By Abdul Hamid Ahmad, Editor-in-Chief | 08-07-2003

The highway to Washington passes through Tel Aviv. This has become a slogan for many governments, especially in the Third World and Islamic and Arab worlds. Chanting this slogan, many countries have been able to reach the heart of Washington, a capital that has bestowed upon them financial, military, economic and political support.

Examples in the Arab world include Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and Qatar. In the Third World there is India, Eritrea and the Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union.

Recently, Pakistan decided to journey along this highway. In what has been interpreted by observers as a pragmatic move, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf gave what seemed like a promise that he would recognise Israel and consider establishing diplomatic relations with it.

This perceived pledge, made before his trip to Washington, represents a turning point in the history of Pakistan not only because it is the second biggest Islamic nation in the world, but because of its distinctive historical and strategic relationship with Arab countries, especially Gulf states that frown upon their allies' ties with Israel.

However, this policy being adopted by the Pakistani leadership is, in many ways, different to the position held by India, a state that has strong relations with the Arab world, but is not obliged to them because it is a non-Muslim state. This allows India a margin of freedom to operate, especially since it has a democratic system of government.

Moreover, since the non-aligned movement has faded, it has helped India to draw up its foreign policies without external influence of its allies.

Though India has established ties with Israel and is keen to develop them further, it has continued to maintain strong relations with the Arab world. India strongly supports the rights of Palestinians, including their right to self-determination and establishment of an independent state.

India tried to strike a balance in its relations with Israel and Palestinians. However, if these relations tilted in favour of Israel, it was after the Oslo accords. India wanted to enhance its relations to benefit from military, economic and technological cooperation with Israel.

In Pakistan's case the issue is different. This is because of opposition in the country, especially from Islamic political factions and its Muslim citizens who reject Israel in principle. They may prove to be an obstacle in Musharraf's journey along that highway even if the rewards are Washington's blessings and the aid it so desperately needs.

This scenario takes us back in time to what happened in Egypt when the government established full diplomatic relations with Israel, but the man on the street was against it. Until today, Egypt's relations have not blossomed beyond the diplomatic level to reach the economic, educational, cultural and tourism spheres.

In Pakistan's case, Musharraf found himself in desperate need to establish some sort of balance with India, which has strong relations with Washington. Musharraf wants to ease pressure on his country, especially over the issue of nuclear weapons and Kashmir.

In this respect, he won't find a better supporter than America to guarantee that the U.S. won't tilt towards India. He aims to thwart Indo-American ties from getting stronger and appear as a strategic ally to Washington.

Despite Pakistan's alliance with Washington, which was strengthened by Musharraf's support for the war on terrorism, the substantial facilities he provided to the U.S. against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the massive operation against what the Americans perceived as terrorist organisations in Pakistan, these "services" were not enough for America to consider Pakistan a strategic ally.

Pakistan has not received any material gain from America after the war in Afghanistan. Nor has it been supported over its nuclear weapons issue or on Kashmir. It also means the highway to Washington is not through providing services no matter how vital they are.

The duration of the journey to Washington can take years or just a few days - it depends on whether Tel Aviv is ignored or not. If it is, the road is long and difficult.

For example, for Syria and Iran, the highway to Washington has not come to an end because their route doesn't take them through Israel.

However, for Musharraf, inclined to establish relations with Israel, the journey might be quicker. Many countries have taken that path before and quickly found themselves in the warm arms of America.

Nobody can blame Pakistan, its president or the government for passing through Tel Aviv on the road to Washington.

And this is merely because Palestinians seek normal ties with Israel. No one can be more Palestinian than the Palestinians, and this is what Musharraf is saying to justify his recent move.

Actually Arab states do not seem bothered with Musharraf's comments outlining his new stand, reiterated in every European capital he has visited. This is simply because some Arabs have already normalised relations with Israel, while others are now in the waiting lounge to undertake a similar journey.

So, why should Arabs be surprised by what Musharraf is saying or doing if he perceives it is in his country's interest?

What is sad, however, for us Arabs is to witness the end of the age of morals and principles, and the introduction of the era of slogans that signal the death of great ideas of freedom.
These noble principles are being replaced by the agenda of self-interest.

We believe that our countries' interests should be our top priority. We want our countries and peoples to live in peace and with dignity.

But what is sad is that this won't be realised unless we journey along that highway passing through Tel Aviv. And why should we travel through that path to guarantee our countries' interests?

Does anybody care to answer?