the word "achievement" is related with intended, desirable and positive accomplishments through effort. Our government, our people, the sponsors of this campaign (the BWI) or every one of us, might obviously have contributed a lot into the effort, in the form of money, time, leadership, or other resources. But the above mentioned results could never have been our desired achievements. A government, worthy of the name cannot plan to destroy itself, to discredit itself, to demolish everything that it had built over years. We all must have had good intentions, such as increased trust and confidence between the governors and the governed, increased sense of ownership, transparency, accountability and above all, the rule of law. But the results we got, do not unfortunately reflect back positively. Ok then! How and why did we end up here? What can be done to get out of here? And by whom? 6.5.1 This campaign was led by people or by a party that had a relatively good record at leading and managing successful campaigns. One can mention that the EPRDF had led a series of glorious military campaigns by our people both before and after becoming a government. The efforts made to revitalize and rehabilitate the economy during the previous 10 years of the EPRDF's rule can be said to have been remarkably successful. Knowing all these, many in the 'silent majority' found no reason to question the authenticity of the "campaign" or the capacity of the EPRDF led government to lead such a campaign, and hence the initial trust, (earned or not earned as the view may be). It has become plainly obvious now that this trust has been clearly and totally betrayed. 6.5.2 If there had been agreement on means and ends right at the start of the campaign, if those that had the means to influence such widely impacting decisions had asked harder and faster questions about the depth and width of the problem, and hence the very need of the campaign, a lot of services would have done to our institutions and to Ethiopia/Ethiopians. Many in the ruling clique failed to ask these critical questions before jumping onto the band-wagon, and thus they (and we) have been driven to where we are now. 6.5.3 The only way out of this mess is to start to ask these critical questions and try hard in order to get convincing answers for all of them. The questions we raise may vary according to identity, role and capacity, but in any case we have to raise them. Answering these questions or obliging others to answer them shall logically lead us to the way out, even if that way involves undoing some things and unwinding others. 7. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS 7.1 A special train kicked off Arat Kilo, on May 2001. It contained some selected passengers, whose selection criteria seem to be not clear but not necessarily the same. The train had no destination or purpose. It was just let to roam around the rail, remotely controlled from the PMO (Arat Kilo). It did indeed roam for a year. 7.2 The attempt to find a cause or purpose for this expensive trip seems to have evidently failed. Those of us who clappingly saw off the train, without asking about its purpose and destination, seem to have become suspicious of foul or vile. Those who paid for the fuel have also begun raising eyebrows. Above all the nation has got only one rail line and it has been occupied by the purposeless train for too long now, and is also showing signs of fatigue. 7.3 After a full year of roaming and wandering, the train is now headed back to the starting point-the PMO. It is about to crash. The controllers at the PMO have choices. 7.3.1 They can just let it crash into the building they are occupying, thereby perishing with it. They can as well leave or vacate the building and let the train crash into the empty building. The third choice will be to stop the train before it crashes, unload the passengers and retract the train out of the rail. 7.3.2 The first two choices are destructive, in that they entail loss of people and assets. The nation cannot just afford such a waste. We are, therefore, left with one choice-the third one. 7.4 Let every one of us think of what we can do, in order to make this choice realizable. And of course much will depend on what the drivers or controllers at the PMO and the Sponsors at the BWI choose to do or agree to do or not to do, but still I have a couple of suggestions: 7.4.1 Stop the campaign and undo some of the perilous doings of the last year, say the annulment of the amendment to the anti-corruption law and the reversal of restraining order on assets. A couple of additional measures to rebuild public confidence and trust will also help. 7.4.2 Initiate an objective study on the extent of the problem of corruption in this country. And the outcome shall lead into the design of the appropriate institutions and modalities for combating it. 7.4.3 And subsequently, let the courts freely decide on the cases at hand; while the defendants shall also be free to defend them.